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This Article examines the recent history and implementation of one of
the central provisions in U.S. banking law, section 23A of the Federal
Reserve Act. Enacted in 1933 in response to one of the perceived causes
of the Great Depression, section 23A imposes quantitative limitations
on certain extensions of credit and other transactions between a bank
and its affiliates that expose a bank to an affiliate's credit or investment
risk, prohibits banks from purchasing low-quality assets from their
nonbank affiliates, and imposes strict collateral requirements with
respect to extensions of credit to affiliates. The key purpose of these
restrictions is twofold: to protect federally insured depository
institutions from excessive credit exposure to their affiliates, and to
prevent transfer of federal subsidy to nondepository financial
institutions. After the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of
1999, which removed the Glass-Steagall era prohibition on affiliation
between commercial banks and investment banks, section 23A
effectively became the principal statutory safeguard preventing the
depository system from subsidizing potentially risky activities of
nonbanking institutions. However, despite its officially endorsed
significance, section 23A remains a largely obscure statute that has not
attracted much scholarly attention to date.
This Article seeks to fill that important gap and to explore how effective
section 23A is in achieving its purported goals in practice. It examines
the body of interpretive letters issued by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (the "Board") between 1996 and 2010, in
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which the Board granted individual banking institutions' requests to
exempt their proposed transactions with affiliates from the
requirements of section 23A. This Article argues that section 23A falls
short of delivering the kind of robust protection for the depository
system it allegedly promises, primarily because it was not designed for
fulfilling such a grand task. This mismatch between its professed
function and practical efficacy became particularly clear during the
global financial crisis of 2007-2009. The Article puts together a
comprehensive record showing how the Board's use of exemptive
authority effectively rendered section 23A irrelevant during the crisis,
by allowing commercial banks to provide financing to their affiliated
securities firms, derivatives dealers, money market funds, and even
automotive companies, in order to prevent potentially disastrous effects
of their failure on the financial system and the broader economy. Crisis
containment and systemic risk considerations consistently prevailed
over the statutory purpose of preventing the leakage of the federal
subsidy outside the depository system. This Article further argues that
the recent amendments to section 23A under the Dodd-Frank Act of
2010 fail to address this fundamental tension in the operation of the
statute. The Article concludes with a discussion of potential
implications of this argument for future financial regulatory reform.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent financial crisis forcefully underscored the continuing
importance of protecting the safety and soundness of the U.S.
banking system, which is increasingly intertwined with, and
vulnerable to risks generated in, the rest of the global financial
services industry. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the "Dodd-Frank Act"),' the most
far-reaching financial reform legislation since the New Deal,2 seeks to
address this problem, among other things, by creating new statutory
firewalls separating deposit-taking institutions from other market
players and activities deemed to be particularly risky. Thus, the
famous Volcker Rule generally prohibits banking organizations from
conducting proprietary trading or investing in private equity and
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.A. (West Supp.
2011)).
2. See, e.g., Viral Acharya et al., A Critical Assessment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, N.Y. UNIV.: LEONARD N. STERN SCH. OF Bus.
(Oct. 20, 2010, 4:18 PM), http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/blogs/regulatingwallstreet/2010/10/a-
critical-assessment-of-the-d.html ("This is widely described as the most ambitious and far-
reaching overhaul of financial regulation in the US since the 1930s.").
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hedge funds above a certain level.' Another provision of the Act
seeks to establish a firewall between commercial banking and
derivatives' trading by prohibiting banks from conducting certain
derivatives activities, which must be moved to their nonbank
affiliates.' It remains to be seen whether or not these new rules will
make the federally insured banking system safer in practice. To a
great extent, their future success depends on effective functioning of
another, much older and less widely acclaimed, statutory firewall:
section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, which imposes limitations on
transactions between banks and their affiliates.6 A closer look at the
recent history and implementation of this important statute helps to
shed light on the potential future impact of the Volcker Rule and
similar provisions of the new legislation.' More generally, it provides
a valuable insight into the practical operation and efficacy of legal
mechanisms designed to keep U.S. commercial banks safely insulated
from their riskier counterparts.
Enacted in 1933 as part of the regulatory reform in response to
the Great Depression, section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act
restricts the ability of U.S. commercial banks to provide funding to
their nonbank affiliates above a certain quantitative limit and imposes
certain collateral and other qualitative requirements with respect to
such transactions. The main purposes of section 23A are (1)
protecting federally insured depository institutions from excessive
credit exposure to their riskier affiliates, and (2) preventing transfer
of federal subsidy (access to federal deposit insurance and liquidity
backup facilities) to nondepository financial institutions.' Prior to the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Board of Governors of the
3. § 619, 124 Stat. at 1620-31 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1851 (West Supp. 2011)).
The Volcker Rule was named after Paul Volcker, a former chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the "Board"), whose ideas formed the basis for
these provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.
4. Derivatives are financial instruments whose value is "derived" from the value of
another asset, referred to as the underlying or reference asset. R. STAFFORD JOHNSON,
INTRODUCrION TO DERIVATIVES: OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND SWAPS 1-10 (2009).
5. § 716,124 Stat. at 1648-51 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 8305 (West Supp. 2011)).
6. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2006) (amended 2010). The Dodd-Frank Act amended section
23A to reinforce these limitations. § 608(a), 124 Stat. at 1608-10 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 371c(c)(1) (West Supp. 2011)).
7. In fact, Wall Street attorneys informally refer to certain requirements of the
Volcker Rule as "Super 23A" provisions. See infra notes 351-52 and accompanying text.
8. See Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 67 Fed. Reg.
76,560, 76,560 (Dec. 12, 2002). In addition, section 23A seeks to promote competition and
prevent banks from favoring their affiliates in allocating credit. See RICHARD SCOTT
CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 427 (4th ed.
2009).
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Federal Reserve System (the "Board") had the exclusive statutory
authority to grant, by regulation or order, exemptions from the
quantitative and qualitative limitations of section 23A, if such
exemptions were in the public interest and consistent with the
purposes of the statute.'
After the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
(the "GLB Act"),"o which removed the Glass-Steagall era prohibition
on affiliation between commercial banks and investment banks,n
section 23A effectively became the principal statutory firewall
protecting the depository system from subsidizing potentially risky
activities of nondepository financial institutions and, in a broader
sense, safeguarding the foundational U.S. principle of separation of
banking and commerce. 12 However, despite being referred to as the
"Magna Carta" of U.S. banking law,13 section 23A remains a largely
obscure, and often not very well understood, statute. Even in the
midst of an intense debate on financial regulation reform, neither
legal academics nor policy experts have been paying much attention
to this particular area of banking law.
This Article fills that gap in the debate and explores how
effective section 23A is in achieving its purported goals in practice.
The focus of this inquiry is on the use of the Board's exemptive power
as a crucial indicator of the efficacy and resiliency of the statutory
firewall.14 This Article examines the body of the Board's published
interpretive letters, issued between 1996 and 2010, granting individual
9. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(f)(2) (2006) (amended 2010). The Dodd-Frank Act amended
section 23A to split the exemptive authority among several federal bank regulators, thus
ending the Board's exclusive power to do so. See infra notes 362-69 and accompanying
text.
10. Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
11. Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), repealed in part by Financial Services
Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338.
12. See, e.g., LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 68 (2011) (describing the historical persistence of the
fundamental separation between banking and commerce in the United States).
13. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, THE UNIQUE TREATMENT OF GMAC UNDER THE
TARP 24 (2010) [hereinafter COP REPORT], available at http://cop.senate.gov/
reports/library/report-031110-cop.cfm (citing an interview with an expert analyst).
14. Section 23A operates in tandem with section 23B, which generally requires that
banks transact with their affiliates on an arms-length basis. See 12. U.S.C. § 371c-1 (2006)
(amended 2010); see also infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (describing the
requirements of section 23B). However, this Article focuses on the implementation of
section 23A as the key statute governing banks' transactions with affiliates.
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banking institutions' requests to exempt their proposed transactions
with affiliates from the requirements of section 23A.5
As usually is the case with federal bank regulatory agencies,
presenting a complete picture of how the Board implements section
23A is an extremely challenging task. U.S. bank regulators have a
great deal of discretion in interpreting and applying the statutes they
administer and often make important decisions through informal
action, such as individual orders and interpretive issuances. Most of
these decisions are made outside of public view, in highly confidential
communications between agency officials and representatives of the
banking institution in question. Bank regulators typically do not
publish any negative determinations in specific cases.16 Moreover,
even published regulatory interpretations and orders are often highly
sanitized and devoid of specific details negotiated behind the scene.
The Board's interpretations of section 23A exhibit all of these
characteristics that make a researcher's task very difficult.
Nevertheless, even acknowledging these blind spots and potential for
incomplete assessment, an analysis of the Board's published decisions
exempting individual transactions from the requirements of section
23A reveals certain key trends and fundamental tensions in the
practical operation of this important statute.17
This Article argues that, contrary to common belief, section 23A
is not only ineffective, as a matter of practice, but inherently ill-suited,
15. These interpretive letters are publicly available on the Board's official website.
See Legal Interpretations, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/ (last updated Mar. 18, 2011). There are
other unpublished interpretive letters issued prior to January 1996, some of which are
available through the Federal Reserve Bulletin and Regulatory Service. In some cases,
exemptions from the requirements of section 23A were included in the Board orders
issued under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 ("BHC Act"). However, based on a
review of a large sample of these publicly available materials, there is no reason to believe
that including these additional documents in the universe of decisions examined here
would add anything substantively new or otherwise alter the argument. Therefore, this
Article focuses on the Board's interpretive letters dealing specifically with section 23A and
published on the Board's website. These letters provide a sufficiently rich source of
information on the evolution of the Board's use of exemptive authority under section 23A.
16. As a matter of practice, if an institution receives an informal indication of the
agency's reluctance to approve a proposed transaction, it does not proceed with a formal
request.
17. It is important to note that the main purpose of this Article is not to provide a
comprehensive ethnographic account of the Board's inner workings. Even if the real
reasons behind the Board's individual decisions may not be fully known or disclosed, once
these interpretations are published, they take on a life of their own and their publicly
stated reasoning becomes regulatory precedent that shapes subsequent decisions. This
Article focuses on that "public" life of the statute.
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as a matter of principle, to perform the monumental task of keeping
the depository system safe from externally generated risks. At the
time of its enactment in 1933, the statute's approach was based on the
key premise that, as a result of the Glass-Steagall Act prohibitions,
none of banks' nonbank affiliates would engage in securities dealing
or other financial activities viewed at the time as unacceptably risky
for federally insured commercial banks."s In that context, section 23A
was expected to provide an extra bit of protection for banks in
transacting with affiliates that were already limited to conducting less
risky financial activities. A partial repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999
suddenly propelled section 23A to new prominence as the
"successor" to its mission of preserving the integrity of the federally
insured depository system. Proponents of the GLB Act successfully
used the very existence of section 23A to justify the repeal of the old
regime.19 Ironically, this unexpected ascent took place just as the
fundamental premise on which section 23A rested ceased to exist and
U.S. banks were allowed to affiliate with investment banks and other
nondepository institutions within large diversified financial
conglomerates.
The passage of the GLB Act heightened the importance of
protecting the U.S. depository system from potential abuse by
nonbank affiliates and, at the same time, created a whole new
universe of opportunities for such abuse. However, the Board's
pattern of granting exemptions under section 23A during that period
generally shows that it did not fully appreciate the fundamental
nature of these changes. Applying a narrow microprudential
approach to exempting individual transactions from the statutory
limits, the Board consistently failed to take into account potential
systemic implications of such transactions. Partly, this may be a result
of the regulator's inability to adjust its implementation and
enforcement practices to the more complex post-GLB Act
environment. Partly, however, the Board's myopia was a product of,
and consistent with, the statute's own narrow and inherently entity-
centric focus. As the U.S. financial sector was undergoing a
fundamental transformation, section 23A remained a largely obscure
and deceptively calm area of banking law, seemingly oblivious to the
18. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
19. See Veryl Victoria Miles, Banking Affiliate Regulation Under Section 23A of the
Federal Reserve Act, 105 BANKING L. 476, 478 (1988) ("Although absent from recent
banking law discussions, section 23A has been the focus of recent proposals by Congress
and banking regulators to repeal the Glass-Steagall restrictions in order to permit banks to
engage in full-fledged securities activities through securities affiliates.").
2011] 1689
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dangerous growth of the so-called "shadow banking system" it
indirectly helped to fuel.20
The implosion of the shadow banking system in 2007
unexpectedly brought section 23A to the forefront of the Board's
interpretive activity. Shifting into full wartime mode, the Board
aggressively used its exemptive authority under section 23A as an
integral part of its response to the unfolding financial crisis. This
Article argues that, during the crisis, the Board effectively rendered
section 23A irrelevant by repeatedly allowing depository institutions
to provide financing to their affiliated securities firms, derivatives
dealers, money market funds, and even automotive companies, in
order to prevent potentially disastrous effects of their failure on the
financial system and the broader economy. Crisis containment and
systemic risk considerations consistently prevailed over the statutory
purpose of preventing the leakage of the federal subsidy outside the
depository system. In effect, the Board dismantled the entire section
23A regime in order to make an emergency transfusion of the federal
subsidy into the shadow banking system and beyond.
This Article presents a comprehensive account of the Board's
use of exemptions from the requirements of section 23A both as a
contributing factor to the recent financial crisis and as a crucial
element of the Board's crisis response. By putting together the first
such systematic record, this Article shows how the superficial
transformation of section 23A from a relatively modest statutory
provision into a core legal device presumably protecting the
fundamental principles of U.S. bank regulation created a false sense
of security with respect to systemic risk containment. Section 23A
may still be effective as a method of limiting individual banks' direct
exposure to affiliates' credit risk, at least in certain circumstances. If
properly enforced, it may even potentially curb the excessive growth
of shadow banking and bank-centered financial conglomerates.
However, section 23A is not well-suited to serve as the principal
guarantee of the safety and soundness of the depository system in
today's increasingly complex and dynamic financial marketplace. As
the recent crisis demonstrated, safety and soundness of the banking
sector is intimately tied to the stability of the broader financial
system. Yet, section 23A is not directly aimed at systemic risk
20. For a discussion on the growth of the shadow banking system, see generally
ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS:
SHADOW BANKING (2010), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff-reports/
sr458.pdf.
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prevention. This conspicuous lack of a macroprudential, systemic
focus undermines the statute's ability to fulfill its presumed function
as the main firewall keeping banks "safe."
This Article further argues that the recent amendments to
section 23A under the Dodd-Frank Act fail to address these
fundamental tensions in the operation of the statute. If the key
statutory firewall, ostensibly designed to protect banks' safety and
soundness by separating them from affiliated nonbank entities,
inevitably disappears in times of financial stress, tightening individual
requirements of the statute is not likely to make that wall strong
enough to withstand the next crisis. And if we admit and accept the
fact that the need to contain systemic crisis will always legitimately
supersede the statutory limits on bank affiliate transactions, whose
operation would thus be limited only to noncritical times, it would
create serious moral hazard issues and potentially undermine the
functioning of the entire bank regulation regime.
The real dilemma, therefore, is much deeper than Dodd-Frank
assumes and goes to the very heart of our existing system of financial
regulation. If section 23A does not deliver the kind of protection for
the depository system it supposedly promises, we have to stop
depending on it as the principal source of such protection. We need to
reassess the fundamental policy goals underlying the statute and to
reevaluate whether or not, in today's financial markets, it is prudent
or efficient to continue relying on intra-company firewalls to protect
depository institutions from affiliate risk. These substantive policy
decisions should guide our search for new methods of implementing
and enforcing desired protections. While this Article does not
endeavor to tackle these issues, facing the reality of what section 23A
is, and what it is not, is a necessary step on the path toward designing
a more effective system of financial regulation.
This Article is structured as follows. Part I provides a brief
overview of the history and key provisions of section 23A before the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. Part II examines the Board's
interpretations granting exemptions from the requirements of section
23A in the period preceding the recent financial crisis. Part III
provides a detailed analysis of the Board's unprecedented and
aggressive use of its exemptive authority under section 23A during
the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Part IV offers a critique of the Dodd-
Frank Act's amendments to section 23A and discusses potential
policy implications of the preceding analysis for future financial
regulatory reform.
2011] 1691
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I. REGULATION OF BANKS' TRANSACTIONS WITH AFFILIATES:
OVERVIEW
This Part briefly describes the requirements and evolution of
section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act prior to the adoption of the
Dodd-Frank Act. It shows how a relatively modest provision of the
U.S. banking law, intended originally to work in tandem with the
broader prohibitions on banks affiliating with securities firms, was
elevated to great prominence after the GLB Act repealed such
prohibitions in 1999. Under the new regime allowing the growth of
large, diversified financial conglomerates, section 23A became the
principal statutory mechanism shielding the U.S. depository system
from risks associated with such conglomeration. However, despite the
major update of section 23A in the Board's Regulation W, the
fundamental structure and focus of the statute remained largely
unchanged, which affected its ability to meet that challenge.
A. Key Provisions and Purposes of Section 23A
Congress enacted section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act in
1933, in response to one of the perceived causes of the banking crisis
of the early 1930s: preferential loans banks made to their affiliates.21
In essence, section 23A seeks to restrict transfers of assets between
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System, or member
banks,22 and their "affiliates."23 It imposes quantitative limitations on
certain "covered transactions" between the bank and its affiliates,
based on the amount of the bank's capital and surplus.24 Under
21. See S. REP. No. 72-584, at 9 (1932).
22. Although provisions of section 23A apply technically only to member banks, 12
U.S.C. § 1828(j) extends their application to transactions between insured state
nonmember banks and their affiliates. Thus, all federally insured deposit-taking
institutions are currently subject to restrictions and limitations of section 23A of the
Federal Reserve Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(j) (2006) (amended 2010); see also infra note 32
(describing applicability of section 23B to nonmember banks' transactions with affiliates).
23. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a) (2006) (amended 2010). Under section 23A, a bank's
"affiliates" generally include any entity that controls the bank, any entity under common
control with the bank, and certain investment funds for which the bank or any of its
affiliates act as an adviser. § 371c(b)(1).
24. § 371c(a)(1). The limitations are ten percent of the bank's capital stock and
surplus, in the case of transactions with any one affiliate, and twenty percent of the bank's
capital stock and surplus, in the case of transactions with all affiliates. Id. Regulation W
defines "capital stock and surplus" as the sum of (1) "a member bank's tier 1 and tier 2
capital under the risk-based capital guidelines of the appropriate Federal banking agency,"
based on the bank's most recent Report of Condition and Income; (2) "the balance of a
member bank's allowance for loan and lease losses not included in its tier 2 capital under
the risk-based capital guidelines of the appropriate Federal banking agency," also based
on the bank's most recent Report of Condition and Income; and (3) "the amount of any
1692 [Vol. 89
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section 23A, "covered transactions" generally include loans and other
extensions of credit' to an affiliate, investments in the securities of an
affiliate, purchases of assets from an affiliate, issuances of guarantees
on behalf of an affiliate, and other transactions exposing a bank to an
affiliate's credit or investment risk.26 In addition to imposing
quantitative limitations, section 23A requires that all covered
transactions be on terms and conditions that are consistent with safe
and sound banking practices27 and prohibits banks from purchasing
certain "low-quality" assets28 from their nonbank affiliates. 29 Finally,
the statute requires that all extensions of credit by the banks to their
affiliates be secured by a statutorily mandated amount of collateral. 0
A companion section 23B,3 1 which was added to the Federal
Reserve Act in 1987, requires, among other things, that transactions
between member banks3 2 and their affiliates be on market terms.33
Section 23B applies to a much broader range of financial transactions.
investment by a member bank in a financial subsidiary that counts as a covered transaction
and is required to be deducted from the member bank's capital for regulatory capital
purposes." 12 C.F.R. § 223.3(d) (2010).
25. The statute does not define what constitutes "a loan or extension of credit." See
§ 371c(b). Regulation W defines "extension of credit" as "the making or renewal of a loan,
the granting of a line of credit, or the extending of credit in any manner whatsoever,
including on an intraday basis, to an affiliate." 12 C.F.R. § 223.3(o).
26. See § 371c(b)(7).
27. See § 371c(a)(3).
28. For a statutory definition of the term "low-quality asset," see § 371c(b)(10). In
essence, this term refers primarily to various types of troubled loans. Id.
29. See § 371c(a)(3). The statute provides an exception for this prohibition where the
bank, pursuant to an independent credit evaluation, committed to purchase the asset in
question before it was acquired by the affiliate. Id.
30. See § 371c(c). The amount of collateral required under section 23A varies
depending on the type of securities or other assets used to collateralize an affiliate's
obligation. For example, if the collateral consists of U.S. government obligations, its value
must be equal to 100% of the value of the extension of credit. However, if collateral
consists of corporate stock or real or personal property, it must have a value equal to
130% of the value of the extension of credit. § 371c(c)(1).
31. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1 (2006) (amended 2010).
32. Section 1828(j) makes section 23B applicable to transactions between insured
nonmember banks and their affiliates. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(j) (2006) (amended 2010).
33. § 371c-1(a)(1). The "market terms" requirement means that each covered
transaction must be conducted on terms and under circumstances, "including credit
standards, that are substantially the same, or at least as favorable to such bank or its
subsidiary, as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with or involving
other nonaffiliated companies." Id. In the absence of comparable transactions, the
transaction must be conducted on terms and under circumstances "that in good faith
would be offered to, or would apply to, nonaffiliated companies." Id.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
It applies to all covered transactions within the meaning of section
23A and to many transactions that do not fall into that category.-
Both section 23A and section 23B contain an "attribution rule"
whereby a transaction with any person is considered a transaction
with an affiliate to the extent that the proceeds of the transaction are
used for the benefit of, or transferred to, the affiliate.35 Thus, under
the attribution rule, if the bank lends money to an unaffiliated
company, which then uses the borrowed money to purchase securities
from the broker-dealer firm affiliated with the bank, the original loan
transaction would be subject to the qualitative and quantitative
limitations of sections 23A and 23B, as if the bank extended credit
directly to the broker-dealer affiliate. The attribution rule aims to
prevent depository institutions from indirectly subsidizing or
supporting their affiliates' business by, among other things, financing
their customers and counterparties.36
The twofold purpose of the quantitative and qualitative
restrictions on transactions between banks and their nonbank
affiliates under section 23A is to protect the safety and soundness of
commercial banks and to prevent them from subsidizing affiliates'
risky business activities with the protection afforded by federal
deposit insurance.37 As originally enacted in 1933, section 23A sought
to ensure "the safer use of the assets of banks, to regulate interbank
control [and] to prevent the undue diversion of funds into speculative
operations."" At the time, the prevailing sentiment was that the main
underlying cause of the Great Depression was the unlimited
participation of commercial banks in securities underwriting and
investment activities and using unregulated affiliates to assume
speculative risks and generate profits at the expense of depositors.39
34. See § 371c-1(a)(2). Examples of such additional types of transactions governed by
section 23B include the sale of securities or other assets by a bank to an affiliate, payment
of money or furnishing of services by a bank to an affiliate, transactions in which an
affiliate acts as an agent or broker for a bank (or for any other person if the bank is a
participant in the transaction), and any transaction by a bank with a third party if an
affiliate has a financial interest in the third party or if an affiliate is a participant in the
transaction. Id.
35. See § 371c(a)(2); § 371c-1(a)(3).
36. Under the so-called "sister-bank exemption," covered transactions between
affiliated depository institutions are exempt from the quantitative and collateral
requirements of section 23A if the same company controls eighty percent or more of the
voting securities of each institution. 12 C.F.R. § 223.41(b) (2010).
37. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
38. H.R. REP. No. 73-150, at 1 (1933).
39. See generally GEORGE J. BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND
INVESTMENT BANKING: THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED
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Although the growth of banks' affiliates was considered one of the
evils behind the crisis,' a total prohibition on affiliation did not
appear feasible at the time.41 Instead, Congress enacted section 23A,
designed to prevent banks from engaging in excessively risky lending
activities with their affiliates.4 2 Importantly, however, section 23A was
adopted as part of the same legislative reform that included the
Glass-Steagall Act, which addressed the broader issue of systemic risk
prevention, as it was understood at the time, by severely restricting
the range of financial activities permissible for bank affiliates. 43
B. Recent History of Section 23A
Since 1933, Congress has amended section 23A several times,
gradually expanding and refining its scope and applicability, so that,
by the 1990s, all insured depository institutions became subject to
sections 23A and 23B." Yet, for decades, regulation of affiliate
(1990) (examining the key reasoning behind the separation of commercial and investment
banking under the Glass-Steagall Act); Edwin J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and
Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483 (1971) (detailing historical events
that led to the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act).
40. S. REP. No. 73-77, at 10 (1933) ("The greatest of such dangers is seen in the
growth of 'bank affiliates' which devote themselves in many cases to perilous underwriting
operations, stock speculation, and maintaining a market for the banks' own stock often
largely with the resources of the parent bank.").
41. Id. In addition to the difficulty of enforcing such a total prohibition in practice,
Congress faced the fact that state legislation allowed state-chartered banks and trust
companies to affiliate with nonbank entities. In the U.S. dual-banking system, where
banks could choose to be chartered either by the federal government or by individual
states, this raised significant competitive concerns. See id.
42. See Miles, supra note 19, at 480-82.
43. See S. REP. No. 73-77, at 10 (stating that the proposed legislation aimed "[t]o
separate as far as possible national and member banks from affiliates of all kinds" and
"[t]o limit the amount of advances or loans which can be obtained by affiliates from the
parent institutions with which they are connected"). This important statement in the
Senate Committee's report clearly underscored the intimate link between Glass-Steagall's
prohibition on affiliation between commercial banks and securities firms, on the one hand,
and the principle of limiting access to bank funds by any nonbank affiliates, on the other.
44. Congress amended the Federal Deposit Insurance Act in 1966 to apply section
23A to state nonmember banks with federally insured deposits to the same extent as if
they were state member banks. Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 12(c), 80 Stat.
236, 242 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1828(j) (West 2001 & Supp. 2011)). The
statute underwent a comprehensive revision in 1982, with the enactment of the Garn-St
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 410, 96 Stat. 1469, 1515
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c (West 2001 & Supp. 2011)). Among other
things, Congress expanded the definitions of "affiliate" and "covered transactions" to
close certain loopholes in the statute, but also created greater flexibility for banks'
transactions with affiliates that were considered as not posing undue risks to deposit
insurance funds. Id. In 1989, Congress revised the Home Owners' Loan Act to apply
section 23A to insured savings associations, or thrifts. Financial Institutions Reform,
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transactions remained a relatively low-profile area of banking law.
The enactment of the GLB Act45 in 1999 brought these statutory
provisions from near total obscurity to the center stage of U.S.
financial regulation. The GLB Act repealed the Glass-Steagall Act's
prohibition on common ownership of deposit-taking institutions and
firms underwriting and dealing in securities.' Its adoption followed
more than a decade of intense policy debate on the pros and cons of
dismantling the Great Depression era wall between commercial
banks and securities firms.47 The proponents of repealing Glass-
Steagall stressed the importance of sections 23A and 23B as the key
statutory mechanisms perfectly capable of maintaining the necessary
degree of separation between banks and their newly permitted
securities, insurance, merchant banking, and other potentially risky
affiliates.' The winning argument in favor of allowing these
affiliations relied heavily on the assumption that the existing
regulation of affiliate transactions effectively protected depository
institutions from excessive risk exposure and prevented the misuse of
the federal safety net.49
As it removed the sixty-six-year-old prohibition on combining
commercial and investment banking activities within a single holding
company structure, Congress recognized the need to strengthen the
limitations on affiliate transactions. Thus, the GLB Act made covered
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 301, 103 Stat. 183, 342
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A. 1468(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2011). Congress added
section 23B to the statute as part of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub.
L. No. 100-86, §102, 101 Stat. 552, 564 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c-1 (West
2001 & Supp. 2011)), and later expanded its scope to apply to the same broad universe of
depository institutions as section 23A.
45. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
46. Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, ch. 89, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), repealed in part by Financial
Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338. The GLB Act repealed sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act, which
prohibited affiliations and management interlocks between commercial banks and
investment banks.
47. See Joseph Karl Grant, What the Financial Services Industry Puts Together Let No
Person Put Asunder: How the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Contributed to the 2008-2009
American Capital Markets Crisis, 73 ALB. L. REV. 371, 380-81 (2010) (detailing
congressional action from 1987 until the enactment of the GLB Act).
48. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 106-44 (1999), reprinted in 1 WILLIAM H. MANZ,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY Acr 54, 66 (William H. Manz
ed. 2001) (quoting FDIC Chairman Tanoue's 1999 testimony).
49. See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Supervisory Letter,
SR 03-2 Adoption of Regulation W Implementing Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal
Reserve Act (2003) ("A key premise of GLBA was that sections 23A and 23B would limit
the risk to depository institutions from these broader affiliations.").
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transactions between banks and their "financial subsidiaries," with
certain exceptions, subject to the quantitative limits and the collateral
requirements of section 23A.so It also created a rebuttable
presumption that any portfolio company in which the financial
holding company ("FHC")si holds fifteen percent or more of equity
pursuant to its merchant banking5 2 authority is an "affiliate" of any
bank controlled by the FHC.3 In addition, the new law required the
Board to adopt rules under section 23A "to address ... credit
exposure arising out of derivative transactions between member
banks and their affiliates and intraday extensions of credit by member
banks to their affiliates."' It stands to reason that the inclusion of this
requirement reflected the explosive growth of over-the-counter
("OTC") derivatives markets in the preceding decade" and the
realization that the partial repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act would
likely lead to an increase in the volume and value of derivatives
transactions between banks and securities firms affiliated with them.
On October 31, 2002, the Board issued Regulation W, a
comprehensive implementation of sections 23A and 23B of the
50. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(e) (2006) (amended 2010). For a definition of a "financial
subsidiary," see § 371c(e)(1). The GLB Act allowed financial subsidiaries of commercial
banks to conduct financial activities not permissible for banks to conduct directly,
including securities dealing and underwriting. See Transactions Between Member Banks
and Their Affiliates, 67 Fed. Reg. 76,560, 76,562 (Dec. 12, 2002). Accordingly, the GLB
Act amended the definition of "affiliate" for purposes of sections 23A and 23B to include
financial subsidiaries of banks, even though other types of bank subsidiaries do not fall
into that category. See § 371c(e)(2).
51. A "financial holding company" is a new category created by the GLB Act. See 12
U.S.C. § 1841(p) (2006) (amended 2010). An FHC is a "bank holding company" ("BHC"),
that is, an entity that owns or controls a U.S. bank, which satisfies certain statutory
conditions and which is permitted to engage in a broader range of financial activities,
including securities dealing and underwriting, insurance, and merchant banking. See 12
U.S.C. § 1843(k) (2006) (amended 2010).
52. The GLB Act permitted FHCs to make what essentially amounts to passive
private equity investments and investment management activities under the so-called
merchant banking authority. See § 1843(k)(4)(H). The Act allowed collective investment
funds sponsored and advised by an FHC's nonbank subsidiaries to invest in a wide variety
of nonfinancial companies, subject to certain conditions and limitations. Id.
53. See § 371c(b)(11). If an FHC owns or controls more than twenty-five percent of a
class of voting shares of a company under the merchant banking authority, such portfolio
company is an "affiliate" of any bank controlled by the FHC by operation of the statutory
definitions in section 23A. See § 371c(b).
54. § 371c(f)(3)(A).
55. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services
Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REV. 215, 334 n.489 (showing that there was over a ten-fold increase in OTC derivatives
trading from 1989 to 1999).
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Federal Reserve Act.56 Regulation W codified various Board
decisions made in prior years and clarified the new interpretations of
the statute in light of the enactment of the GLB Act." Among other
things, Regulation W provided that private investment funds that are
not registered as publicly traded mutual funds are also included in the
definition of an "affiliate,"s listed examples of what constitutes an
"extension of credit,"5 9 and clarified that a bank need not unwind an
existing transaction if it crosses one of the quantitative limits under
section 23A but is temporarily barred from entering into new covered
transactions.?
Regulation W also provided a complicated web of important and
often overlapping exceptions to, and exemptions from, section 23A
limitations.6 1 Perhaps the most important policy choice the Board
made in Regulation W was a decision not to extend the quantitative
and qualitative limitations of section 23A to derivatives transactions
between banks and their affiliates.62 Instead of including derivatives
56. Regulation W, 12 C.F.R. pt. 223 (2010). Regulation W became effective on April
1,2003.
57. See Stephen Hayden, Note, Developments in Banking Law: 2002: VII. Regulation
W, 22 ANN. REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 108,108 (2003).
58. See 12 C.F.R. § 223.2(a)(6) (2010). Specifically, under Regulation W, private funds
(1) for which a bank or its affiliate acts as an investment adviser, and (2) of which the bank
or its affiliate owns or controls more than five percent of any class of voting shares, are
included in the definition of "affiliate" for the purposes of section 23A. Id.
59. The list includes, inter alia, advances to and overdrafts by an affiliate, the sale of
federal funds to an affiliate, and a lease that is functionally equivalent to an extension of
credit. See 12 C.F.R. § 223.3(o) (2010).
60. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 223.11, 223.12 (2010). The prohibition of additional covered
transactions is lifted once the bank has room under the applicable statutory limits.
Regulation W also allowed a bank that crossed the ten percent limit on covered
transactions with one affiliate to engage in covered transactions with other affiliates. See
Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 67 Fed. Reg. 76,560, 76,572
(Dec. 12, 2002).
61. See 12 C.F.R. § 223.32(a) (2010). For instance, Regulation W exempted covered
transactions between banks and their financial subsidiaries from the ten percent limit on
aggregate transactions between a bank and a single affiliate. Id. Purchases of
"marketable" securities from affiliated broker-dealers were exempted from the
quantitative and collateral requirements of section 23A and Regulation W, but remained
subject to the prohibition on purchases of low-quality assets and safety and soundness
conditions. 12 C.F.R. § 223.42(f) (2010). The Board exempted certain "riskless principal"
securities transactions from the quantitative limitations, collateral requirements, and
prohibition on purchases of low-quality assets. 12 C.F.R. § 223.42(m). These are only a few
examples of the complex hierarchy of exemptions in Regulation W.
62. See Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 67 Fed. Reg. at
76,588. The only exceptions to this approach were credit derivatives in which a bank
protected a nonaffiliated third party from a default on, or a decrease in the value of, the
obligation of a bank's affiliate. In the Board's view, these credit derivatives were
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in the definition of a "covered transaction," the Board required banks
to establish and maintain internal policies and procedures for
managing their exposure to affiliates under derivatives transactions. 63
Regulation W also clarified that all bank-affiliate derivatives
transactions were subject to the market-terms requirement of section
23B.6
The decision not to treat derivatives as "covered transactions"
for the purposes of section 23A, in effect, created a crucial gap in the
functionally equivalent to a guarantee issued by the bank on behalf of an affiliate and thus
fell within the statutory definition of a covered transaction. Id.
63. 12 C.F.R. § 223.33(b) (2010). Historically, the Board refrained from taking a
position on whether or not derivatives transactions between banks and their affiliates were
covered transactions for the purposes of section 23A. However, as noted above, see supra
note 54 and accompanying text, the GLB Act required the Board to adopt a rule that
would address this issue. See Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates,
67 Fed. Reg. at 76,587-88. In May 2001, the Board published the interim final rule that
subjected derivatives transactions between banks and their affiliates to the requirements
of section 23B and required banks to adopt internal policies and procedures dealing with
credit exposure under such bank-affiliate derivatives. The Board also sought public
comment on the desirability of subjecting such derivatives transactions to the quantitative
and qualitative limitations of section 23A. Id. The financial industry actively lobbied
against such an expansive approach and argued strongly in favor of allowing banks to
handle their credit exposure to affiliates under derivatives transactions on an individual
basis. According to industry comments, such an approach would give banks the necessary
flexibility to design an internal risk management system that was best-suited for their
unique derivatives portfolios and risk exposure. Subjecting such bank-affiliate derivatives
to the limitations of section 23A, the argument went, would be unnecessarily burdensome
and would potentially reduce the ability of banking organizations to manage their risk and
maintain their profitability. See, e.g., Letter from James E. Riley, Chair, Holding Co.
Comm., Sec. Indus. Ass'n, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec'y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys. 4 (Aug. 15, 2001), available at http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=1177.
Acknowledging that commentators uniformly argued against including derivatives in the
definition of a "covered transaction," the Board retained its original approach and
explicitly incorporated the interim final rule on derivatives in the final Regulation W.
Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 67 Fed. Reg. at 76,588.
64. 12 C.F.R. § 223.33(a). The Board adopted a similar approach to intraday
extensions of credit by banks to their affiliates. 12 C.F.R. § 223.42(1). Intraday extensions
of credit include daylight overdrafts and other similar extensions of credit by a bank to an
affiliate arising out of "mismatches between the timing of funds sent and received during
the business day," typically in the context of settlement of financial transactions.
Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 67 Fed. Reg. at 76,595-96.
More generally, an intraday extension of credit is any extension of credit that the bank
expects to be repaid by the end of the business day. See 12 C.F.R. § 223.42(l)(2). Although,
unlike derivatives, intraday extensions of credit are "covered transactions," Regulation W
exempted all such transactions from the quantitative and collateral requirements of
section 23A, as long as the bank maintained policies and procedures for managing the
intraday exposure and had no reason to believe that any affiliate receiving intraday credit
would have difficulty repaying it in accordance with its terms. Like derivatives
transactions, all intraday extensions of credit became fully subject to the requirements of
section 23B. See 12 C.F.R. § 223.42(1).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
operation of the statute. Derivative instruments enable the
counterparties to create high levels of hidden leverage and are
frequently used as functional equivalents of credit extensions.
Excluding them from statutory limitations effectively opened up a
nearly unlimited channel for such extensions of credit. The Board
reasoned that derivatives transactions between banks and their
nonbank affiliates were used primarily for risk management and not
for funding purposes.' However, in practice, it is difficult to draw a
clear line and prove that securities firms do not use access to affiliated
depository institutions to finance their speculative derivatives
activities. To the extent intra-group derivatives transactions are
driven by profit maximization, this type of regulatory arbitrage is
virtually certain to happen."
In the preamble to Regulation W, the Board heralded sections
23A and 23B as "important statutory provisions designed to protect
against a depository institution suffering losses in transactions with
affiliates" and to "limit the ability of a depository institution to
transfer to its affiliates the subsidies arising from the institution's
access to the Federal safety net."67 After the GLB Act opened the
way for the formation of giant diversified financial conglomerates,
these sections became the key statutory firewall protecting depository
institutions-and the federal deposit insurance fund-from exposure
to risks associated with their securities, insurance, investment
management, and a variety of unregulated affiliates.'
However, the potential significance of section 23A goes beyond
the traditional area of bank safety and soundness. In practice, the
statutory limitations on bank affiliate transactions may also function
as one of the principal mechanisms of preventing the excessive
growth of nonbank financial institutions taking advantage of their
affiliation with a depository institution. In that respect, section 23A
can potentially serve as an important tool for containing the growth
of the shadow banking system that feeds off of the federal safety net
and access to cheap sources of funding through affiliation with
65. See Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 67 Fed. Reg. at
76,587.
66. As the Board acknowledged in its discussion of Regulation W derivatives
provisions, "Banks and their affiliates often choose to use each other as their derivative
counterparties ... to maximize the profits of and manage risks within the consolidated
financial group." Id.
67. Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 67 Fed. Reg. at 76,560.
68. See Wilmarth, supra note 55, at 456 ("The GLB Act relies on Sections 23A and
23B of the Federal Reserve Act to prevent abusive transactions between banks and their
nonbank affiliates within the new financial holding company structure.").
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depository institutions. Moreover, if properly enforced, the
limitations on bank affiliate transactions may reduce the incentives
for excessive conglomeration in the financial services sector and
potentially impose meaningful checks on the size and complexity of
bank-centered financial groups.69
Whether section 23A lives up to these great expectations and
functions effectively as a strong statutory wall protecting the integrity
of the U.S. banking system depends on its implementation and
enforcement. In other words, the real question is how penetrable the
statutory wall is in practice and how difficult, or easy, it is for financial
institutions to get around it.
Under the statute, the Board has considerable discretion to
interpret its meaning and determine the scope of its application.70 The
statute also gave the Board authority to exempt, at its discretion,
either by regulation or by order, transactions and relationships from
the requirements of section 23A, if such exemptions were in the
public interest and consistent with the statutory purposes.7 The
ability to grant exemptions by order provided a great deal of
flexibility and power to the Board, allowing it to make decisions in
individual cases without going through the formal rulemaking process
that involves publishing proposed rules for public comments.72
Although the Dodd-Frank Act limited this exemptive authority, it did
not eliminate it. 73
How the Board uses its exemptive authority in practice is critical
to assessing the effectiveness of the statute in achieving its stated
purposes. It has been noted that, in recent years, the Board "has
repeatedly waived the application of affiliate transaction rules to
large financial conglomerates during financial crises."7 4 However, to
69. See infra notes 353-58 and accompanying text.
70. For instance, section 23A explicitly authorizes the Board to determine, by
regulation or order, whether any company other than those enumerated in the statute is
an "affiliate" of the bank for the purposes of applying the statutory limitations. See 12
U.S.C. § 371c(b)(1)(E) (2006) (amended 2010).
71. See § 371c(f)(2). By contrast, under section 23B, the Board may grant exemptions
only by regulation. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1(e) (2006) (amended 2010).
72. See Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
73. See infra notes 362-69 and accompanying text.
74. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Subprime Crisis Confirms Wisdom of Separating Banking
and Commerce, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP., May 2008, at 1, 9. Thus, after the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Board reportedly announced a blanket
suspension of the statutory restrictions on affiliate transactions and "urged major banks to
make large transfers of funds to their ... affiliates," in order to prevent a prolonged
liquidity crunch in the markets. Wilmarth, supra note 55, at 472. Of course, this was an
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date, there has been no in-depth analysis of the Board's evolving
approach to making these determinations. A systematic examination
of the Board's decisions reveals some of the fundamental tensions in
the operation of the statute in the context of today's complex and
interconnected financial marketplace.
II. GUARDING THE WALL IN TIMES OF CALM: THE USE OF
EXEMPTIONS FROM SECTION 23A BEFORE THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISIS
Two key events serve as important markers in the evolution of
the Board's use of its exemptive power under section 23A: the
passage of the GLB Act in 1999 and the global financial crisis of
2007-2009. Accordingly, the Board's interpretations can be divided
into three categories: the pre-GLB Act exemptions, the post-GLB
Act exemptions issued during the period between 2000 and mid-2007,
and the crisis-driven exemptions issued during the period between
mid-2007 and 2010.11 This Part examines the Board's interpretive
letters exempting financial institutions from the limitations of section
23A, which were issued before the global financial crisis erupted in
mid-2007. While the early exemptions provide a baseline for assessing
subsequent decisions, the primary focus of this Part is on the Board's
use of its exemptive authority after the GLB Act's repeal of the
prohibition on affiliation between commercial and investment banks.
This Part argues that, in granting exemptions from the
requirements of section 23A, the Board failed to appreciate fully the
radical change in the regulatory landscape as a result of the repeal of
the Glass-Steagall era restrictions on bank affiliations. Faced with the
rapid rise of large, diversified financial conglomerates, closely
interconnected through an intricate web of complex financial
transactions, the Board continued to rely heavily on its pre-1999
precedent, with its exclusive focus on potential risks dealing with
affiliates posed to individual banks. This approach, while consistent
with the letter of the statute, failed to reflect the heightened risk of
indirect transfers of the federal subsidy to the growing shadow
banking sector. Although it is difficult to draw direct causal links
between individual exemptions and the accumulation of excessive risk
in the financial system, this Part argues that, by ignoring systemic
extreme, and probably unique, instance of such a blanket suspension of the statute, which
is why this Article does not specifically analyze it.
75. While generally chronological, these three periods denote qualitatively distinct
stages in the evolution of the Board's use of exemptive authority under section 23A.
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factors, the Board's decisions indirectly contributed to that process
and facilitated the growth of the dangerously unstable shadow
banking system. This Part also shows how the inherently nonsystemic
focus of section 23A undermined its ability to fulfill its new role as the
principal firewall guarding the integrity of the depository system in
the post-GLB Act era of financial conglomeration, innovation, and
interconnectedness.
A. Early Interpretations: In Sleepy Backwaters
Before the GLB Act made section 23A the central statutory
mechanism for preventing depository institutions from subsidizing
risky activities of their newly permitted affiliates in securities and
other financial markets, it was a fairly quiet and uneventful area of
banking law. It appears that, during that period, banking
organizations rarely approached the Board with requests for
interpretations of, or exemptions from, the statutory limitations on
transactions with affiliates.7 6
Many of these early published letters were responses to banks'
requests for clarification of the requirements of section 23A, as they
applied to their transactions. Banking organizations commonly
approached the Board with requests to define in greater detail the
scope of section 23A and to determine whether specific transactions
were properly treated as covered transactions subject to the
quantitative and collateral requirements of section 23A77 or exempted
from its limitations." The Board also routinely responded to banks'
76. Thus, on the Board's website, out of more than eighty published interpretations of
section 23A, less than ten were issued between January 1996 and November 2000, when
the GLB Act became effective. See Legal Interpretations, supra note 15. As noted above,
this Article does not examine the Board's interpretive letters issued prior to 1996. See
supra note 15. Nevertheless, by analyzing the published letters from that initial period in
the context of the entire body of the Board's interpretations over the past fourteen years,
it is possible to discern some of the principal trends and themes in the process.
77. Thus, the Board determined that a loan extended to farmers who used the
proceeds to grow crops on farmland leased from the bank's affiliate was a covered
transaction. Letter from J. Virgil Mattingly, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bd., to Charla
Jackson, Am. State Bank (Aug. 26, 1996), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
BoardDocs/Legallnt/FederalReserveAct/1996/19960826/. On the other hand, the Board
concluded that reinsurance by a captive insurance subsidiary of a bank's parent company
of corporate-owned life insurance policies purchased by the bank on the lives of its
directors and officers was not a covered transaction for the purposes of the statute. Letter
from J. Virgil Mattingly, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bd., to Michael Phenner, Hopkins &
Sutter (Nov. 14, 1996), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Legallnt/
BHCChangenControl/1996/19961114/.
78. For instance, the Board clarified that a bank's purchase of mortgage loans
originated by its mortgage affiliate qualified for an exemption from the quantitative limits
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questions with respect to proper calculations in connection with the
quantitative requirements of section 23A." These types of purely
interpretive questions effectively ceased after the issuance of the final
Regulation W that addressed many uncertainties in the language of
the statute and included the Board's interpretations of the key
statutory provisions.
An important theme that emerges in the Board's early
interpretations concerns the treatment of bank purchases of assets of
their affiliates, both in the ordinary course of business and in the
course of corporate reorganizations."o Perhaps the most common
example of an ordinary business transaction that could cause a bank
to cross the applicable statutory quantitative thresholds is a one-time
purchase of a high-price piece of real or personal property, such as its
office building or a corporate jet, from its parent company or another
affiliate."' These cases rarely presented any difficulty, primarily
because the possibility of using such one-time property transfers to
shift a worthless asset from an affiliate to an insured depository
of section 23A where the bank made an independent credit evaluation of each loan and
agreed to purchase it before the affiliate extended credit. Letter from J. Virgil Mattingly,
Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bd., to Steven Alan Bennett, Senior President & Gen.
Counsel, Bank One (Jan. 17,1996), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/
Legallnt/FederalReserveAct/1996/19960117.
79. See, e.g., Letter from William W. Wiles, Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to
Jack Otten, AVP, Credit Admin. Officer, The Bank of Bentonville (Mar. 6, 1997),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Legallnt/FederalReserveAct/1997/
19970306/ (responding to a three-part inquiry as to how to calculate the applicable
quantitative threshold).
80. See, e.g., Letter from Jennifer Johnson, Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to
Ronald C. Mayer, Senior Vice President & Assoc. Gen. Counsel, The Chase Manhattan
Bank (Aug. 18, 2000) [hereinafter Chase Bank Letter], available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2000/20000818/ (responding to request
for exemptions from section 23A to assist in a reorganization following an acquisition);
Letter from J. Virgil Mattingly, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Reserve Bd., to Bruce Moland, Wells
Fargo & Co., (Jan. 21, 1999), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/
Legallnt/FederalReserveAct/1999/19990121/ (concerning the quantitative limits of section
23A "when a loan is made to an unrelated third party and is secured by securities issued
by an affiliate").
81. See, e.g., Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve
Bd., to Irwin M. Berman, Omni Nat'l Bank (Apr. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Omni Nat'l Letter],
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2005/
20050408/ (granting a retroactive exemption from section 23A and Regulation W to
permit Omni Bank to retain an aircraft purchased from an affiliate); Letter from Robert
deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to Athena Skaleris, Boardman,
Suhr, Curry & Field, LLP (Bank of Wausau) (Nov. 19, 2003) [hereinafter Bank of Wausau
Letter], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/
2003/20031119/ (permitting the Bank of Wausau to purchase its premises from an
affiliate).
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institution or otherwise take unfair advantage of the federal bank
subsidy was generally remote.' Reduction in the bank's operating
expenses as a result of owning its premises or a corporate airplane
was generally the key fact sufficient to establish that an exemption
was in the public interest and consistent with the purposes of section
23A.11 The key condition for an exemption was an independent
appraisal of the property's fair market value, which ensured the
quality of the purchased asset and satisfied the market terms
requirements of section 23B.'
Exemptions for purchases of assets of affiliated companies in the
course of a corporate reorganization raised a broader spectrum of
potential concerns, as they could result in the transfer of risky loans
or other low-quality assets from an uninsured entity to a federally
insured depository institution."s On the other hand, strictly formalistic
application of section 23A to bona fide internal restructuring of a
banking organization's operations may have unnecessarily harsh
consequences not intended by Congress. Throughout the years, the
Board has routinely granted exemptions for such reorganizations
from the statutory limitations as being in the public interest and
consistent with the statutory purpose.
However, the Board explicitly made the exemptions subject to a
set of conditions that began to take shape before 1996. Thus, the
Board typically conditioned an exemption for corporate
reorganizations on the bank and bank's parent company making
certain asset-quality commitments. While specific conditions varied
from case to case, they typically included the following commitments:
82. In granting these types of requests for an exemption, the Board emphasized, "The
legislative history of this section indicates that Congress gave the Board the authority to
permit a bank to purchase from an affiliate certain expensive properties such as a building
because 'such transactions are not the type of transactions that section 23A is designed to
cover.' " Bank of Wausau Letter, supra note 81 (quoting S. REP. No. 97-536, at 32 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3054, 3078).
83. Omni Nat'l Letter, supra note 81; Bank of Wausau Letter, supra note 81.
84. See Omni Nat'l Letter, supra note 81; Bank of Wausau Letter, supra note 81. The
letters often referred to other "commitments and representations" made by the applicants
and deemed to be conditions upon which an exemption was granted.
85. For the purposes of section 23A, corporate reorganizations, in which a bank
acquires all of the shares of an affiliated company and that company becomes the bank's
subsidiary, are generally treated as purchases of assets of an affiliate in the amount equal
to the sum of the consideration paid for the shares and total liabilities of the affiliate in
question. See 12 C.F.R. § 223.31 (2010).
86. In several published interpretations, the Board cited a number of its own
interpretive letters dating back to 1987, in which it had granted similar exemptions for
corporate reorganizations. See, e.g., Chase Bank Letter, supra note 80 (noting that the
Board had previously approved similar transfers relating to reorganizations).
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(1) that none of the assets purchased by the bank would be "low-
quality" within the meaning of section 23A; (2) that the parent
company would periodically repurchase from the bank any
transferred assets that become "low-quality" within a certain time
period (typically, two years after the transaction) or reimburse the
bank in cash for any loss of value of such assets; (3) that the majority
of the bank's directors would review and approve the transaction;7
and (4) that, after the transaction is consummated, both the bank and
its parent bank holding company ("BHC") remain "well capitalized"
under the applicable standards."
These core commitments, aimed at ensuring the quality of the
assets purchased by banks from their affiliates, were later codified in
Regulation W and continued to play a key role in a wide variety of
the Board's decisions to grant exemptions from section 23A for bank
purchases of assets from their affiliates.89
B. After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: New Challenges, Old
Standards
The enactment and implementation of the GLB Act had a
profound effect on the structure and development of the U.S.
financial services industry. Once Congress finally removed the Glass-
Steagall Act's prohibition on combining commercial and investment
banking under common corporate ownership, the financial industry
went through a wave of consolidation and formation of large,
diversified financial conglomerates.9 0 Under the new legal regime,
BHCs that qualified for the newly created FHC status were able to
87. The Board's early interpretations often specified that the directors approving the
transaction had to be independent. See, e.g., Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Assoc.
Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to Thomas J. Pax, Shaw Pittman (HSBC Bank) (Nov.
21, 2000) [hereinafter HSBC Bank Letter], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2000/20001121/ ("Before the purchase of the
assets, the majority of the members of [the] board of directors who are not affiliated with
[the bank] ... will review and approve the purchase of assets."). However, this
requirement largely disappeared, as more recent interpretations condition exemptions on
the approval of the proposed transactions by the relevant bank's directors, without the
reference to their independence.
88. See id.; Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Assoc. Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve
Bd., to Bruce Moland, Wells Fargo & Co. (Jan. 8, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Wells Fargo
Letter], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/LegalInt/FederalReserve
Act/2001/20010108/; Chase Bank Letter, supra note 80.
89. See 12 C.F.R. § 223.41(d) (2010).
90. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., How Should We Respond to the Growing Risks of
Financial Conglomerates?, in FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION AFTER GRAMM-LEACH-
BLILEY 1, 6 (Patricia C. McCoy ed., 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=291859.
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move aggressively into securities underwriting, dealing and trading,
investment management, merchant banking, and other capital
markets activities.91 As a result, many commercial banks significantly
expanded their affiliations.' Not only did they acquire a far greater
number of nonbank affiliates, but those more numerous affiliated
entities engaged in a much broader range of newly permissible
financial activities.93
As noted earlier, in the post-GLB Act world, section 23A and
Regulation W became the principal legal and regulatory mechanisms
for shielding deposit-taking institutions from increased exposure to
risks associated with their affiliates' expanded activities, especially in
capital markets.94 Perhaps even more importantly, the quantitative
and qualitative limitations on affiliate transactions became the main
safeguard against the transfer of the federal bank subsidy to
investment banks, insurance companies, private investment funds, or
other entities allowed to affiliate with deposit-taking institutions
under the GLB Act.
Compliance with section 23A became one of the key concerns
for commercial banks and their parent companies that were eager to
leverage their subsidiary banks' high credit ratings and access to
cheap sources of funding to increase profitability of their nonbank
subsidiaries.95 To realize the newly possible synergies among their
various business segments, FHCs needed more flexibility to transfer
assets and funds between banks, securities firms, and other entities
within their corporate structure. As the volume and range of such
affiliate transactions increased, the old quantitative limits of section
23A quickly became too restrictive. Not surprisingly, after the
passage of the GLB Act, the volume and range of requests for
exemptions from the requirements of section 23A and Regulation W
submitted to the Board by commercial banks and their parent
91. See Vincent DiLorenzo, Cost Benefit Analysis, Deregulated Markets, and
Consumer Benefits: A Study of the Financial Services Modernization Experience, 6 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 321, 348-51 (2003) (detailing the changes in the banking sector in
the years immediately following the passage of the GLB Act).
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
95. Commercial banks generally have the highest credit rating of all entities within the
entire holding company. They also have access to the cheapest source of funding, demand
deposits, and the federal safety net. Although banks are required to hold a certain amount
of regulatory capital against their assets, a variety of financial structuring techniques,
including securitization, can be used to reduce or eliminate entirely that additional
regulatory cost.
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companies expanded radically. Accordingly, the significance of these
seemingly mundane administrative decisions for maintaining systemic
stability increased greatly with the rise of the ever-bigger and more
complex global financial conglomerates of the post-GLB Act era.
1. Corporate Reorganizations: Citigroup's Subprime Moment
The overwhelming majority of exemptions from the
requirements of section 23A granted by the Board in the period
between the passage of the GLB Act and the onset of the global
financial crisis in mid-2007 dealt with corporate reorganizations. As
financial institutions developed new activities, engaged in mergers
and acquisitions, and otherwise expanded their operations, they
sought to reorganize and consolidate their growing businesses in
order to lower costs and increase profits. Thus, the Board issued
numerous interpretations exempting from the quantitative and
qualitative limitations of section 23A one-time transfers of mortgage
assets,96 credit card and other consumer loans,97 agricultural loans,98
student loans," and hedge fund loans" from nonbanking entities to
their affiliated banks and thrifts.
The Board's reasoning followed the same logic as in the earlier,
pre-GLB Act, interpretations. It continued to follow earlier
precedent with respect to corporate reorganizations and consistently
96. See, e.g., Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve
Bd., to Karen Grandstrand, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A. (Klein Financial, Inc.) (Apr. 1,
2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserve
Act/2005/20050401/; Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed.
Reserve Bd., to Karen M. Nee, Exec. Vice President, GMAC Commercial Holding Corp.
(July 7, 2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/LegalInt/Federal
ReserveAct/2004/20040707/; Letter from Margaret McCloskey Shanks, Assistant Sec'y,
Fed. Reserve Bd., to Winthrop N. Brown, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP
(HSBC Bank) (Dec. 29, 2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
legalint/FederalReserveAct/2003/20031229/.
97. See, e.g., Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve
Bd., to Winthrop N. Brown, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP (HSBC Bank) (Dec.
22, 2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Legallnt/FederalReserve
Act/2004/20041222/.
98. See, e.g., Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve
Bd., to S. Alan Rosen, Horgan, Rosen, Beckman & Coren (Valley Indep. Bank) (Aug. 14,
2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserve
Act/2003/20030814/.
99. See, e.g., 2001 Wells Fargo Letter, supra note 88.
100. See, e.g., Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve
Bd., to David Teitelbaum, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP (Merrill Lynch Bank USA)
3 (May 15, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/Federal
ReserveAct/2006/20060515/20060515.pdf.
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imposed a standard set of conditions on proposed transactions.'01 As
long as the parent company promised to protect the bank from
getting saddled with low-quality assets, either at the time of the
transaction or for a couple of years after its consummation, the Board
did not seem to view such internal reorganizations as raising any
particularly serious concerns under section 23A. The Board typically
reasoned that these transactions were in the public interest because
they enhanced the efficiency and profitability of the firms in
question.10 As the body of Board precedent grew on this issue, it
further entrenched the assumption that transfers of affiliates' assets to
a bank in the course of an internal reorganization were a routine and
uncontroversial matter and that certain standard conditions were
sufficient to control the key risks of such transfers.103
However, the case of Citigroup illustrates how deceptive these
assumptions can be. One of the largest U.S. financial conglomerates,
Citigroup nearly failed during the recent financial crisis, in large part
because of excessive exposure to toxic subprime mortgage assets.'" In
the early 2000s, Citigroup started aggressively growing its residential
mortgage business, especially in the subprime sector, both organically
and through acquisition. In 2000, Citigroup completed acquisition of a
Texas-based consumer finance company, Associates First Capital
Corporation (the "AFCC"), which at the time was one of the
101. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. In 2002, Regulation W codified the
exemption from the quantitative and collateral requirements of section 23A for certain
corporate reorganizations and made it explicitly subject to these conditions. 12. C.F.R.
§ 223.41(d) (2010). However, these exempted corporate reorganizations remained subject
to the statutory prohibition on the purchase of low-quality assets from an affiliate and the
requirement that each such transaction was consistent with the bank's safety and
soundness considerations. Id.
102. See, e.g., Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve
Bd., to Robin J. Maxwell, Goodwin Procter LLP (The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc)
2 (Nov. 22, 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.govfboarddocs/legalint/
FederalReserveAct/2005/20051122/default.pdf.
103. Of course, there is a possibility that the Board refused to exempt some of the
proposed transfers of assets that it considered to be too risky. Since the Board does not
typically issue such negative determinations in a documented form, there is no way to
know whether, or how frequently, the Board denied banking organizations' requests for
exemptions, and what reasons it gave for its decisions. However, based on the Board's
general approach to this issue in published decisions, it does not seem very likely that the
Board would, in fact, interfere with an internal reorganization by refusing to lift the
quantitative limits of section 23A.
104. See David Enrich et al., U.S. Agrees to Rescue Struggling Citigroup, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 24, 2008, at Al (detailing government actions designed to keep Citigroup from
failing).
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country's largest subprime lenders." The bulk of AFCC's consumer
lending assets, including subprime mortgage assets, were transferred
to CitiFinancial Mortgage Company, Inc. ("CitiFinancial"),
Citigroup's nonbank subprime lending unit. 0 6 However, in order to
fully absorb the wide-ranging assets of the acquired company,
Citigroup needed an exemption from the quantitative and qualitative
requirements of section 23A. On August 28, 2001, the Board issued a
letter granting such an exemption allowing Citigroup to transfer a
total of $46.7 billion in AFCC's commercial finance, credit card, and
international consumer finance assets to its bank subsidiaries,
including Citibank, N.A. ("Citibank"), the group's flagship
commercial bank.07 In granting this exemption, the Board followed
its precedent and imposed the same standard conditions on the
transaction, with one important exception: unlike the previous cases,
this transaction involved a transfer of $2.4 billion of low-quality
assets.108 The Board accepted Citigroup's proposal to contribute cash
105. See Paul Beckett, Citigroup Completes Associates Purchase as It Agrees to
Improve Lending Practices, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 1, 2000, at C22. The acquisition of AFCC
created a host of problems for Citigroup, not only because it contributed to the growth of
Citigroup's subprime mortgage assets that later sustained huge losses, but also because of
the company's predatory lending practices and the bad publicity it generated for
Citigroup. Thus, in March 2001, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") charged AFCC,
Citigroup, and CitiFinancial with abusive lending practices. See Press Release, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, FTC Charges One of Nation's Largest Subprime Lenders with Abusive Lending
Practices (Mar. 6, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/03/associates.shtm.
Citigroup later settled the suit with the FTC for a record sum of $215 million. Press
Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Citigroup Settles FTC Charges Against Associates: Record-
Setting $215 Million for Subprime Lending Victims (Sept. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/09/associates.shtm.
106. See Citigroup Settles Predatory Lending Charges for $215 Million,
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM (Sept. 19, 2002), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news02/citi
settles.html.
107. See Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd.,
to Carl V. Howard, Gen. Counsel, Citigroup, Inc. (Aug. 28, 2001) [hereinafter 2001
Citigroup Letter], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs[Legallnt/Federal
ReserveAct/2001/20010828/.
108. Id. According to the Board,
In previous cases, any low-quality assets held by the affiliate being transferred to
the bank were removed before the transfer of the affiliate's shares. The low-
quality assets then were either separately transferred to the bank for no
consideration after consummation of the share transfer or retained at the holding
company level.
Id.
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capital to offset the value of these low-quality assets, so that the
banks would not be deemed to "purchase" such assets.1
In an effort to get a better handle on managing its sprawling and
highly complex business operations and to simplify its corporate
structure, Citigroup sought to consolidate its mortgage origination,
servicing, and securitization activities. Between 2003 and 2006, the
Board issued three more letters granting Citigroup exemptions from
section 23A to allow the transfer of residential mortgage assets from
nonbank subsidiaries (mortgage lenders) to deposit-taking
subsidiaries (national banks and thrifts). In 2003, the Board exempted
from section 23A the transfer of all shares of CitiMortgage, Inc.
("CitiMortgage"), a nonbank consumer finance unit that specialized
in prime mortgage lending, to Citigroup's thrift subsidiary, Citibank
(West), FSB ("CitiWest").1 o The exemption was subject to the same
general set of conditions consistent with the Board's precedent.
Again, the Board agreed to allow a transfer to CitiWest of certain
low-quality assets, in light of Citigroup's commitment to make a cash
contribution to CitiWest in the amount equal to the value of such
low-quality assets.
A year later, in 2004, the Board granted another exemption from
section 23A and Regulation W for transfer of all the shares of
CitiFinancial, and all of its subprime mortgage assets to Citicorp
Trust Bank ("CTB"), another thrift subsidiary of Citigroup."' The
Board based its decision on Citigroup's commitments (1) not to
transfer any low-quality assets to CTB, 112 and (2) for a five-year
period following the purchase of assets (rather than the typical two-
year commitment required in prior cases), to make quarterly cash
payments reimbursing the thrift for any losses in the value of any
109. Id. Section 23A provides that "a member bank and its subsidiaries may not
purchase a low-quality asset from an affiliate unless the bank or such subsidiary, pursuant
to an independent credit evaluation, committed itself to purchase such asset prior to the
time such asset was acquired by the affiliate." 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(3) (2006) (amended
2010).
110. See Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd.,
to Carl V. Howard, Gen. Counsel, Citigroup, Inc. (Feb. 27, 2003), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2003/20030227/.
111. See Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd.,
to James E. Scott, Citigroup, Inc. (May 14, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Citigroup Letter],
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Legallnt/FederalReserveAct/2004/
20040514/.
112. Approximately $8 billion in CitiFinancial's low-quality assets were transferred to
another nonbank subsidiary of Citigroup. Id.
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transferred assets that become low-quality assets.113 The Board
stressed that CTB's board of directors reviewed the transferred assets
and approved the proposed transaction. The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") and the Office of Thrift Supervision
("OTS"), CTB's primary federal regulator, also reviewed the
proposal and informed the Board that they had no objection.114 In
light of these circumstances, the Board concluded that the proposed
reorganization appeared to be "consistent with safe and sound
banking practices and on terms that would ensure the quality of assets
transferred."1 s
In 2006, Citigroup sought to further rationalize and simplify its
banking operations by bringing most of them into Citibank, its main
commercial bank and the largest single legal entity."' A part of this
restructuring plan was the consolidation of Citigroup's residential
mortgage origination and servicing operations, conducted by
CitiFinancial and CitiMortgage, within Citibank. In June 2006, the
Board granted Citigroup's request to lift statutory limitations on
affiliate transactions to permit the transfer of all the shares of
CitiFinancial, the subprime mortgage lender, to CitiWest, which
would later merge into Citibank.117 This transaction, valued at
approximately $17.3 billion, involved a transfer of $561 million in low-
quality assets.' The Board allowed the transfer to proceed based on
113. Id. It is difficult to determine the precise reasons why (or even whether) the Board
insisted on a longer commitment by the parent company to reimburse the depository
institution for losses from deterioration in the quality of transferred assets. Most likely, it
reflected the Board's potential unease with the fact that the bulk of CitiFinancial's assets
were in subprime mortgage loans.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, The Dugan
Testimony, Appendix E: OCC Supervision of Citibank, N.A. 3 (Apr. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2010/nr-occ-2010-39g.pdf. Thus, in
2006, Citibank constituted 49.5% of Citigroup's total assets, while at year-end 2009 its
share of the group's assets grew to 62%. See id.
117. See Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd.,
to Carl Howard, Gen. Counsel, Citigroup Inc. 4 (June 30, 2006) [hereinafter 2006
Citigroup Letter], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/Federal
ReserveAct/2006/20060630/20060630.pdf. The consolidation of residential mortgage
business in Citibank was structured as a series of consecutive transactions, with the first
step being a transfer of the shares of CitiFinancial, the subprime mortgage lender, to
CitiWest, a thrift subject to regulation by the OTS, which already owned CitiMortgage
and which later would merge into Citibank. In this interpretive letter, the Board
technically reviewed and exempted from the requirements of section 23A the initial step
in the transaction, the transfer of CitiFinancial to CitiWest, but with the full view to its
ultimate result.
118. Id. at 4.
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the familiar reasoning that Citigroup's cash contribution offsetting the
value of such low-quality assets was sufficient to deem the transfer as
not involving a "purchase" by a depository institution of any low-
quality assets."9 The Board conditioned the exemption on the
commitment by Citigroup to make quarterly cash payments to
reimburse CitiWest for losses on the transferred assets that became
low-quality assets.'20 Citigroup also made a separate promise to
continue tracking CitiFinancial's assets originally transferred to CTB
pursuant to the Board's exemption granted in 2004 and to continue
making cash reimbursements to CitiFinancial's parent depository
institution in accordance with that earlier commitment for the
remainder of the five-year period.12 1 As long as CitiWest's directors
reviewed and approved the transaction, and in light of the FDIC's
and the OTS's stated lack of objection, the Board determined that the
proposed reorganization appeared to be "consistent with safe and
sound banking practices and on terms that would ensure the quality
of the assets transferred" and granted the requested exemption.1 22
As a result of these series of corporate reorganizations, by late
2006, Citigroup's considerable subprime mortgage assets were
ultimately transferred to Citibank. Unfortunately, the subprime
mortgage market began showing serious signs of crisis by January
2007 and effectively collapsed by March 2007.123 By that time,
CitiFinancial was already the fourth-largest subprime mortgage
lender in the country.124 Citigroup incurred particularly high losses
from direct exposure to subprime mortgage markets.125 The losses
sustained by Citibank, in particular, were a direct result of Citigroup's
aggressive acquisition of subprime mortgage assets and placing them
119. Id.
120. Id. Citigroup committed to make these cash payments until CitiWest was merged
into Citibank. Id.
121. See 2004 Citigroup Letter, supra note 111.
122. 2006 Citigroup Letter, supra note 117, at 4.
123. See, e.g., KATALINA M. BIANcO, THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS: CAUSES AND
EFFECTS OF THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 12-13 (2008), available at http://business.cch
.com/bankingfinancefocus/news/SubprimeWPjrev.pdf.
124. Chris Isidore, Subprime Woes: How Far How Wide?, CNNMONEY.COM (Mar. 5,
2007), http://money.cnn.com/2007/03/05/news/economy/subprime/index.htm.
125. The bulk of Citigroup's total losses during the crisis resulted not from origination
of subprime mortgages but from exposure to collateralized debt obligations ("CDO") and
other mortgage-backed securities structured by its nonbanking subsidiaries and held off-
balance sheet by special purpose vehicles ("SPVs"). Citibank, N.A., became exposed to
the risk of the CDO SPVs by issuing "liquidity puts" guaranteeing their obligations. Press
Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 116, at 6-7. The off-
balance sheet SPVs were not even considered affiliates of Citibank and so were not
subject to the limitations of section 23A.
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within Citibank's chain of ownership, to reduce the cost of doing
business.126 According to the recent public testimony of the former
Comptroller of the Currency, John Dugan,
Additional subprime mortgage losses resulted from a major
corporate restructuring completed in October 2006. In this
action, Citigroup reduced the number of insured depository
institutions from twelve to five as it consolidated approximately
$200 billion of assets into Citibank. Approximately 10 percent
of this total consisted of subprime mortgages originated
primarily by Citigroup's consumer finance company,
CitiFinancial. Many of these mortgages were originated in 2005
and 2006, when underwriting standards were weakest, and
Citibank has taken large losses and made substantial loan loss
provisions as a result. Subprime mortgages subsequently issued
by Citibank in 2007 have also produced losses.12 7
Dugan's testimony, phrased carefully in neutral terms, does not
mention the fact that federal bank regulators-the Board, the FDIC,
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), and the
OTS-reviewed and approved the entire chain of transactions that
transferred to Citibank, one of the largest federally insured
commercial banks in the country, almost $20 billion in subprime
mortgage assets.128 Each time Citigroup requested an exemption from
section 23A for an internal reorganization of its mortgage operations,
the Board had a chance to evaluate potential dangers of allowing it to
proceed and to limit Citibank's exposure to potentially toxic
subprime mortgage assets. Ironically, the Board, with the explicit
concurrence of other agencies, repeatedly opted to remove the key
legal impediment to such accumulation of risk by exempting
Citigroup's transactions from the quantitative and qualitative
limitations of section 23A.
126. Since 2007, CitiFinancial has been generating a large portion of Citigroup's loan
losses. See Bradley Keoun, CitiFinancial to Close 376 Branches, Cut 720 Jobs,
BLOOMBERG (June 1, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2010-06-01/citigroup-
s-citifinancial-unit-will-cut-376-branches-720-jobs.html. In early 2009, CitiFinancial
"became a part of Citi Holdings, a pen for Citi's noncore or distressed assets" slated for
eventual sale. Heather Landy, Why CEO Pandit Won't Shutter CitiFinancial, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 23, 2010, at 8, 8, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/news/citi
financial-1024098-1.html.
127. John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Statement Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 16 (Apr. 8, 2010),
available at http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/congressional-testimony/2010/pub-test-
2010-39-written.pdf.
128. Id.
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While there is no basis for accusing regulators of directly causing
Citigroup's subprime mortgage losses, a closer look at the Board's
decisions to grant Citigroup exemptions from section 23A raises
serious questions as to how diligent and how effective the Board was
in exercising its statutory mandate. It appears that the Board did not
probe into the proposed transfers too deeply, perhaps operating on
an assumption that internal corporate restructurings were generally
routine matters not likely to present serious problems.129  As
subsequent events demonstrated, the standard safeguards imposed by
the Board as conditions on granting exemptions failed to ensure the
quality of mortgage assets transferred to Citibank. Thus, regulators
later admitted that the quality of mortgages transferred to Citibank in
the course of Citigroup's consolidation of its business activities in
2006 "was substantially worse than expected."130 Apparently, neither
the directors of Citigroup's banking subsidiaries nor the FDIC were
able to detect potential risks of CitiFinancial's subprime mortgage
assets. Moreover, the Board actually deviated from its own precedent
by explicitly allowing transfers of low-quality assets in Citigroup
transactions if accompanied by a cash payment offsetting the value of
such assets. 1 3 The Board did not seem to appreciate the danger that
the "value" of low-quality mortgage assets at the time may not have
reflected the true extent of risk exposure transferred onto Citibank's
books.13 2 Even the key safeguard that the Board imposed-
Citigroup's commitment to make quarterly payments to reimburse
the bank for losses on some of the transferred subprime mortgages
for five years instead of the typically shorter two-year period-
129. Of course, it is possible that the Board did, in fact, scrutinize proposed
transactions more closely than the reasoning in its interpretive letters reveals. However, it
is very difficult to ascertain how diligent the Board's due diligence effort really was.
130. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 116, at 5-6.
131. In Citigroup's case, the Board created a fiction that no low-quality assets were
transferred where the parent made a cash capital contribution to the bank to offset their
value. See 2001 Citigroup Letter, supra note 107. More generally, however, even in cases
where no low-quality assets were transferred as part of the corporate reorganization, such
assets were sometimes transferred to banks after the reorganization and for no
consideration. Id. Thus, even where the Board technically conditioned its exemption for
corporate reorganization on excluding low-quality assets from the transfer, such transfers
took place anyway, despite the statutory prohibition.
132. According to the OCC, Citibank and its sister national bank (a specialty credit
card bank) lost $9.3 billion in 2008 and 2009. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, supra note 116, at 5.
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ultimately failed, as Citigroup's dire financial condition in the midst
of an unfolding crisis rendered that commitment hollow."'3
More generally, the Citigroup example demonstrates the Board's
failure to analyze the riskiness of individual transactions in the
broader market context. The Board did not seem to connect
Citigroup's internal reorganization project with the fact that such
consolidation of mortgage operations was one of the important
factors fueling the growth of the complex and increasingly risky
markets for mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt
obligations ("CDOs"). Concentrating mortgage assets in bank
subsidiaries enabled financial conglomerates to leverage banks'
access to the federal safety net, higher credit ratings, and a lower cost
of capital to create and sell CDOs and other structured products
backed by subprime mortgages.'TM However, in considering
Citigroup's requests for exemptions, the Board did not inquire into
the broader aspects of the group's business strategy and did not
analyze potential risks that concentrated exposure to subprime
mortgage assets posed to the safety and soundness of Citibank, or the
depository system as a whole. Instead, the Board's analysis remained
narrowly focused on the formal attributes of the proposed
transactions and on standard protections mandated in prior
exemptions from section 23A for various types of corporate
reorganizations.
At the same time, the Board's analysis is consistent with the
statute's own inherently nonsystemic approach to regulating banks'
transactions with affiliates. On its face, section 23A is concerned
primarily with potential risks such transactions pose to individual
banks and seeks to prevent transfer of federal subsidy within an
individual conglomerate. Systemic risk prevention is not a direct
purpose of section 23A. Thus, one could argue that the Board
pursued the only legitimate interpretive strategy and that it would be
a stretch to expect the Board to take into account systemic
implications of its decisions under section 23A. However, the
enactment of the GLB Act fundamentally altered the context in
133. Citigroup itself barely survived the crisis and had to be bailed out by the federal
government to the tune of $45 billion. See Eric Dash, U.S. Selling Last of Stake in
Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2010, at B1 (recounting the bailout required to save
Citigroup). As a result, the U.S. government received about a thirty-six percent equity
stake in Citigroup. See David Enrich & Deborah Solomon, Cit4 U.S. Reach Accord on a
Third Bailout, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2009, at B.
134. See, e.g., POZSAR ET AL., supra note 20, at 26-30 (explaining the role of a bank
subsidiary in securitization).
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which section 23A operated and made systemic risk issues central to
preserving the safety and soundness of depository institutions.
Unfortunately, the Board failed to adapt the way it implemented and
enforced the statute to these new circumstances and to adopt a
broader, more systemic approach in its exercise of exemptive
authority under section 23A.
2. Securities Lending and Borrowing: Letting the Shadow Grow?
The true impact of the GLB Act on the financial sector went far
beyond allowing commercial banks to engage in investment banking.
It created a myriad of opportunities for FHCs to increase profitability
not only by moving into previously inaccessible markets but also by
expanding their traditional lines of business. The new law, which
allowed affiliations between depository institutions and securities
firms, removed some of the natural constraints on the growth of their
pre-GLB Act business activities. As a result, certain financial markets
and instruments-including securitization and structured products,
derivatives, securities lending, and repurchase markets-experienced
unprecedented growth in the first decade of the twenty-first
century."' These activities and markets formed the so-called shadow
banking system, which became integral to the operation of the formal
banking system, but remained largely outside regulators' reach."'
Shadow banking served to create and hide the unsustainable levels of
leverage in the financial system.'37 The accumulation of such hidden
leverage and risk in the shadow banking system was one of the key
causes of the global financial crisis from 2007 to 2009.38
135. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REv. 963,
988-94 (2009) (examining the rise of securitization, structured products, and derivatives);
Phyllis Plitch, Funds' Lending Sparks 'Short' Debate, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2005, at B2D
(describing over $300 billion in growth in the securities lending market from 2003 to 2004);
Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2007,
at 29-30 (May 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractid=1401882 (explaining that the securities repurchase market grew quickly and
in step with securitization).
136. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT, SHADOW
BANKING AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 7 (2010) [hereinafter FCIC SHADOW BANKING
REPORT], available at http://www.fcic.gov/reports/pdfs/2010-0505-Shadow-Banking.pdf;
Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation and the Distribution of Wealth and Income 3
(Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 10-32, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1656451.
137. See FCIC SHADOW BANKING REPORT, supra note 136, at 15-17; Blair, supra note
136, at 3.
138. See Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the Lehman Bankruptcy
Examiner: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 167 (2010) (statement
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Numerous factors have contributed, directly or indirectly, to the
rapid growth of shadow banking that reached its peak in 2007 and
2008.139 It is often assumed that these markets were operating and
expanding almost entirely outside of the government's view, as
financial regulators did not have a jurisdictional window into their
operation.14 0 However, it is more likely that regulators and lawmakers
purposely refrained from interfering in the process of financial
innovation.14 ' Through the process of regulating and supervising
commercial banks, securities broker-dealers, mutual funds, and other
regulated financial institutions, regulators had significant potential
influence on the scope and speed of financial innovation driving the
growth of the shadow banking system. While it is certainly true that
substantial gaps in the existing system of financial regulation and
supervision facilitated the accumulation of excessive risk in the fast-
evolving financial markets, 42 at least some of the legal mechanisms
already in place at the time could have provided important
checkpoints on the path of financial innovation by giving regulators
an opportunity to ask tough questions and potentially foreclose or
significantly curb some risky activities.
Restrictions on banks' transactions with affiliates under section
23A were one such potentially important statutory mechanism. Even
though the Board's interpretive decisions to exempt individual
transactions from these restrictions appeared highly fact-specific and
applied narrowly to the financial institutions requesting an
exemption, it is important to understand potential cumulative effects
of these decisions on broader market dynamics.
of Timothy F. Geithner, Sec'y, United States Department of the Treasury) (arguing that
the explosive growth of leverage and maturity transformation in the shadow banking
system set the stage for the crisis).
139. See id. ("At its peak, the shadow banking system financed about $8 trillion in
assets with short-term obligations, making it almost as large as the real banking system.").
140. See Peter S. Goodman, Rule No. 1: Make Money by Avoiding Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 2010, at WK3 (stating that the shadow banking system was completely
unregulated); Paul Krugman, Bubbles and Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2010, at A27 (noting
that bank regulators relaxed the rules and failed to expand them to cover shadow
banking); Nelson D. Schwartz & Katrin Bennhold, France's Minister in a Critical Role at
Global Economic Talk, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008, at B5 (stating the system grew outside
of regulatory control).
141. See Blair, supra note 136, at 3.
142. Thus, the fragmented nature of the U.S. financial regulation and lack of unified
oversight of systemic risk allowed for the emergence of many "shadow banking" activities
that ultimately led to the global crisis. See, e.g., Former Fed Chairman Volcker Dismisses
Critics of Financial Regulatory Reform, BANKING DAILY (Sept. 24, 2010), http://news.bna
.com/bdln/BDLNWB/split-display.adp?fedfid=17834015&vname=bbdbulallissues&fn=178
34015&jd=a0c4glq9y8&split=0.
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One interesting and little-noticed trend in the Board's
interpretations, which emerged in the aftermath of the GLB Act, was
the grant of exemptions from the limitations of section 23A for banks'
extensions of credit to their affiliated securities broker-dealers in
connection with lending and borrowing of securities.
Securities lending is a widespread market practice whereby one
party (the lender) temporarily transfers securities to another party
(the borrower), for a fee.143 The borrower is obligated to return the
borrowed securities to the lender, either upon demand or at the end
of a specified term. The borrower secures its obligation by delivering
collateral to the lender (typically, cash or government bonds) in an
amount slightly exceeding the value of borrowed securities.'" The
title to borrowed securities, as well as securities used as collateral,
passes between the parties to the transaction.145 The borrower
receives voting rights and all rights of economic ownership with
respect to the borrowed securities but is contractually obligated to
"manufacture" the economic benefits (dividends, distributions, etc.)
back to the lender.'46 Originally an informal practice among securities
brokers who needed to deliver share certificates to settle their trades
before receiving such certificates from their clients, securities lending
now is an important market in its own right.147 The rapid growth of
OTC derivatives markets in recent decades greatly increased the
demand from dealers and investors for borrowed securities to engage
in market-making, arbitrage trading, and to hedge their risks.148
Securities lending is often used by securities dealers, prime brokers,
hedge funds, and other financial institutions to facilitate short-selling,
both as a hedging technique and as a speculative trading strategy.149 in
143. ASS'N OF BRITISH INSURERS ET AL., SECURITIES LENDING: AN INTRODUCTORY
GUIDE 2 (2010), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/gilts/sl-intro-green
9_10.pdf.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. To be able to exercise voting rights, the lender must negotiate a contractual right
to recall equivalent securities from the borrower. Id.
147. See MARK C. FAULKNER, AN INTRODUCTION TO SECURITIES LENDING 13
(2004), available at http://www.isla.co.uk/uploadedFiles/Publications/Intro%20to%20
Securities%20Lending.pdf.
148. Thus, according to some estimates, "[s]ecurities lending peaked in 2007, with
transactions totaling $5 trillion." Emily Lambert, Securities Lending Meltdown, FORBES
(June 22, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0622/mutual-funds-pension-securities-
lending-meltdown-print.html.
149. See David P. McCaffrey, Review of the Policy Debate over Short Sale Regulation
During the Market Crisis, 73 ALB. L. REV. 483, 483 (2010) (describing the purpose of short
selling). A short sale is a trading strategy in which a trader sells securities borrowed from a
third party (typically, a broker) with an intention to buy identical securities at a later date
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a broader sense, securities lending supports higher trading volumes
and greater complexity of trading strategies in securities and
derivatives markets.s0 Securities lending is also closely tied to the
market for securities repurchase agreements (or, repos), which serves
as the principal source of short-term financing for securities broker-
dealers, hedge funds, derivatives traders, and other financial market
participants, particularly in the shadow banking system.'5'
JPMorgan Chase & Co. ("JPMCC") and Bank of New York
Company ("BNYC") were the first firms to request an exemption
from section 23A for setting up an in-house securities lending
program. 52 In both of these cases, the proposal was to allow the
in order to return them to the lender. See id. Typically, the short seller's strategy is based
on an expectation that the price of securities sold would decrease between the time of sale
and the time of repurchase. See id. Speculative short-selling often takes the form of so-
called "naked shorting." See James W. Christian et al., Naked Short Selling: How Exposed
Are Investors?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1033, 1035-40 (2006) (discussing the prevalence of
naked short-selling). Naked shorting refers to a trading strategy in which a trader sells
securities short without first borrowing them or ascertaining that they are available for
borrowing. See id. at 1038. The recent financial crisis demonstrated the potentially
pernicious effects of short sales on asset prices, prompting many governments to
temporarily outlaw short sales of certain securities. See Takashi Nakamichi, 'Naked' Ban
Is Extended by Japan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2009, at C2; Kara Scannell, Short Sale Ban
Spreads Around the Globe, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 22, 2008, at C1 (reporting on bans in the
United Kingdom, Australia, Taiwan, and the Netherlands); Kara Scannell et al., SEC Is
Set to Issue Temporary Ban Against Short Selling, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2008, at Al.
150. State St., Securities Lending, Liquidity and Capital Markets-Based Finance, in
SECURITIES FINANCE: SECURITIES LENDING AND REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS 39, 47
(Frank J. Fabozzi & Steven V. Mann eds., 2005).
151. A repo is very similar to a securities lending transaction, in which securities are
lent overnight and secured by cash collateral. See Jose Gabilondo, Leveraged Liquidity:
Bear Raids and Junk Loans in the New Credit Market, 34 J. CORP. L. 447, 458 (2009). In a
repo transaction, one party (the seller) sells securities to another party (the buyer) and
contractually commits to repurchase identical securities from the buyer at a future date
(typically, the next day) at a price that is slightly higher than the price at which the buyer
bought such securities. Id. The economic substance of a repo is secured financing: the
"seller" in a repo borrows cash from the "buyer" and uses securities as collateral. Id. The
repo market is a key source 6f short-term financing of broker-dealers' securities
inventories. See id. ("Especially for investment banks with large securities portfolios, the
repo market is one of their most important ways of funding their activities day to day
because repo [transactions] let the firm reduce the carrying costs of their securities
portfolios."). Repos and securities lending transactions are governed by different types of
legal agreements. For general background on repos, see Peter Hordahl & Michael R.
King, Developments in Repo Markets During the Financial Turmoil, BANK FOR INT'L
SETELEMENTS Q. REV. (Dec. 2008), http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r.qt0812e.htm.
152. See Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd.,
to Michael M. Wiseman, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (BNYC) (May 5, 2005) [hereinafter
BNYC Letter], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocslegalint/Federal
ReserveAct/2005/20050505/; Letter from Jennifer Johnson, Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve
Bd., to Marjorie E. Gross, JPMorgan Chase & Co. (Oct. 31, 2001) [hereinafter JPMCC
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commercial banking subsidiaries within the holding company
structure to lend their customers' securities, held in trust or as
collateral, to the affiliated securities broker-dealers.15 3 The affiliated
broker-dealers could use securities for their business purposes but
were obligated to return borrowed securities to the bank on demand.
The banks in these programs, acting as agents for their customers who
owned securities, were obligated to indemnify the customers for any
loss resulting from the affiliate's failure to return securities upon the
customer's demand.'5
The Board concluded in both cases that the bank's risk of loss in
the proposed transactions was insignificant enough to warrant an
exemption from section 23A limits. Under the Board's reasoning, the
key factor mitigating the bank's credit exposure to the affiliated
broker-dealer was collateralization by high-quality assets, such as
cash or U.S. government securities. So long as the bank employed
adequate daily mark-to-market and collateral maintenance
procedures, the risk of the value of collateral falling below the value
of securities on the loan would be insubstantial. However, the
Board specified that "[t]he case for exempting transactions
collateralized by property other than cash or U.S. government
Letter], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/LegalInt/FederalReserve
Act/2001/20011031/.
153. See BNYC Letter, supra note 152; JPMCC Letter, supra note 152. Each holding
company's proposal envisioned initially only its flagship commercial bank-the Bank of
New York ("BNY") and the Chase Manhattan Bank ("Chase Manhattan"), respectively-
lending securities to their largest securities broker-dealer entity. See BNYC Letter, supra
note 152; JPMCC Letter, supra note 152. However, both proposals asked specifically for
an ability to extend the securities lending program to other banks and broker-dealers in
their corporate structure. See BNYC Letter, supra note 152, at n.2; JPMCC Letter, supra
note 152, at n.14.
154. The Board noted that, in addition to this principal source of credit exposure to the
affiliated broker-dealer, the bank may also have short-term exposure in the amount of any
distributions that the bank credits to the customer's account prior to receiving the same
amount from the broker-dealer. See BNYC Letter, supra note 152; JPMCC Letter, supra
note 152.
155. As the Board noted, the bank's exposure on the obligation to indemnify the
customers is limited to the amount by which the market value of the borrowed securities
exceeds the value of the collateral posted by the borrower-affiliate. The Board further
reasoned that, to the extent that collateral consists of cash or U.S. Treasury bonds, and the
bank marks both collateral and lent securities to market daily in order to maintain a
proper level of collateralization, it would be highly unlikely that the value of the collateral
would fall below the value of securities on the loan. BNYC Letter, supra note 152; JPMCC
Letter, supra note 152.
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securities is not as strong"5 6 and limited the exemption for securities
lending transactions secured by corporate, municipal, or non-U.S.
securities.s 7
Another important factor supporting the Board's decision was
the fact that these transactions were subject to the market-terms
requirements of section 23B. The Board stressed that both Chase
Manhattan Bank ("Chase Manhattan") and Bank of New York
("BNY") already actively engaged in securities lending to unaffiliated
securities firms and committed to treat their affiliated broker-dealers
on the same terms as those applied to nonaffiliates.5 8 Because
including affiliates in their existing securities lending program
enabled the banks' customers to increase the return on their assets,
the Board found an exemption to be in the public interest.'
The Board used the same reasoning to grant exemptions from
section 23A to Bank of America Corporation ("BAC") and
Wachovia Corporation ("Wachovia"), both of which sought to
establish similar in-house securities lending programs.160 The same
two companies also requested an exemption from section 23A for an
in-house program whereby their flagship commercial banks-Bank of
America, N.A. ("BANA") and Wachovia Bank, N.A. ("Wachovia
Bank"), respectively-were allowed to borrow securities from their
156. JPMCC Letter, supra note 152; see also BNYC Letter, supra note 152 (granting
the requested exemption subject to specific conditions for the transactions collateralized
by property other than cash or U.S. government securities).
157. Under the Board's interpretation, such transactions were exempted from section
23A only to the extent that the total market value of securities lent against such collateral
did not in the aggregate exceed the lesser of (1) five percent of the bank's total capital and
surplus, or (2) five percent of the total market value of the securities the bank lent to the
borrower-affiliate. See BNYC Letter, supra note 152; JPMCC Letter, supra note 152. The
marginal amount above that threshold would be treated as nonexempt and thus count
against the quantitative limits on covered transactions and be subject to the qualitative
requirements of section 23A. See JPMCC Letter, supra note 152.
158. See BNYC Letter, supra note 152; JPMCC Letter, supra note 152.
159. See JPMCC Letter, supra note 152.
160. Letter from Jennifer Johnson, Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to Patrick S.
Antrim, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Bank of Am. Corp. 4-6 (Jan. 23, 2007) [hereinafter 2007
BAC Letter], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/Federal
ReserveAct/2007/20070123/20070123.pdf; Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Sec'y of the
Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to Courtney D. Allison, Senior Vice President & Assistant Gen.
Counsel, Wachovia Corp. 4-5 (Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Wachovia letter],
available at http://www.federalreserve.govlboarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2006/
200609292/200609292.pdf. Compare JPMCC Letter, supra note 152, and BNYC Letter,
supra note 152 (proposing similar section 23A exemptions), with 2007 BAC Letter, supra,
at 1-3 & nn.7, 9, and 2006 Wachovia Letter, supra, at 1-3 & n.3 (using language similar to
that contained in the JPMCC and BNYC letters regarding the proposed section 23A
exemptions, as well as citing the same letters as precedent).
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affiliated securities broker-dealers, in order to facilitate the banks'
derivatives trading business.16'
By the mid-2000s, both BANA and Wachovia Bank had
developed thriving businesses trading and dealing in a wide range of
derivatives. 62 As part of their equity derivatives business, they
routinely took significant synthetic long positions in equities.163 Part
of their hedging strategy involved short sales of the underlying
securities, which necessitated reliable access to securities
borrowing." Both BAC and Wachovia argued that borrowing
securities from their affiliates would allow their banks to maintain the
confidential and proprietary nature of their hedging activities and to
lower operating expenses by utilizing the affiliated broker-dealers'
existing securities borrowing infrastructure. 65
Under these proposals, the bank would borrow securities from
an affiliated broker-dealer and collateralize its obligation to return
borrowed securities on demand by cash or U.S. government bonds.'6
Unlike situations where the bank lends securities to affiliates, the
bank's potential risk exposure as a borrower is higher, because the
value of the borrowed securities may fluctuate and is more likely to
161. Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to
Courtney D. Allison, Senior Vice President & Assistant Gen. Counsel, Wachovia Corp. 1-
2 (June 12, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Wachovia Letter], available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2007/20070612/20070612.pdf; Letter
from Robert deV. Frierson, Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to John H. Huffstutler,
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Bank of America Corp. (June 7, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 BAC
Letter], available at http://www.federalreserve.govlboarddocs/legalint/FederalReserve
Act/2005/20050607/.
162. Thus, by the end of 2005, BANA and Wachovia Bank were listed as two of the top
five U.S. commercial banks holding the largest notional amounts of OTC derivatives
contracts. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BANK DERIVATIVES REPORT
FOURTH QUARTER 2005, at 18 tbl.1 (2005), available at http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-
markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/dq405.pdf (showing that, as of December
31, 2005, BANA held over $21.7 trillion in the total notional amount of OTC derivatives,
and Wachovia Bank held over $3.6 trillion). The top five banks collectively accounted for
ninety-six percent of the total notional amount of derivatives contracts in the U.S.
commercial bank system, which at the end of 2005 reached $101.5 trillion. See id. at 1.
163. See 2007 Wachovia Letter, supra note 161, at 1; 2005 BAC Letter, supra note 161.
164. See 2007 Wachovia Letter, supra note 161, at 1; 2005 BAC Letter, supra note 161.
165. See 2007 Wachovia Letter, supra note 161, at 2; 2005 BAC Letter, supra note 161.
166. As is typical in all securities lending and borrowing transactions, the borrower's
obligation would be overcollateralized, so that the market value of the collateral is
between 102% and 105% of the market value of the borrowed securities. In the absence of
an exemption from section 23A requirements, the entire value of the collateral posted by
the bank would have to be counted toward the quantitative limits of section 23A. See, e.g.,
2007 Wachovia Letter, supra note 161, at 3 & n.8. In addition, if the bank borrows equity
securities, section 23A would require that the amount of borrowed securities equal at least
130% of the value of the collateral posted by the bank. See id.
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fall below the value of collateral securing them. Accordingly, the
Board imposed several conditions on the exemption. First, the bank
had to continue to mark to market its securities borrowing
transactions with affiliated broker-dealers on a daily basis.167 Second,
the exemption was limited only to transactions involving borrowing
securities with a "ready market" (i.e., securities publicly traded in the
U.S. or OTC securities quoted by independent market makers in an
interdealer network).'" In addition, with respect to each securities
borrowing transaction, the amount of the bank's unsecured credit
exposure had to be treated as nonexempt and thus count toward the
section 23A quantitative limits.16 Third, the Board conditioned the
exemption on the affiliated broker-dealer borrowing securities from
an unaffiliated third party substantially contemporaneously with, and
on the same basic terms as, the bank's securities-borrowing
transaction with the broker-dealer. 17 0 The purpose of this requirement
was to ensure that these transactions were "bank-driven" and not
designed to provide financing for the affiliate."' Finally, to ensure the
bank's ability to close out securities-borrowing transactions if the
affiliate-lender became insolvent, the bank had to document the
transactions as "securities contracts" for purposes of section 555 of
the Bankruptcy Code.172 As long as all of these conditions were
satisfied, the Board reasoned, exempting proposed transactions
would bring substantial public benefits by reducing the cost of
securities borrowing for the banks and, as a result, making them more
167. See 2007 Wachovia Letter, supra note 161, at 4; 2005 BAC Letter, supra note 161.
168. This condition aims at ensuring the banks do not borrow illiquid securities.
However, the definition used here allows for the borrowing of securities with only limited
liquidity, which may be susceptible to sudden liquidity shocks. See 2007 Wachovia Letter,
supra note 161, at 4; 2005 BAC Letter, supra note 161.
169. 2007 Wachovia Letter, supra note 161, at 4-5; 2005 BAC Letter, supra note 161.
The nonexempt amount consisted of the bank's (1) current unsecured exposure, or the
amount by which the current value of the collateral exceeds the current value of the
borrowed securities; and (2) an estimate of potential future exposure ("PFE"), which
would be initially fixed at six percent of the current market value of the borrowed
securities but may be ultimately calculated based on the bank's internal model. The PFE
seems to function as a sort of safety cushion. See 2007 Wachovia Letter, supra note 161, at
4-5; 2005 BAC Letter, supra note 161.
170. See 2007 Wachovia Letter, supra note 161, at 5; 2005 BAC Letter, supra note 161.
The broker-dealer would repledge the collateral to secure a contemporaneous borrowing
of the same securities from an unaffiliated third party.
171. See 2007 Wachovia Letter, supra note 161, at 5; 2005 BAC Letter, supra note 161.
172. 2007 Wachovia Letter, supra note 161, at 5-6; 2005 BAC Letter, supra note 161. In
certain qualifying securities contracts, the counterparty's ability to liquidate the
transaction generally cannot be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by operation of the
Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 555 (2006).
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competitive in pricing their equity derivatives products and
services.'73
Once again, the Board stressed that these securities-borrowing
transactions, just like the securities-lending transactions previously
exempted from section 23A, remained subject to the market-terms
requirements of section 23B, which would ensure that the banks did
not treat their affiliated broker-dealers more favorably than
unaffiliated counterparties. 17 4 In granting the requested exemptions
for both securities-lending and securities-borrowing transactions, the
Board's focus was on specific mechanisms-such as the requirements
of section 23B and the entity-specific conditions and commitments-
designed to minimize each involved bank's credit exposure to its
securities affiliates. In that respect, the Board appears to diligently
assess the risks to individual banks and to limit the exemptions in a
manner reasonably expected to minimize such risks.
However, what was missing from the Board's interpretive letters,
in some way, is more revealing than what these letters said. All of
these interpretations conspicuously lacked a meaningful discussion of
potential systemic implications of proposed transactions. The Board's
traditionally microprudential approach, with its exclusive focus on
individual institutions' risk exposure, prevented it from exploring how
the proposed transactions fit into, and reflected, the broader
dynamics of the financial market. The Board's persistent failure to
raise that issue before permitting some of the country's largest
commercial banks to engage in high-volume securities lending and
borrowing with their affiliated securities broker-dealers, themselves
major players in capital markets, was a striking omission.
It may be unrealistic to expect the Board to foresee the far-
reaching systemic implications of its day-to-day decision making.
However, situating specific banks' exemption requests in the context
of broader market developments might have altered the Board's risk
calculus. The emphasis on section 23B and the fact that affiliates,
either as lenders or as borrowers of securities from the affiliated
banks, did not get any direct cost advantage and were subject to
industry-wide standards obscures the possibility of indirect
advantages inherent in such arrangements. Thus, the in-house
securities lending programs provide securities firms with continuous
and reliable access to a ready pipeline of securities available for
173. See 2007 Wachovia Letter, supra note 161, at 6; 2005 BAC Letter, supra note 161.
174. See 2007 Wachovia Letter, supra note 161, at 6; 2007 BAC Letter, supra note 160,
at 4; 2006 Wachovia Letter, supra note 160, at 4; 2005 BAC Letter, supra note 161.
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borrowing. Such access may be more important than the pricing,
especially for financial firms actively engaged in securities trading and
dealing.
Although the Board's letters did not specify the purposes for
which the broker-dealers needed to borrow securities from the
affiliated banks on a scale large enough to potentially trigger the
quantitative limits of section 23A, securities firms typically borrow
securities to cover short sales in the course of proprietary trading or
dealing in equity and derivatives instruments.'75 Broker-dealers also
often relend borrowed securities to their customers, including hedge
funds and arbitrageurs, enabling them to engage in short selling and
other complex trading strategies.' 6  Having assured access to
securities held by BNY or Chase Manhattan put their affiliated
broker-dealers in a position to grow both their own proprietary
trading and dealing operations and increase their clients' trading
abilities."' Direct links between availability of securities for
borrowing and the potential rise in the volume and complexity of
speculative market activities involving short selling, as well as a
potential increase in hidden leverage throughout the financial system,
are important factors that should have at least been acknowledged as
the Board deliberated on its decisions. 78
Similarly, permitting large commercial banks like BANA and
Wachovia Bank access to their affiliated broker-dealers' securities
borrowing pipeline gave these banks a potential opportunity to
expand their equity derivatives operations. By the time of the Board's
decisions, U.S. commercial banks had already developed an active
business trading and dealing in OTC derivatives.' Over the past
175. See McCaffrey, supra note 149, at 483.
176. See ASS'N OF BRITISH INSURERS ET AL., supra note 143, at 2.
177. This was particularly relevant because BNY and Chase Manhattan were the two
largest clearing banks in the U.S. and the key trust and custodian institutions on Wall
Street holding huge amounts of customers' securities.
178. It is possible that the Board was fully aware of these potential systemic
consequences of allowing such expanded in-house securities lending and borrowing
programs. However, without access to behind-the-scenes discussion and deliberations,
documented or verbal, it is difficult to ascertain whether the Board took these systemic
considerations into account and made fully informed decisions. One would expect that, if
the Board considered these issues, it would have included at least some references to its
conclusions in the text of the interpretive letters.
179. Thus, in the first quarter of 2005, the total notional amount of derivatives
contracts held by U.S. commercial banks was $91.1 trillion. COMFIROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, OCC BANK DERIVATIVES REPORT, FIRST QUARTER 2005, at 1 (2005),
available at http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/
derivatives/dq105.pdf. In the first quarter of 2007, that same total notional amount was
$144.8 trillion. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC'S QUARTERLY REPORT ON
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three decades, U.S. bank regulators, whose decisions gradually
empowered commercial banks to enter the OTC derivatives market,
have been notoriously oblivious to potential systemic consequences of
this fundamental shift in the U.S. banking industry's business and risk
profile." The Board's decisions show that, as late as mid-2007,
regulators still failed to recognize the significance of this trend for
increasing the levels of risk, complexity, leverage, and
interconnectedness in the financial system. In fact, the Board viewed
increasing the ability of two of the largest depository institutions in
the United States 81 to expand their derivatives trading and dealing
activities as the key public benefit of granting the requested
exemptions.182
Of course, it is not the purpose of this Article to argue that the
Board's use of its exemptive power under section 23A was the direct
cause of the global financial crisis. Making that assertion, especially
with the benefit of hindsight, would be quite a stretch. It is difficult, if
not impossible, to prove that allowing affiliated banks and broker-
dealers to borrow securities from one another did, in fact, lead to
significantly increased volume of short selling and speculative trading
in the financial system, which ultimately contributed to the market
meltdown.8 3 It is important to keep in mind that the Board's actions
under section 23A are only a small piece in a complex and multi-
faceted puzzle. However, a closer look at these obscure and
seemingly mundane administrative actions reveals certain deeply
seated tensions in the operation of the statute.
C. Summary
After the passage of the GLB Act, section 23A gained new
prominence as the principal statutory provision keeping depository
institutions safe from excessive exposure to potentially risky activities
BANK DERIVATIVES ACrIVITIES, FIRST QUARTER 2007, at 1 (2007), available at
http://www.occ.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/dqlO7.pdf.
180. See generally Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives
Changed the "Business of Banking," 63 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1041 (2009) (examining the
evolution of the OCC's decisions allowing national banks to conduct derivatives
activities).
181. By 2007, BANA, JPMorgan Chase, and Wachovia Bank were the three largest
deposit holders in the United States. Eric Dash, Big Bank Stops Effort to Change Law
Limiting Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2007, at C3.
182. See 2007 Wachovia Letter, supra note 161, at 6; 2007 BAC Letter, supra note 160,
at 4.
183. Of course, it is equally hard to prove the absence of any causal link between these
phenomena.
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of nonbank financial institutions. Not surprisingly, the volume of
banks' requests for exemptions from the limitations of section 23A,
and the spectrum of transactions for which exemptions were
requested, increased significantly in comparison to the pre-GLB Act
years.
However, an examination of the Board's decisions shows that,
even on the very eve of a major crisis, the U.S. bank regulators did
not seem to fully appreciate the fundamental changes in the dynamics
of the financial system. The Board's over-reliance on prior precedent,
exclusive focus on entity-level risk, and failure to place proposed
transactions in the broader context limited its ability to identify and
assess potential effects of such transactions on the accumulation of
risk in the financial system. Perhaps, by placing these strategies in the
broader context and by using its review of proposed transactions as
the window into the complex dynamics of the financial market, the
Board might have seen some warning signs of the looming disaster.
And, perhaps, by being more conservative in lifting the restrictions of
section 23A, the Board might have prevented banks from being
saddled with toxic subprime mortgage assets or even curbed the
disastrous overgrowth of shadow banking.
Yet, regulatory nearsightedness is only part of the story. To a
great extent, the Board's approach was a product of an inherently
nonsystemic focus of the statute itself. Systemic risk prevention is not
an explicit purpose of section 23A, which is concerned primarily with
the safety and soundness of individual banks. As the GLB Act
changed the broader context in which section 23A operates, it created
a fundamental mismatch between the statute's entity-centric
approach and the increasing dependence of individual banks' safety
and soundness on systemic factors. It is much more difficult to
maintain the fiction of complete separateness of a commercial bank
from the affiliated nonbank entities within a single financial
conglomerate." As the methods of potential transfer of federal
subsidy from banks to their affiliates become more complex and
sophisticated, and the risks of such transfer are amplified, policing the
section 23A firewall becomes a far more complicated task for the
regulators. Performing that task effectively requires a more explicitly
systemic approach that reflects growing interdependence among
184. See Kera Ritter, Systemic Risk: Task of Prying Apart Interconnected Firms
Daunting Part of "Wind-Down" Rulemaking, BANKING DAILY (Nov. 8, 2010), http://news
.bna.com/bdin/BDLNWB/split-display.adp?fedfid=18383932&vname=bbdbulallissues&fn
=18383932&jd=aOc4u4d3cO&split=0 (stating that the lines between banks and the rest of
the holding company are blurred and intentionally intertwined).
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depository institutions and the rest of today's vast and dynamic
financial system.
As this Part has demonstrated, in the years preceding the latest
global financial crisis, the Board fell short of developing such an
approach. By relaxing statutory constraints in response to exemption
requests, the Board failed to utilize the potential ability of the section
23A regime to reduce incentives for excessive conglomeration and
the growth of the shadow banking system, which were important
contributing factors behind the latest financial crisis.
III. BANKS TO THE RESCUE: THE BOARD'S USE OF EXEMPTIVE
POWER UNDER SECTION 23A DURING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISIS
The inherent weakness of the statutory wall between depository
institutions and their nondepository affiliates became particularly
visible during the recent financial crisis that put intense pressure on
financial conglomerates to use their deposit-taking subsidiaries as a
source of emergency financing for other entities within their
corporate structure.
This Part examines the Board's interpretations issued in the
three-year period between mid-June 2007 (the eruption of the
subprime mortgage crisis in the United States) and mid-2010 (the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act). In these interpretations, the Board
granted numerous financial institutions exemptions from the
quantitative and qualitative requirements of section 23A in order to
prevent the failure of their nonbank businesses and to avert broader
market dislocations, even though such emergency measures
contradicted the fundamental policy goals behind section 23A. This
Part argues that, during the crisis, the Board effectively dismantled
the statutory wall by aggressively using its exemptive authority under
section 23A to make massive infusions of funds from and through the
depository system into the shadow banking sector.
A. Saving the Shadow Banking System
The global financial crisis began in June of 2007, when the U.S.
subprime mortgage markets suddenly collapsed, spreading panic
among investors in a variety of mortgage-related assets and other
financial instruments. An effective creditor run on the shadow
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banking system created an unprecedented liquidity shortage in
various segments of the global financial market.8
1. Saving Mortgage-Backed and Asset-Backed Securities Markets
On August 20, 2007, the Board issued three nearly identical
interpretive letters granting Citigroup, BAC, and JPMCC exemptions
from the quantitative and qualitative limitations of section 23A to
allow their flagship bank subsidiaries (Citibank, BANA, and
JPMorgan Chase Bank, respectively) to engage in certain "securities
financing transactions" ("SFTs") with their affiliated securities
broker-dealers (Citigroup Global Markets, Bank of America
Securities, and JPMorgan Securities, respectively)." In these letters,
the Board allowed each of these three largest U.S. banks to extend
credit in the form of reverse securities repurchase (reverse repo)'"8
and securities borrowing transactions to their securities affiliates,
which would then enter into mirror image transactions with
unaffiliated third parties. The purpose of these back-to-back
transactions was to inject short-term liquidity into the markets for
mortgage-backed and other asset-backed securities, gripped by
sudden liquidity shock in the wake of the subprime fallout,'TM  by
185. For a comprehensive examination of the causes and key lessons of the financial
crisis of 2007-2009, see generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011) [hereinafter FCIC
FINAL REPORT], available at www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf.
186. See Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to
Patrick S. Antrim, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Bank of Am. Corp. 1-5 (Aug. 20, 2007)
[hereinafter BAC SFT Letter], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
legalint/FederalReserveAct/2007/20070820a/20070820a.pdf; Letter from Robert deV.
Frierson, Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to Carl Howard, Gen. Counsel, Citigroup
Inc. 1-5 (Aug. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Citigroup SFT Letter], available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2007/20070820b/20070820b.pdf; Letter
from Robert deV. Frierson, Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to Kathleen A. Juhase,
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 1-5 (Aug. 20, 2007) [hereinafter JPMCC SFT Letter], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2007/20070820cl200
70820c.pdf.
187. A reverse repo is a regular securities repo transaction but from the viewpoint of
the buyer of securities (or the lender of cash) rather than the seller (or the borrower of
cash). See Gabilondo, supra note 151, at 458 (stating that a reverse repo is a repo viewed
from the other side of the transaction). Thus, the seller of securities would characterize the
transaction as a repo, while the buyer of securities would characterize it as a reverse repo.
For a definition of a securities repo, see supra note 151.
188. Thus, according to one commentator,
The repo market virtually disappeared in August 2007 and the drought has lasted
for months. The repo market dried up because dealer banks would not accept
collateral because they rightly believed that if they had to seize the collateral,
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enabling the three major securities broker-dealers to continue trading
and dealing in these illiquid assets. 18 9
In each case, the exemption was granted for SFTs in the
aggregate amount of up to $25 billion, which constituted less than
thirty percent of each of the three banks' total regulatory capital and,
therefore, was far above the quantitative limit of section 23A for
extensions of credit to a single affiliate." Within the next few months,
the Board granted substantively identical exemptions from section
23A to Deutsche Bank, 191 Barclays Bank,'" and Royal Bank of
Scotland, 93 allowing these banks' U.S. branches to engage in the
there would be no market in which to sell it. This is due to the absence of prices.
The amount lent depends on the perceived market value of the asset offered as
security. If that value cannot be determined, because there is no market-no
liquidity-, or there is the concern that if the asset is seized by the lender, it will
not be saleable at all, then lender will not engage in repo.
Gary B. Gorton, The Panic of 2007, at 67 (Yale Sch. of Mgmt. & Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 08-24, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract id=1255362.
189. This arrangement allowed the broker-dealers to extend financing to market
participants against illiquid collateral (mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities,
possibly interests in CDOs and other structured products), while funding their obligations
by simultaneous borrowing from their affiliated banks against that same collateral. In the
shadow banking system, large volumes of trading in various types of asset-backed
securities and structured products, including CDO tranches, were financed through repos
and securities borrowing. Large securities broker-dealers were central players in these
markets, intermediating the complex flows of funds and assets. Once the U.S. subprime
mortgage market collapsed and the market value of mortgage-backed and other asset-
backed securities fell, such short-term secured financing quickly disappeared. Using
commercial banks as a source of liquidity was meant to support these major dealer-firms'
ability to maintain the market by continuing trading and dealing in these assets. For a
detailed discussion of the causes and mechanics of the subprime mortgage crisis, see
generally the FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 185; Wilmarth, supra note 135; Gorton,
supra note 188.
190. Section 23A limits extensions of credit to a single affiliate to ten percent of the
bank's capital stock and surplus. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1) (2006) (amended 2010).
191. Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to
Michael L. Kadish, Deutsche Bank AG 3-5 (Sept. 12, 2007), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2007/20070912/2007
0912.pdf. The exemption was granted for up to $13 billion, which constituted less than
thirty percent of the bank's total regulatory capital. Id. at 3.
192. Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to
Alan B. Kaplan, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Ams., Barclays Bank PLC 3-5 (Oct. 11, 2007),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2007/
20071011/20071011.pdf. The exemption was granted for up to $20 billion, which
constituted less than thirty percent of the bank's total regulatory capital. Id. at 3.
193. Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to
Jay Levine, Head of RBS Global Banking & Mkts., N. Am., Royal Bank of Scotland PLC
3-5 (Oct. 12, 2007), available at http://www.federal reserve.govfboarddocs/legalint/
FederalReserveAct/2007/20071012/20071012.pdf. The exemption was granted for up to
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same types of securities financing transactions with their affiliated
U.S. securities broker-dealers. These decisions unlocked an additional
$43 billion in potential short-term liquidity, bringing the total amount
of exempt SFTs to $118 billion.'94
This was an extraordinary set of decisions. Never before had the
Board removed the quantitative and qualitative requirements of
section 23A, on such a massive scale, in order to prop up broader
markets in distress-a systemic concern that goes far beyond the
specific purposes of the statute. In fact, the effect of these exemptions
was directly contrary to the twin statutory purposes of protecting
depository institutions from losses in transactions with affiliates and
limiting the ability of depository institutions to transfer to affiliates
the subsidy arising from the institutions' access to the federal safety
net.'95 In these transactions, the risks associated with lending against
illiquid collateral, such as mortgage-backed securities and other
potentially "toxic" assets, were shifted to depository institutions,
including the three largest commercial banks in the country.
Moreover, these exemptions were granted in conjunction with the
Board establishing a special discount window lending facility that
gave depository institutions access to term loans (instead of the
typical overnight loans) at the discount window and lowered the
discount rate for such loans.'96 The Board specifically made these
exemptions temporary, to stay in effect only for as long as that special
discount window lending facility was outstanding.'" The removal of
$10 billion, which constituted less than thirty percent of the bank's total regulatory capital.
Id. at 3.
194. Of course, this amount represents only the aggregate capacity of the six banks to
engage in the SFTs under the exemption. In practice, the banks might not have used the
total capacity and might have extended less credit to their affiliated broker-dealers under
the exempt SFTs.
195. See Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 67 Fed. Reg.
76,560, 76,560 (Dec. 12, 2002).
196. The Board's first order of business in responding to the financial crisis was making
it easier for banks to borrow money. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Federal
Reserve Approves Modifications to the Terms of Its Discount Window Lending Program
(Feb. 18, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/
20100218a.htm. On August 17, 2007, the Board reduced the spread of the primary credit
rate (or the discount rate) over the federal funds target rate from 1% to 0.5% and
lengthened the typical maximum maturity of discount loans from overnight to thirty days.
Id. On December 12, 2007, the Board established the Term Auction Facility ("TAF") to
provide additional liquidity to depository institutions. On March 16, 2008, the Board
further lowered the spread of the discount rate over the target federal funds rate to 0.25%
and extended the maximum maturity of discount window loans to ninety days. Id.
197. All six exemptions were terminated on March 18, 2010, when the typical
maximum maturity for banks' discount window borrowing returned to overnight. See
Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to Patrick
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the statutory restrictions enabled precisely the kind of a large-scale
transfer of the federal subsidy from depository institutions to their
securities affiliates and their counterparties in capital markets that the
statute sought to minimize.
To bolster its claim that the exemptions were consistent with the
purposes of section 23A, the Board stressed that the proposed
transactions were meant explicitly to extend credit to unaffiliated
third-party participants in the liquidity-starved markets for mortgage-
backed securities, CDOs, and other structured products, and that the
broker-dealer affiliates were mere conduits for this substantial
injection of liquidity into these markets.' Thus, the Board
concluded, granting an exemption from section 23A would have
significant public benefits.'99 However, it is hard to deny that these
extraordinary liquidity backup programs also functioned to prop up
the banks' broker-dealer affiliates, which could not have continued to
operate and possibly faced failure as a result of market collapse.200
S. Antrim, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Bank of Ams. Corp. 1 (Mar. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2010/20100318/2010
0318a.pdf; Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd.,
to Alan B. Kaplan, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Americas, Barclays Bank PLC 1 (Mar. 18,
2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserve
Act/2010/20100318/20100318e.pdf; Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the
Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to Carl Howard, Gen. Counsel, Citigroup Inc. 1 (Mar. 18, 2010),
available at http://www.federalreserve.govfboarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2010/
20100318/20100318b.pdf; Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed.
Reserve Bd., to Michael L. Kadish, Dir. & Senior Counsel, Deutsche Bank AG 1 (Mar. 18,
2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserve
Act/2010/20100318/20100318d.pdf; Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the
Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to Kathleen A. Juhase, Senior Vice President & Assoc. Gen.
Counsel, JPMorgan Chase & Co. 1 (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2010/20100318/20100318c.pdf; Letter
from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to Jay Levine,
Head of RBS Global Banking & Mkts., Royal Bank of Scotland PLC 1 (Mar. 18, 2010),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2010/20
100318/20100318f.pdf.
198. The Board somewhat euphemistically refers to "operational reasons" for back-to-
back transactions instead of direct extension of bank credit to market participants. See
BAC SFT Letter, supra note 186, at 1; Citigroup SFT Letter, supra note 186, at 1; JPMCC
SFT Letter, supra note 186, at 1. According to the Board, using the affiliated broker-
dealer as the conduit was "the most rapid and cost-effective" method of injecting liquidity
into the market. BAC SFT Letter, supra note 186, at 4; Citigroup SFT Letter, supra note
186, at 4; JPMCC SFT Letter, supra note 186, at 4. As a practical matter, it was a product
of the structure and operation of the market for these assets, and these dealer-firms'
multiple roles in it. See supra note 189.
199. See BAC SFT Letter, supra note 186, at 4; Citigroup SFT Letter, supra note 186,
at 4; JPMCC SFT Letter, supra note 186, at 4.
200. For an analysis of potential vulnerabilities of securities broker-dealers in the OTC
markets, see Durrell Duffie, The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks 10-14 (Bank for Int'l
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Their affiliated broker-dealers were the "conduits" for these
emergency securities financing transactions because they were in the
business of creating, trading, and dealing in securities that needed
such financing and, as a result, had direct exposure to these highly
unstable markets. 201
The Board imposed several conditions on the exemptions similar
to those found in its earlier exemptions for banks' securities
borrowing from affiliates." Thus, the proposed SIFTs had to be over-
collateralized at all times, marked to market on a daily basis, and
remain subject to daily margin maintenance requirements. 203 To
assure the banks' ability to promptly close out and liquidate the
posted collateral in the event of the affiliated broker-dealers'
bankruptcy, all SFfs had to qualify as "securities contracts" under the
Bankruptcy Code.21 The Board also required that each broker-dealer
execute an SFT with an unaffiliated market participant
contemporaneously and on the same terms as the SFT with its
affiliated bank.205 Finally, the SFs remained "subject to the market-
terms requirement of section 23B."206
One can reasonably question the practical significance of these
conditions as effective mechanisms for limiting banks' risk, given the
illiquid nature of the collateral securing the broker-dealers'
obligations. The very purpose of exempting the SFTs was to provide
secured financing for assets whose market value was negatively
affected by the subprime mortgage crisis.207 Conditionality based on
Settlements, BIS Working Paper No. 301, 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
work30l.pdf.
201. See Greg Ip, Fed's Credit Window Does Brisk Business, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24,
2007, at A2 (explaining that, in Citigroup's case, the exemption was granted in order to
facilitate the financing of mortgage-related assets). More than half of Citigroup's losses in
the crisis came from mortgage-related securities created in-house. See Eric Dash & Julie
Creswell, Citigroup Pays for Rush to Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at N1.
202. See supra notes 166-74 and accompanying text.
203. See BAC SFT Letter, supra note 186, at 3; Citigroup SFT Letter, supra note 186,
at 3; JPMCC SFT Letter, supra note 186, at 3.
204. BAC SFT Letter, supra note 186, at 3 n.7 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 555 (2006));
Citigroup SFT Letter, supra note 186, at 3 n.7 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 555 (2006)); JPMCC
SFT Letter, supra note 186, at 3 n.7 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 555 (2006)).
205. BAC SFT Letter, supra note 186, at 3; Citigroup SFT Letter, supra note 186, at 3;
JPMCC SFT Letter, supra note 186, at 3.
206. BAC SFT Letter, supra note 186, at 4; Citigroup SFT Letter, supra note 186, at 4;
JPMCC SFT Letter, supra note 186, at 4.
207. For these reasons, the Board did not subject the proposed SFTs to all of the
conditions typical for securities borrowing transactions previously exempted from section
23A. Thus, under the Board's previous exemptions for banks borrowing securities from
affiliated broker-dealers, such securities had to have a "ready market" and the amount of
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pre-crisis precedent appears to be largely a cosmetic device in the
context of the financial crisis that had just begun to unfold.
2. Auction-Rate Securities and Other Consumer Finance Markets
The Board used a similar approach to grant exemptions from the
requirements of section 23A for transactions whereby depository
institutions were allowed to purchase assets from their affiliates in
order to inject liquidity into the markets for auction-rate securities
("ARS") and similar instruments. ARS are long-term debt securities
with an interest rate that resets periodically in an auction process,
effectively turning it into short-term debt.208 Before the crisis, ARS
were widely used to finance municipal bonds, student loans, and a
variety of other debt.20 Investment banks and brokerages that sold
ARS and managed auctions often provided liquidity support for the
securities by submitting bids in the absence of sufficient investor
interest and committing to repurchase ARS from their holders on
short notice.210 In early 2008, as institutional investors withdrew from
the ARS market and mounting financial difficulties forced securities
firms to stop supporting ARS auctions, the ARS market came under
severe liquidity strain.2 11
In December 2008 and January 2009, the Board issued four
interpretations exempting bank purchases of ARS from their
securities affiliates from the requirements of section 23A and
the bank's unsecured credit exposure (which is inversely related to the market value of
borrowed securities) was not exempt from the quantitative limits of section 23A. See 2007
Wachovia Letter, supra note 161, at 4-5 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(11)(i) (2007));
2005 BAC Letter, supra note 161.
208. See Gretchen Morgenson, The Investors Who Can't Come in from the Cold, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2008, at BUL. Thus, auctions resetting ARS rates could be held as
frequently as every seven, twenty-eight, or thirty-five days. See, e.g., WELLS FARGO SEC.,
AUCTION RATE SECURITIES: OVERVIEW, FEATURES, AND RISK 2-3 (2009), available at
https://saf.wellsfargoadvisors.comlemx/dctm/Marketing/MarketingMaterials/FixedInco
meBonds/E6581.pdf.
209. See FCIC SHADOW BANKING REPORT, supra note 136, at 22. The ARS issuers
benefitted from being able to issue long-term debt at short-term rates and the investors
viewed them as liquid and near risk-free assets.
210. Id.
211. See Jenny Anderson & Vikas Bajaj, New Trouble in Auction-Rate Securities, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at C6. As a result of massive auction failures, the issuers were
contractually forced to pay interest on their securities at high penalty rates. See Gretchen
Morgenson, If You Can't Sell, Good Luck, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2008, at BUL. Securities
firms that underwrote and sold ARS became targets of investor lawsuits and government
investigations into their sales practices. See Eric Dash & Louise Story, 2 Big Banks Buying
Back Securities, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2008, at Cl (discussing settlements by Citigroup and
Merrill Lynch).
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Regulation W.21 2 From the outset, the Board stressed that the
proposals for which exemptions were requested arose directly "out of
ongoing dislocations in the ARS market."213 In all cases, the banks'
securities affiliates were active participants in ARS markets,
underwriting, selling, and purchasing the ARS through trusts and
other special purpose entities set up specifically for that purpose.214
Because of a contractual obligation or as an accommodation to their
clients seeking to liquidate their ARS holdings in the illiquid market,
the banks' securities affiliates had to repurchase the ARS from their
current holders.215 Transferring these ARS to commercial banks was
meant to provide financing for these purchases.
212. See Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd.,
to William E. Stern, Goodwin Procter LLP (Fifth Third Bank) 4-5 (Jan. 30, 2009)
[hereinafter Fifth Third Bank Letter], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocslegalint/FederalReserveAct/2009/20090130/20090130.pdf; Letter from Robert
deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to Charles M. Horn, Mayer
Brown LLP (BB&T Corp.) 5 (Jan. 9, 2009) [hereinafter BB&T Letter], available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2009/20090109/2009
0109_1.pdf; Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd.,
to Jennifer M. Dirkin, Senior Attorney, N. Trust Corp. 3 (Jan. 9, 2009) [hereinafter
Northern Trust Letter], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocslegalint/
FederalReserveAct/2009/20090109/20090109_- 2.pdf; Letter from Robert deV. Frierson,
Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to H. Rodgin Cohen, Sullivan & Cromwell
LLP (Wachovia Bank) 4-5 (Dec. 29, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Wachovia Letter], available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2008/20081229/
20081229.pdf (granting exemption allowing Wachovia Bank to purchase up to $7 billion of
ARS from two affiliated securities broker-dealers).
213. 2008 Wachovia Letter, supra note 212, at 1.
214. Technically speaking, both BB&T Corporation and the Fifth Third Bancorp
requested exemptions for purchases of variable rate demand notes ("VRDNs") and
tender option bonds ("TOBs"). See Fifth Third Bank Letter, supra note 212, at 1
(requesting exemption for purchases of VRDNs only); BB&T Letter, supra note 212, at 1
(requesting exemption for purchases of both VRDNs and TOBs). VRDNs are very similar
to ARS; interest rates on VRDNs are reset either weekly or daily through an auction-like
process that is similar to the ARS auction. Municipal Bond Turmoil: Impact on Cities,
Towns, and States: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 5 (2008)
(statement of Martin Vogtsberger, Regional Bond Dealers Ass'n), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/hearingll0/vogtsbergerO3l208.pdf. However, unlike
ARS, VRDNs have an explicit contractual liquidity support (so-called "hard put") from
the remarketing agent (the securities firm that underwrites and markets VRDNs) and a
liquidity credit line from a bank. Thus, both BB&T Corporation and the Fifth Third Bank
provided such liquidity facility for the VRDNs sold and remarketed by their securities
affiliates. TOBs are essentially securitizations of long-term fixed-rate municipal bonds,
which pay variable interest at rates reset periodically in a remarketing process. Id. Like
VRDNS, TOBs have a "hard put" that assures liquidity support. For a more detailed
description of these instruments, see id. For the sake of simplicity, the following discussion
includes VRDNs and TOBs in the general category of ARS.
215. Thus, the Northern Trust Corporation ("NTC"), the parent company of the
Northern Trust Company, offered, as an accommodation to its customers, to purchase at
par the ARS that its securities subsidiary sold to them. See Northern Trust Letter, supra
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Wachovia Bank's request for an exemption presents a
particularly interesting case. In August 2008, two of Wachovia Bank's
securities affiliates, Wachovia Securities, LLC, and Wachovia Capital
Markets, LLC (collectively, "Wachovia Securities"), reached a
preliminary agreement to settle the charges that the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") and various state regulators had
brought against them for alleged misrepresentations Wachovia
Securities made to its customers about the liquidity risk of the ARS it
underwrote, marketed, and sold.216 As part of the settlement,
Wachovia Securities agreed to purchase, at par, certain ARS sold to
their retail and institutional customers before February 14, 2008.217 In
December 2008, the Board granted Wachovia Bank's request for an
exemption from the quantitative and qualitative limitations of section
23A to permit it to purchase up to $7 billion of ARS from Wachovia
Securities.218
The Board indicated that granting the exemption was in the
public interest because "it would facilitate the provision of liquidity
by Wachovia to customers holding unexpectedly illiquid securities as
a result of dislocation in the ARS market." 2 19 To protect the bank
from excessive risk of loss, the Board imposed a long list of
conditions.220 Some of these conditions were the familiar ones from
the long line of the Board's precedent: the parent company's
commitment to "repurchase from the bank, on a quarterly basis" the
note 212, at 1. In the cases of BB&T Corporation and the Fifth Third Bank, the holders of
the ARS had a contractual right, in the event of a failed remarketing, to sell those ARS
back to the remarketing agents (the banks' securities affiliates) or the trusts that issued
them. The trusts had the right to draw on the banks' credit support facility to finance those
repurchases. See Fifth Third Bank Letter, supra note 212, at 1-2; BB&T Letter, supra note
212, at 1-2.
216. See Press Release, SEC, Wachovia Agrees to Preliminary Auction Rate Securities
Settlement that Would Offer Approximately $9 Billion to Investors (Aug. 15, 2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-176.htm. Specifically, it was alleged
that Wachovia Securities falsely represented to investors that ARS were essentially cash
equivalents and failed to disclose to them that the liquidity of these securities depended on
Wachovia Securities' support for the auctions, and that Wachovia Securities was not
obligated to continue providing such liquidity support. Id.
217. Id. Wachovia Securities was one of several major investment banks that settled
similar charges with the SEC and state regulators. The list included JPMCC, Morgan
Stanley, Citigroup, UBS, and other firms. See Patrick Temple-West & Yvette Shields,
Wachovia to Buy Back $8.8 Billion of ARS, BOND BUYER, Aug. 18, 2008, at 1, available at
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/117-157/-293538-1.html?zkPrintable=true.
218. 2008 Wachovia Letter, supra note 212, at 4-5. That amount represented
approximately eleven percent of the bank's total capital stock and surplus, which exceeded
the statutory limit on transactions with any single affiliate. Id. at 4.
219. Id. at 3.
220. Id. at 4.
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transferred assets "that become low-quality assets"; the requirement
that both the bank and the parent remain "well-capitalized" after the
transfer; and the prerequisite that assets are purchased at fair market
value.221 In addition, the Board required that all purchased ARS be
highly-rated2 22 and that Wachovia Bank and its parent company
(initially, Wachovia and then Wells Fargo & Company ("WFC") as
its successor entity) enter into a repurchase agreement giving the
bank the right to sell the ARS to the parent, by July 31, 2010, at the
full purchase price plus interest.223
The Board imposed similar conditions and limits on other
exemptions for bank purchases of ARS from their securities affiliates.
In each of those cases, the Board also imposed some temporal limits
on the exemption, which highlighted the emergency nature of these
transactions designed explicitly for the purpose of alleviating the
ongoing disruptions in the ARS market. Thus, the Board either
mandated that all ARS had to be repurchased from the bank by the
bank's parent company by a certain future date24 or limited the ARS
eligible for the exemption to those repurchased by the securities
affiliate from its customers before a certain date.225
Much like in the SFT? exemptions discussed above, the Board's
conditions, designed on their face to satisfy the statutory requirement
that the exemptions it grants be consistent with the purposes of
section 23A, may fall short of achieving that goal in practice. For
instance, the requirements that banks purchase only ARS with a high
investment grade rating and purchase them at their fair market value
seem less meaningful when placed in the context of the almost
completely illiquid ARS market.226 Similarly, in the midst of the
221. Id. On October 3, 2008, Wells Fargo & Company ("WFC") entered into an
agreement to acquire Wachovia Corporation ("Wachovia"), so the Board's conditions
applied specifically to both WFC and Wachovia. Id. at 2. One of the conditions of the
exemption was the requirement that WFC succeed to Wachovia's obligations and
commitments made in connection with this exemption. Id. at 4.
222. Specifically, the Board required that all ARS be externally rated investment
grade, and the majority be rated in the two highest categories of investment grade debt. Id.
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Northern Trust Letter, supra note 212, at 3 (stating that NTC had to
repurchase the transferred ARS from the bank by July 31, 2010, at the price the bank paid
plus any accrued interest).
225. See, e.g., Fifth Third Bank Letter, supra note 212, at 4 (stating that "the exemption
appli[ed] only to covered transactions [involving securities] purchased by [the bank's
affiliated broker-dealer] from customers on or before December 31, 2009"); BB&T Letter,
supra note 212, at 4 (same).
226. Of course, the assumption behind this requirement was that the relevant ARS
were fundamentally sound financial investments, which was reflected in their high credit
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financial crisis, the BHCs' commitments to protect their subsidiary
banks from losses on the purchased assets are considerably less
reliable protective devices than they might be under normal
circumstances. The Board's pre-crisis precedent is of limited value
where the explicit purpose of the exemption is to allow financial
conglomerates to use depository institutions' access to federal subsidy
and emergency government support not only to inject liquidity into
specific markets but to alleviate the significant financial strain on
their securities subsidiaries. After all, it was that logic that guided the
Board's decision to permit Wachovia to shift up to $7 billion in
illiquid ARS from its securities subsidiaries to Wachovia Bank, one of
the largest U.S. commercial banks.227
As the crisis deepened, the Board granted a series of exemptions
from section 23A and Regulation W for various transactions that
allowed banks to directly support markets for consumer and student
loans, which were severely affected by the near complete halt in
securitization financing.228 These cases exhibited the same pattern in
ratings, and thus were likely to regain their value once the temporary liquidity squeeze
was over.
227. Wachovia Securities fulfilled its obligations to repurchase ARS from customers
under its settlement with the SEC. See Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Completes Review
of Performance by Citigroup, RBC and Wachovia Under Auction Rate Securities
Settlements (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/
Ir21585.htm. According to the SEC, Wachovia purchased $7.45 billion of ARS from its
retail and institutional customers. Id.
228. See, e.g., Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve
Bd., to William J. Sweet, Jr., Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (CIT Bank) 4
(Apr. 13, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.govfboarddocslegalint/Federal
ReserveAct/2009/20090413/20090413.pdf (allowing the newly converted CIT Bank to
acquire all the shares of three nonbank affiliates engaged in student loan financing and
securitization as part of consolidation of the consumer lending operations of the CIT
Corporation); Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve
Bd., to John G. Holinka, HSBC Bank USA, N.A. 4-5 (Jan. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.govboarddocslegalint/FederalReserveAct/2009/20090114/2009
0114.pdf (allowing HSBC Bank USA to acquire from its affiliate a portfolio of subprime
and near-prime automobile loans, credit card loans, and related securitized interests);
Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to William
S. Eckland, Sidley Austin LLP (GE Money Bank) 4 (Jan. 12, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2009/20090112/2009
0112.pdf (allowing GE Money Bank to purchase consumer loan receivables from affiliates
as part of the consolidation of the consumer lending business of GE Capital Corporation);
Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to Daniel F.
Kaplan, Perry, Guthery, Haase & Gessford, P.C., L.L.0 (Union Bank & Trust Co.) 3
(Nov. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Union Bank Letter], available at http://www.federal
reserve.govfboarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2008/20081126/20081126.pdf
(exempting a purchase by Union Bank & Trust Company of federally guaranteed student
loans from its affiliate, Nelnet, Inc., one of the country's largest originators, holders, and
servicers of student loans).
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the Board's approach: in times of extreme distress in financial
markets, the limitations of section 23A were lifted to allow banks to
come to the rescue of their nonbank affiliates. And, again, the Board
got around that sensitive issue by stressing the public benefits of
maintaining liquidity in consumer markets.229
3. Exemptions by Regulation: Saving Money Market Funds and Tri-
Party Repo Markets
While the majority of the Board's exemptions were issued "by
order," or in an individualized action upon a specific request from a
financial institution, in two instances the Board felt it was necessary
to grant broad-based exemptions from the requirements of section
23A, albeit on a temporary basis. These cases involved two critically
important sources of short-term funding: the money markets and the
tri-party repo markets.230
Money market funds, which were major investors in the
commercial paper, short-term bond, and securities repo markets,
experienced serious turmoil in the fall of 2008.' On September 16,
2008, the oldest money market fund in the United States, Reserve
Primary Fund, which was heavily exposed to bankrupt Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc. ("Lehman Brothers"), "broke the buck" and
set off an investor run on money market funds. 2 Faced with
mounting redemption requests, money market funds were forced to
liquidate assets and withdraw from buying corporate commercial
paper, which caused serious concerns about companies' ability to roll
over their debt used to fund their day-to-day operations.233
229. See, e.g., Union Bank Letter, supra note 228, at 3.
230. For a definition of tri-party repos and a description of how tri-party repo markets
operate, see infra note 241.
231. As of the end of 2008, money market funds had approximately $3.8 trillion in
assets under management. They held 40% of all outstanding commercial paper (which
made them by far the largest investor in that vital market), 23% of all repurchase
agreements, 65% of state and local government short-term debt, 24% of short-term
treasury securities, and 44% of short-term agency securities. Money Market Fund Reform,
Exchange Act Release No. IC-28807, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688, 32,689 (proposed June 30,
2009).
232. See Christopher Condon, Reserve Primary Money Fund Falls Below $1 a Share,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 16, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=a502y1golGRU. The term "breaking the buck" refers to a fall in the money market
fund's net asset value ("NAV") of $1.00 per share. Id. The fall in the NAV of the Reserve
Primary Fund to ninety-seven cents per share was only the second such instance in the
nearly four-decade long history of U.S. money market mutual funds, with the first case
occurring in 1994. Id.
233. See Money Market Fund Reform, Exchange Act Release No. IC-28807, 74 Fed.
Reg. at 32,692. Thus, in the final two weeks of September 2008, money market funds
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Within three days, the federal government staged an
unprecedented market intervention in order to stabilize money
market funds and provide liquidity to the short-term debt markets.
On September 19, 2008, the Treasury Department introduced a
temporary guarantee program for certain investments in participating
money market funds.234 At the same time, the Board established the
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund
Liquidity Facility ("AMLF"), which provided nonrecourse loans at
the discount window rate to U.S. depository institutions and BHC to
finance their purchases of highly-rated asset-backed commercial
paper ("ABCP") from money market mutual funds.235 The purpose of
the AMLF was to enable money market funds to sell some of their
secured assets at amortized cost, and to use the proceeds to meet
requests for redemptions by investors, as well as to foster liquidity in
the commercial paper markets.236
To enable banks to take full advantage of the AMLF, the Board
amended Regulation W to grant a temporary exemption from the
quantitative and qualitative requirements of section 23A for member
banks' purchases of the ABCP from affiliated money market funds, if
(1) the purchases were made on or after September 19, 2008; (2) the
bank used the purchased ABCP as collateral securing the loan from
the AMLF; and (3) the Board had not specifically informed the bank
reduced their holdings of top-rated commercial paper by $200.3 billion, or twenty-nine
percent. Id.
234. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Guaranty
Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 19 2008), available at http://www.treasury
.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hpl147.aspx. The Treasury's guarantee program
expired on September 19, 2009. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury
Announces Expiration of the Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 19,
2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg293.aspx.
235. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve
Board Announces Two Enhancements to Its Programs to Provide Liquidity to Markets
(Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/
20080919a.htm.
236. Id. The AMLF program was originally scheduled to expire on January 31, 2009,
but was extended and eventually expired on February 1, 2010. Press Release, Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Board Announces Extensions of and
Modifications to a Number of Liquidity Programs (June 25, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20090625a.htm. In addition to
the AMLF, the Board also established a separate Commercial Paper Funding Facility
("CPFF"), to provide liquidity directly to commercial paper markets. See Commercial
Paper Funding Facility, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/cpff.htm (last updated Feb. 5, 2010). For
more detailed information on the AMLF, see Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money
Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/abcpmmmf.htm (last updated Feb. 5, 2010).
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that it could not use the exemption.237 The exemption was to remain
in effect until the expiration of the AMLF. In the preamble to the
final rule, the Board stressed that granting this exemption was in the
public interest because it facilitated usage of the AMLF and thus
helped to resolve liquidity problems in the money markets.238 The
Board also reasoned that the exemption was "consistent with the
purposes of section[] 23A," because the nonrecourse financing
provided under the AMLF effectively protected the banks from risk
associated with holding the ABCP and "largely mitigate[d] the safety-
and-soundness concerns that sections 23A and 23B were designed to
address." 239 Characteristically, however, the Board neglected to
mention the second, equally important, purpose of the statute: to
prevent the transfer of the federal subsidy from depository
institutions to their affiliates. In fact, this exemption was adopted
precisely to enable the transfer of such special federal subsidy,
available to banks through the AMLF, to affiliated money market
funds.240
237. 12 C.F.R. § 223.42(o) (2010). The Board adopted an interim final rule, bypassing
the more typical "peacetime" process of issuing a proposed rule and soliciting comments,
granting this exemption on the same day as it established the AMLF. See Transactions
Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 73 Fed. Reg. 55,708, 55,708 (Sept. 26, 2008).
The final rule, adopted on January 30, 2009, essentially restated the exemption in the
interim rule but reflected an extension of the AMLF program past the originally
scheduled expiration date. Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 74
Fed. Reg. 6,226, 6,227 (Feb. 6, 2009) (stating that the AMLF was extended until April 30,
2009).
238. Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 74 Fed. Reg. at 6,227.
239. Id.
240. Although the Board granted a general exemption for banks' purchases of ABCP
from affiliated money market funds by regulation, it also granted two specific exemptions
upon request by individual banking institutions. See Letter from Robert deV. Frierson,
Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to [Redacted] 2-3 (Dec. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2008/20081201/2008
1201.pdf; Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to
[Redacted] 2-3 (Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
legalint/FederalReserveAct/2008/20081006/20081006.pdf.
It is not entirely clear why these institutions had to request exemptions, but it
appears that the purchases involved money market funds' assets other than the ABCP and
were not financed through the AMLF. The Board based its decisions on the same public
interest rationale. The Board reasoned that granting such exemptions would have
significant public benefit because they would enable the funds to meet redemption
requests without having to sell their assets into the fragile and illiquid money markets.
Letter from Robert deV. Frierson to [Redacted] (Dec. 1, 2008), supra, at 2; Letter from
Robert deV. Frierson to [Redacted] (Oct. 6, 2008), supra, at 2. In both cases, the Board
imposed a number of familiar conditions on the exemptions: the assets had to be
externally rated at A-1/P-1 and purchased by the bank at fair market value, the parent
company had to reimburse the bank for any losses sustained by the bank in connection
with the purchased assets, and both the bank and its parent company had to remain well-
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The same need to save short-term funding markets from collapse
drove another amendment to Regulation W, which provided a
temporary exemption from the requirements of section 23A for
certain securities financing transactions in order to provide
emergency liquidity support to the U.S. tri-party repo market.241
It is difficult to overestimate the significance of the U.S. tri-party
repo market, in which two government securities clearing banks,
JPMorgan Chase Bank ("JPMC Bank") and Bank of New York
Mellon ("BNYM"), serve as the tri-party repo agents.242 Securities
broker-dealers obtain a significant portion of financing for their own
and their clients' inventories through tri-party repos, making it a huge
and vitally important market.243 At its peak in early 2008, the tri-party
repo market reached about $2.8 trillion, which declined to about $1.7
trillion in early 2010.24 Collateral used to secure tri-party repos
typically consists of U.S. Treasury securities and agency mortgage-
backed securities.245 In early 2008, at the market's peak, about thirty
percent of the collateral securing tri-party repos consisted of various
capitalized for as long as the exemption was in effect. Letter from Robert deV. Frierson to
[Redacted] (Dec. 1, 2008), supra, at 2-3; Letter from Robert deV. Frierson to [Redacted]
(Oct. 6, 2008), supra, at 2-3. In both cases, the exemptions were granted for a specified
period of time and limited to the amount necessary to cover redemption requests by
investors in the affiliated money market funds.
241. Tri-party repos are securities repos in which a third party, the tri-party agent,
participates in the transaction along with the cash lender (typically, money market funds
and mutual funds, custodial banks investing cash collateral on behalf of their securities
lending customers, government entities, and other investors seeking relatively stable short-
term secured lending opportunities) and the cash borrower (typically, securities broker-
dealers, hedge funds, and other leveraged investors). FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., TRI-
PARTY REPO INFRASTRUCTURE REFORM 6 (2010) [hereinafter FRBNY WHITE PAPER],
available at http://www.ny.frb.org/banking/nyfrb-triparty-.whitepaper.pdf. The agent
facilitates the transaction by providing operational services, including custody of securities,
valuation of collateral, and settlement of cash and securities. Id.
242. PAYMENTS RISK COMM. TASK FORCE ON TRI-PARTY REPO INFRASTRUCTURE,
REPORT 3 (2010) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT], available at http://www.newyork
fed.org/prc/report100517.pdf.
243. Id. ("The importance of the U.S. [tri-party] repo market is underscored by the fact
that it is the market in which the Federal Reserve operationally implements U.S.
monetary policy.").
244. FRBNY WHITE PAPER, supra note 241, at 6. Tri-party repos offered a variety of
benefits for securities broker-dealers and other cash borrowers, including a preferential
treatment under the Bankruptcy Code. See id. at 11-12 (discussing the general benefits of
tri-party repos); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra, note 242, at 3 (explaining the bankruptcy
treatment).
245. FRBNY WHITE PAPER, supra note 241, at 8. "Agency" securities are securities
issued by the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") and Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"), and securities guaranteed by the
Government National Mortgage Association ("Ginnie Mae"). Id. at n.6.
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corporate debt and equity securities, some of which were
considerably less liquid than the traditional government and agency
securities.2'
However, as the financial crisis deepened, securities broker-
dealers' financial condition deteriorated, the valuation of collateral
became less certain, and cash lenders became increasingly reluctant to
lend against nongovernment securities. This exposed the two tri-party
repo agents, or clearing banks, which routinely extended intraday
credit to broker-dealers as cash borrowers, to extremely high levels of
risk.247 Several times during the financial crisis, the tri-party repo
market came dangerously close to collapsing, most notoriously in
connection with the near-failure of Bear Stearns Companies Inc.
("Bear Stearns") and the failure of Lehman Brothers, both of which
were major dealer-participants in the tri-party repo markets.2 48 To
preserve stability in the vitally important tri-party repo market, the
federal government took a series of extraordinary measures.249 On
March 16, 2008, in the wake of the emergency acquisition of Bear
Stearns by JPMCC, the Board established the Primary Dealer Credit
Facility ("PDCF"), which allowed securities broker-dealers to obtain
short-term secured financing directly from the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York ("FRBNY"). 250 On September 14, 2008, the day before
Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, the Board expanded the
246. Id. at 8. Such securities were rated primarily investment-grade and included
corporate bonds, asset-backed securities, money market instruments, collateralized
mortgage obligations and municipal bonds. Id. at n.7. According to the Task Force Report:
Tri-party repo grew from its origin as a funding instrument for U.S. Treasuries to
include nearly all securities held by Dealers. The growth of the tri-party repo
market mirrored the growth of Dealer balance sheets. The market evolved from a
strictly overnight market to include significant term trading.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 242, at 14.
247. For a detailed explanation of the mechanics of the clearing banks' intraday
exposure, see FRBNY WHITE PAPER, supra note 241, at 9-11.
248. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 242, at 4.
249. For detailed information on the special facilities established to provide liquidity to
securities broker-dealers, see Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet, BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
bst_1endingprimary.htm (last updated Feb. 5, 2010).
250. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: GOVERNMENTAL
RESCUES OF "TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL" FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 21-23 (2010) [hereinafter
FCIC "TBTF" REPORT]. Expanding access to liquidity backup facilities of the Federal
Reserve System beyond depository institutions was an unprecedented step. See id. at 22.
To establish the PDCF, the Board used its authority under section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act, which required the Board to make a finding of "unusual and exigent
circumstances." 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006) (amended 2010).
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PDCF by broadening the acceptable collateral to include all forms of
collateral accepted in the tri-party repo market.251
Simultaneously with the expansion of the PDCF, the Board
amended Regulation W to provide a temporary exemption from the
requirements of section 23A to allow banks to provide their affiliates
(primarily securities broker-dealers) with short-term financing for
''securities or other assets that the affiliate ordinarily would have
financed through the U.S. tri-party repurchase agreement market.",2 2
This exemption was designed to facilitate the ability of securities
broker-dealers to continue financing their securities inventories
despite the liquidity shortage in the tri-party repo market. To protect
the safety and soundness of the banks, the Board imposed several
conditions on the exemption, including the requirement that the
banks could use the exemption to finance only those asset types that
the affiliate financed in the tri-party repo market during the week
preceding the establishment of the PDCF.253 The Board also required
that the transactions be "marked to market daily," be "subject to
daily margin maintenance requirements," and that "the member bank
[be] at least as over-collateralized . . . as the affiliate's clearing bank
was" in its tri-party repo transaction with the affiliate on September
12, 2008.254 To ensure that the banks used the exemption only to help
provide liquidity to the U.S. tri-party repo market, the Board
required that the aggregate risk profile of the exempt transactions not
exceed the aggregate risk profile of the affiliate's tri-party repos on
September 12, 2008.255 The Board also conditioned the exemption on
the bank's top BHC guaranteeing the affiliate's obligations to the
bank. 256 Finally, the Board reserved the right to specifically prohibit
251. FCIC "TBTF" REPORT, supra note 250, at 24. Previously, only investment-grade
debt securities were acceptable PDCF collateral.
252. Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 74 Fed. Reg. 6,225,
6,225 (Feb. 6, 2009). The Board initially adopted an interim rule granting this exemption.
See Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 73 Fed. Reg. 54,307 (Sept.
19. 2008). The final rule, adopted on January 30, 2009, essentially restated the exemption
in the interim rule but reflected an extension of the exemption past the originally
scheduled expiration date. The final rule provided that the exemption expired on October
30, 2009. Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 74 Fed. Reg. at 6,225.
The PDCF expired on February 1, 2010. See Primary Dealer Credit Facility, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pdcf.html (last visited Apr.
29, 2011).
253. 12 C.F.R. § 223.42(n)(1)(i) (2010).
254. § 223.42(n)(1)(ii).
255. § 223.42(n)(1)(iii).
256. § 223.42(n)(1)(iv). Instead of the guarantee, the parent company could also post
additional liquid, high-quality collateral. See id.
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any bank from using this exemption or to impose additional
conditions? As the Board pointed out, the market-terms
requirement of section 23B provided additional protection for banks'
safety and soundness."
All of the cases discussed above clearly illustrate the new crisis-
driven decision making in the context of the Board's interpretation of
section 23A. Faced with the sudden disappearance of credit and
liquidity in various segments of capital markets, the Board found
compelling public interest in lifting the statutory restrictions on
affiliate transactions and allowing commercial banks to effectively
finance rescue efforts. Despite the Board's efforts to include formal
requirements and conditions ostensibly meant to ensure that the
exemptions were consistent with the purposes of section 23A, the
pressing need to prevent further market instability clearly outweighed
the twin statutory purposes of protecting depository institutions from
their affiliates' risk and, more importantly, preventing the transfer of
federal subsidy outside the depository system.
B. Saving Wall Street: Corporate Reorganizations on a New Scale
A similar but conceptually separate trend in the Board's use of
exemptive power under section 23A during the recent financial crisis
involved removing the statutory limitations to allow or facilitate
extraordinary corporate reorganizations that served to prevent
potential systemic effects of the failure of major financial
institutions.25 9
1. Exemptions Facilitating Emergency Mergers
The first big emergency merger of the crisis took place on March
16, 2008, when JPMCC agreed to acquire Bear Stearns, the fifth
largest U.S. investment bank that experienced a sudden liquidity
squeeze related to its large exposure to toxic mortgage assets.260 To
257. § 223.42(n)(1)(v) ("[Tlhe member bank has not been specifically informed by the
Board ... that the member bank may not use this exemption.").
258. Transactions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates, 74 Fed. Reg. at 6,227.
259. For an insightful analysis of these extraordinary reorganizations, see generally
Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government's Response to
the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009) (examining the U.S. government's
actions during the financial crisis).
260. GARY SHORTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34420 BEAR STEARNS: CRISIS
AND "RESCUE" FOR A MAJOR PROVIDER OF MORTGAGE-RELATED PRODUCTS 1
(2008), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34420_20080326.pdf. For a detailed
discussion of the events surrounding the failure of Bear Steams and its acquisition, which
was orchestrated and financed with unprecedented government assistance, see id.
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facilitate the acquisition, the Board authorized the FRBNY to
provide a $29-billion nonrecourse loan to JPMCC, at the discount
rate, collateralized by $30 billion worth of Bear Stearns's assets.26'
JPMCC assumed exposure to the first $1 billion in losses on the
assets, which were placed in a separate vehicle, Maiden Lane LLC.262
Merging Bear Stearns's operations into JPMCC's vast corporate
structure presented a significant challenge, especially in the context of
the worsening credit crisis. To accomplish this task, JPMCC
repeatedly requested exemptions from the quantitative and
qualitative requirements of section 23A. Thus, on April 1, 2008, the
Board granted an exemption to allow JPMC Bank to extend credit to,
and issue guarantees on behalf of, the former Bear Stearns entities,
up to an aggregate amount equal to fifty percent of JMPC Bank's
capital stock and surplus.263 The exemption was granted for eighteen
months, with the initial exempt amount to be gradually reduced over
that period.26 Citing prior precedent, in which it granted exemptions
from section 23A for corporate reorganizations and securities
financing transactions, the Board stressed that this exemption was
necessary to facilitate the orderly integration of Bear Stearns with
and into JPMCC and, therefore, had "substantial public benefits." 265
The Board's list of conditions appears quite short: all exempt
transactions had to be fully collateralized and were subject to daily
mark-to-market and remargining, and JPMCC had to guarantee the
affiliates' obligations to JPMC Bank.266
That initial exemption was largely replaced by another
exemption, granted to JPMCC on July 1, 2008, which allowed JPMC
Bank to purchase from JPMCC the derivatives portfolio, along with
261. Id. at 7. The assets were marked to market at the time of the transfer. The
majority of the assets were mortgage-backed securities and related products. Id.
262. Id. The transaction was structured so that, technically, Maiden Lane LLC
borrowed approximately $28.8 billion from the FRBNY in the form of a senior loan,
which, together with $1.15 billion borrowed from JPMCC in the form of a subordinated
loan, was used by Maiden Lane LLC to purchase the portfolio of assets from Bear Stearns,
with an estimated market value, as of March 14, 2008, of approximately $30 billion. See
Maiden Lane Transactions, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/
maidenlane.htmI (last visited Apr. 29, 2011).
263. Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to
Kathleen A. Juhase, Senior Vice President and Assoc. Gen. Counsel, JPMorgan Chase &
Co. 3 (Apr. 1, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/Federal
ReserveAct/2008/20080403/20080403.pdf.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 2-3. The Board also stressed that the transactions would remain subject to
the requirements of section 23B. Id. at 3.
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associated hedges, acquired from Bear Stearns.2 67 The total value of
the exempt transaction was approximately $44 billion.26 The Board
reasoned that this exemption would increase the profitability and
efficiency of JPMC Bank's existing derivatives business and benefit
derivatives markets at large by increasing their overall liquidity.269
The Board conditioned the exemption on several commitments,
generally similar to typical commitments in precedent dealing with
ordinary corporate reorganizations.270
The third exemption from the requirements of section 23A
permitted JPMC Bank to enter into back-to-back swaps with JPMCC
and Maiden Lane, designed to transfer synthetically risky positions
embedded in a portfolio of hedging transactions related to mortgage-
backed securities and other assets purchased by Maiden Lane from
Bear Stearns. 271 The Board concluded that granting this exemption
was in the public interest because it would "facilitate the
consummation of the FRBNY facility" supporting JPMCC's
acquisition of Bear Stearns.272 The Board's interpretation was short
and scarce on details, and essentially based on the fact that JPMC
Bank was merely passing risk directly from JPMCC to Maiden Lane
and that its exposure to JPMCC would be fully collateralized by
cash. 273 The Board stressed that, in effect, the risk would be passed on
to the FRBNY, which had the predominant economic interest in
Maiden Lane.274
267. Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to
Kathryn V. McCulloch, Senior Vice President & Assoc. Gen. Counsel, JPMorgan Chase &
Co. 5 (July 1, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/Federal
ReserveAct/2008/20080701/20080701.pdf.
268. Id. at 3. The derivatives portfolio included, among other types, foreign exchange
and credit derivatives. See id. at n.2.
269. Id. at 4.
270. See id. at 4-6. Thus, JPMCC committed not to transfer any low-quality assets to
JPMC Bank, to make a cash capital infusion to ensure that the bank's capital ratios were
not affected as a result of the transaction, and to protect the bank from losses in
connection with deterioration in the creditworthiness of the portfolio derivatives
counterparties for a period of five years after the date of the exemption. Id. at 4-5.
271. Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to
Kathleen A. Juhase, Senior Vice President & Assoc. Gen. Counsel, JPMorgan Chase &
Co. 1 (June 26, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.govlboarddocs/legalint/
FederalReserveAct/2008/20080626/20080626.pdf.
272. Id. at 3.
273. Id. It is unclear from the Board's letter why the transfer had to be structured as a
back-to-back series of swaps, with the bank being an intermediary passing on the risk.
Most likely, this was due to regulatory and capital arbitrage.
274. Id.
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The Board also granted exemptions from the limits of section
23A and Regulation W to both WFC and BAC to facilitate their
internal reorganization efforts aimed at integrating the newly
acquired businesses of Wachovia and Merrill Lynch & Company, Inc.
("Merrill Lynch"), respectively. In October 2008, WFC acquired
deeply troubled Wachovia, whose flagship Wachovia Bank was the
fourth-largest U.S. depository institution at the time, in a dramatic
saga aptly described elsewhere.275 On November 20, 2008, the Board
lifted the statutory restrictions to allow Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
("Wells Fargo Bank"), to extend up to $17 billion in credit to
Wachovia Bank, to help it meet its short-term funding obligations
during the transition period until the merger was completed.276
Although the amount of the proposed extensions of credit was close
to forty percent of Wells Fargo Bank's capital stock and surplus, the
Board reasoned that these were transactions between two depository
institutions and that imposing certain conditions would provide
sufficient protection to Wells Fargo Bank.2 77 The Board concluded
that, in light of the fragility in the financial markets, allowing Wells
Fargo Bank to provide liquidity to Wachovia Bank would have
significant public benefits.
275. See, e.g., Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impacts of Extraordinary Government
Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the
Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm'n (Sept. 1, 2010), http://fcic.law.stanford.edulhearings/testimony/
too-big-to-fail-expectations-and-financial-crisis. Wachovia sustained heavy losses in 2008
as a result of its exposure to subprime residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, and
CDOs. Robert K. Steel, former President & Chief Exec. Officer, Wachovia Corporation,
Statement Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm'n 1 (Sept. 1, 2010), http://fcic.law.stanford
.edu/hearings/testimony/too-big-to-fail-expectations-and-financial-crisis. The bulk of that
risk was associated with a portfolio of mortgage assets Wachovia inherited from Golden
West, a large California-based thrift it acquired in 2006. Id.
276. Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to
John David Wright, Chief Regulatory Counsel, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 3 (Nov. 20, 2008),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2008/
20081120/20081120.pdf.
277. Id. at 3. One of the most interesting conditions in this letter was the requirement
that all extensions of credit under the exemption had to be secured by collateral with the
current market value of at least 200% of the extension of credit, and that such collateral
would not include any low-quality assets. In addition, Wells Fargo Bank agreed to other,
more typical, conditions, such as the commitment that all extensions of credit would be
marked to market on a daily basis and be subject to daily margin maintenance
requirements. WFC committed to reimburse Wells Fargo Bank for any losses in
connection with the proposed transactions and to ensure that both entities remained well
capitalized at all times. As usual, the extensions of credit would be subject to requirements
of section 23B. See id.
278. Id. The exemption was set to expire upon the completion of the acquisition of
Wachovia by WFC. See id.
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On September 3, 2010, the Board granted an exemption to BAC
to allow the transfer of certain credit facilities originated by Merrill
Lynch to BANA, as part of its efforts to consolidate and integrate its
operations.2 79 Even though the amount of the transfer was within the
limits of section 23A,2 BANA sought the exemption "to preserve all
of its capacity under the 20 percent limit to engage in transactions
with all its affiliates" so it could "use bank resources to meet its
overnight funding requirements and other contingency needs."28 1 The
Board treated this request as a routine internal reorganization matter
and conditioned the exemption on compliance with typical
commitments, consistent with its precedent.282
2. Facilitating Conversions to Bank Holding Companies: New
Regulatory Arbitrage
A different kind of corporate reorganization that emerged during
the financial crisis involved radical changes in the regulatory status of
certain large financial institutions that voluntarily sought to become
subject to the full panoply of U.S. banking laws and regulations-a
result they took pains to avoid in prior decades.283
On September 21, 2008, the Board approved expedited
applications by Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the last two
free-standing Wall Street investment banks, to convert into BHCs.m
279. Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to
Phillip A. Wertz, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Bank of Am. Corp. 4 (Sept. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.federalreserve.govlboarddocs/legalint/FederalReserveAct/2010/20100903/2010
0903a.pdf.
280. At the time, BANA's quantitative limit for covered transactions with any single
affiliate was approximately $15 billion. Id. at 2.
281. Id.
282. Id. Thus, BAC committed (1) not to transfer any low-quality assets as part of the
transaction; (2) for a period of four years, to reimburse BANA for losses on the assets that
become low-quality; (3) to ensure that BANA holds capital cushion in the amount equal
to 100% of the value of any transferred assets that become low-quality; and (4) to
maintain the "well capitalized" status of both BANA and BAC. The transaction was also
subject to prior approval by BANA's directors. Id. at 3-4.
283. Under the BHC Act, any entity that owns or controls a U.S. bank becomes subject
to certain strict limitations on its direct and indirect activities and investments, designed to
maintain the principle of separation of banking and commerce central to the U.S. system
of bank regulation. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2011) (defining the term
"bank holding company"); 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1842-1843 (West 2001 & Supp. 2011) (setting
forth the limitations on the activities and investments of U.S. BHCs). Investment banks
and other financial companies that did not own or control a U.S. bank, within the meaning
of the statute, were free of such activity restrictions, which gave them a significant
competitive advantage.
284. See Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Companies, 94 FED. RES.
BULL. C101, C102 (2008), available at 2008 WL 7861871, at *4 (order approving Goldman
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These events were both shockingly unexpected and foreseeable.
Immediately after Lehman Brothers had filed for bankruptcy,
Morgan Stanley came under intense pressure not only from its trading
counterparties and short-term creditors but also from short-sellers.2 85
Federal regulators felt increasingly concerned that Morgan Stanley's
failure at that critical moment would have potentially devastating
effects on the fragile market and bring down one of its main trading
partners, Goldman Sachs.286 The announcement of the Board's
simultaneous approval of the BHC status for both of these
institutions was widely interpreted as a clear signal that the federal
government would not let either of them fail.287 Conversion to BHCs,
and the concomitant conversion of their existing thrifts and industrial
banks288 into commercial banks, gave Morgan Stanley and Goldman
Sachs assured access to the discount window and other government
support programs, including the Treasury Department's Troubled
Asset Relief Program ("TARP").28 9
On April 22, 2009, the Board granted both Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley exemptions from the requirements of section 23A, to
facilitate their internal reorganization as part of the conversion into
Sachs Group's request to become a BHC on conversion of Goldman Bank to a state-
chartered bank); Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Companies and Notice to
Engage in Certain Nonbanking Activities, 94 FED. RES. BULL. C103, C105 (2008),
available at 2008 WL 7861872, at *5 (order approving Morgan Stanley's request to become
a BHC on conversion of Morgan Stanley Bank to a bank).
285. FCIC "TBTF" REPORT, supra note 250, at 28.
286. Id.
287. See, e.g., DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST 217-18 (2009) (stating that the
conversion into BHCs gave both Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley "the Fed's public
promise of protection and a permanent source of lending in a crisis").
288. An industrial bank (or an industrial loan company) is a state-chartered depository
institution that is not considered a "bank" for the purposes of the BHC Act and,
therefore, does not subject its parent company to federal regulation and supervision as a
BHC. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(c)(2)(H); see also Kenneth Spong & Eric Robbins, Industrial
Loan Companies: A Growing Industry Sparks a Public Policy Debate, ECON. REV., 4th
Quarter 2007, at 41, 44, available at www.kc.frb.org/Publicat/Econrev/PDF/4Q07Spong.pdf
(describing the rapid growth of industrial loan companies and public policy issues
associated with industrial loan companies).
289. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ("EESA"), which Congress
passed on October 3, 2008, authorized $700 billion in TARP funds to be used in tranches
to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions. Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765. TARP officially expired on October 3,
2010. For complete information on the operation and impact of TARP, see Financial
Stability, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.financialstability.gov/ (last visited
Apr. 29, 2011); see also Lissa L. Broome, Government Investment in Banks: Creeping
Nationalization or Prudent, Temporary Aid?, 4 FLA. INT'L U. L. REV. 409, 410-21 (2009)
(detailing the early evolution and analyzing the effects of TARP).
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BHCs.290 In these nearly identical letters, the Board allowed the
newly converted banks, Goldman Sachs Bank USA ("Goldman
Bank") and Morgan Stanley Bank, N.A. ("MS Bank"), to acquire
certain entities and assets from their parent companies and to provide
short-term financing (through repos, securities borrowing, and other
transactions) to their nonbank affiliates on a transitional basis, in the
amounts exceeding the quantitative limits of section 23A.291
With respect to the purchase of assets, 2" the Board likened them
to other one-time asset transfers routinely approved in the past and,
in each case, granted a temporary exemption for such purchases,
subject to certain conditions. 293 However, in addition to typical
conditions imposed in similar situations, the exemption was
conditioned on the requirement that the parent company must, at the
request of the Board or the OCC (in the case of MS Bank),
repurchase the transferred assets from the bank at the bank's original
purchase price. 294 The Board also required the parent to secure its
obligations by pledging to the bank collateral that was acceptable to
the Board and in an amount equal to a certain percentage of the
aggregate covered-transaction amount for the life of the transferred
assets.2 95 The parent's commitment to reimburse the bank for the
290. See Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd.,
to Michael Civitella, Chief Exec. Officer & President, Goldman Sachs Bank USA 7 (Apr.
22, 2009) [hereinafter GS Reorganization Letter], available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/BoardDocs/Legallnt/FederalReserveAct/2009/20090422/20090422b.pdf; Letter
from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to Paul E. Glotzer,
Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP (Morgan Stanley Bank) 7 (Apr. 22, 2009)
[hereinafter MS Reorganization Letter], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
BoardDocs/Legallnt/FederalReserveAct/2009/20090422/20090422.pdf.
291. GS Reorganization Letter, supra note 290, at 6; MS Reorganization Letter, supra
note 290, at 7. The proposed extensions of credit were designed to provide financing to the
banks' affiliates during the transitional period before the parent company completed the
transfer of the assets to the bank. These financing transactions were to be secured by the
assets subject to such transfer. See GS Reorganization Letter, supra note 290, at 5.
292. These assets included, among other things, loan assets, various securities,
mortgage servicing rights, and derivatives. Goldman Bank also acquired several operating
subsidiaries, including a multipurpose OTC derivatives dealer, a mortgage lending
company, and several other specialized lending entities. See id. app. A.
293. See id. at 3; MS Reorganization Letter, supra note 290, at 3. Under the Board's
exemptions, both Goldman Bank and MS Bank had to complete the purchases within a
specified period, which in the case of MS Bank was approximately five months from the
date the exemption was granted. See GS Reorganization Letter, supra note 290, at 5; MS
Reorganization Letter, supra note 290, at 4.
294. See GS Reorganization Letter, supra note 290, at 4; MS Reorganization Letter,
supra note 290, at 4.
295. See GS Reorganization Letter, supra note 290, at 4; MS Reorganization Letter,
supra note 290, at 4. The exact percentage requirement for this parent guarantee collateral
was redacted in the public version of each letter.
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losses associated with deterioration in the quality of any transferred
assets was also extended for the lifetime of the transferred assets, as
opposed to the more typical two-to-five-year period.296 Finally, the
bank had to maintain specified capital ratios that were higher than
the legally required minimum.297
With respect to extensions of credit to affiliates, the Board also
imposed several conditions.298 In addition, the parent company
committed to fully guarantee the affiliates' repayment obligations and
post collateral supporting such guarantee in an amount equal to a
specified percentage of each financing transaction. 299 These unusual
additional conditions were clearly meant to provide stronger
protection for the safety and soundness of the newly formed banks
than was typically the case in the Board's prior precedent. Subject to
these conditions, the Board reasoned that the exemptions were in the
public interest because the reorganization would enhance the banks'
profitability and allow them to extend additional credit into the
markets still embroiled in a severe credit crisis.30
Although Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were by far the
most high-profile cases of this peculiarly crisis-driven kind of
regulatory arbitrage, a number of other large financial institutions
296. See GS Reorganization Letter, supra note 290, at 4; MS Reorganization Letter,
supra note 290, at 3-4.
297. See GS Reorganization Letter, supra note 290, at 4; MS Reorganization Letter,
supra note 290, at 4. Thus, Goldman Bank committed to maintain a leverage ratio of at
least six percent, a Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio of at least eight percent, and a total risk-
based capital ratio of at least eleven percent. GS Reorganization Letter, supra note 290, at
5. The ratios applicable to MS Bank were redacted in the public version of the letter.
298. See GS Reorganization Letter, supra note 290, at 5-6; MS Reorganization Letter,
supra note 290, at 5. These conditions included the requirement that all such extensions of
credit had to be overnight financing transactions, fully secured, marked to market daily,
subject to daily margin maintenance, and that the collateral securing the loans was of
sufficient credit quality. GS Reorganization Letter, supra note 290, at 5-6; MS
Reorganization Letter, supra note 290, at 5.
299. See GS Reorganization Letter, supra note 290, at 5-6; MS Reorganization Letter,
supra note 290, at 5. Morgan Stanley committed that all of the proposed financing
transactions were qualified securities contracts, so that MS Bank would be able to
promptly liquidate them in the event of bankruptcy of the borrowing affiliate. Since
Goldman Bank was not able to give such assurance, it agreed to cap the total amount of
the exempted financing transactions and to conduct such transactions only until a specific
cut-off date. GS Reorganization Letter, supra note 290, at 6.
300. GS Reorganization Letter, supra note 290, at 6; MS Reorganization Letter, supra
note 290, at 6. The Board also stressed that, in each case, the exempt transactions
remained subject to the market-terms requirements of section 23B and that, consistent
with previous exemption requests, the proposed transactions had been approved by the
directors of the bank. Id.
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converted into BHCs.o' Thus, CIT Group, Inc. ("CIT"), one of the
largest U.S. commercial lending companies, received its BHC status
in December 2008.3 On April 13, 2009, CIT also received an
exemption from the quantitative and qualitative limits of section 23A,
allowing its newly converted CIT Bank to acquire all of the shares of
three affiliates engaged primarily in holding and securitizing federally
guaranteed student loans in the aggregate amount of $5.66 billion.303
The Board emphasized that the government guarantee of the
transferred student loans effectively eliminated the risk to CIT Bank
but, nevertheless, made the exemption subject to standard conditions
for one-time asset transfers in corporate reorganizations."
Ironically, however, it is the relatively uncomplicated and low-
risk CIT case that illustrates the limited efficacy of the Board's
standard conditions to exemptions of asset transfers from the
requirements of section 23A. Despite the $2.33 billion capital
injection from TARP, CIT filed for bankruptcy on November 1,
2009.305 Although it emerged from bankruptcy in thirty-eight days, the
301. These included, for example, American Express and General Motors Assurance
Corporation ("GMAC"). See Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Companies
and Notice to Engage in Certain Nonbanking Activities, 95 FED. RES. BULL. B20, B22
(2009), available at 2009 WL 6529111, at *5 (order approving American Express
Company's request to become a BHC on conversion of American Express Centurion
Bank to a bank); Order Approving Formation of Bank Holding Companies and Notice to
Engage in Certain Nonbanking Activities, 95 FED. RES. BULL. B29, B33 (2009)
[hereinafter GMAC BHC Order], available at 2009 WL 6529114, at *7 (order approving
GMAC's request to become BHCs on conversion of GMAC to a commercial bank).
302. See Order Approving Formation of a Bank Holding Company and Notice to
Engage in Certain Nonbanking Activities, 95 FED. RES. BULL. B26, B29 (2009), available
at 2009 WL 6529113, at *5 (order approving CIT Group, Inc.'s request to become a BHC
on conversion of CIT Bank to a state bank).
303. Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to
William J. Sweet, Jr., Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP 4 (CIT Group, Inc.)
(Apr. 13, 2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/legalint/Federal
Reserve Act/2009/20090413/20090413.pdf.
304. Id. at 3. These conditions included a five-year commitment by CIT to reimburse
CIT Bank for losses in connection with the deteriorating quality of the transferred assets,
an agreement to make a cash capital contribution to CIT Bank in the amount equal to the
book value of any low-quality assets transferred to the bank and to ensure the bank would
hold a 100% capital cushion for all such low-quality assets. Both CIT and CIT Bank
committed to stay well-capitalized, and the board of directors of CIT Bank had to approve
the transactions. Id. at 5-6.
305. Press Release, CIT Group, Inc., CIT Board of Directors Approves Proceeding
with Prepackaged Plan with Overwhelming Support of Debtholders (Nov. 1, 2009),
available at http://ir.cit.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=99314&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1349179
&highlight.
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restructuring took a serious toll on the company.3 06 In granting
exemptions from section 23A, the Board tends to rely heavily on the
BHCs' commitments to protect the bank from losses and to maintain
the "safe" level of capital. This assumption may not be free of doubt
even in the best of circumstances, and in periods of market turmoil it
becomes largely indefensible, as the CIT example has clearly shown.
Making a determination that a specific bank is duly protected from
assuming excessive risk through transactions with affiliates requires
more than a formalistic requirement of a parent company's
guarantee. Instead, it may require a more substantive examination of
the parent company's overall risk profile and financial stability.
It is clear that, in all of these cases of crisis-driven corporate
reorganizations, the grant of exemptions from the quantitative and
qualitative limits of section 23A played an ancillary role. Substantive
policy decisions to allow, and even facilitate, mega-mergers and
emergency conversions were made in a different regulatory context
and on the basis of different considerations. Exemptions from the
statutory limits on affiliate transactions were necessary to successfully
carry out these internal reorganizations.
Nevertheless, these transactions were far from ordinary and had
serious implications for broadening access to the federal safety net
and further exacerbating the problem of moral hazard. Although
preventing excessive consolidation and concentration in the financial
industry was not originally part of the legislative intent, restrictions
on bank affiliate transactions under section 23A can potentially serve
as a check on that process, an opportunity for subjecting these trends
to additional regulatory scrutiny. The Board's decisions to remove
such restrictions contributed, albeit only indirectly, to the increasing
concentration of economic power in a small number of financial
institutions that became too big, or too important, to fail.
C. Saving the U.S. Automotive Industry: The Curious Case of
GMAC
Without a doubt, the most extraordinary and unprecedented
expansion of the federal safety net in direct contravention of the
306. See Michael J. de la Merced, CIT Leaves Bankruptcy, with Questions, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 10, 2009, at B7.
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underlying purposes of section 23A was the Board's treatment of
General Motors Assurance Corporation ("GMAC").m
GMAC was established in 1919 as a captive financing arm of
General Motors ("GM"), one of the largest automakers in the United
States.308 in accordance with industry practice, GMAC provided the
bulk of consumer financing for buyers of GM vehicles and wholesale
floorplan financing for GM dealers.30 9 Although GM spun off GMAC
in 2006,3' the company remained the principal source of credit
supporting retail and wholesale sales of GM's automobiles.3 " During
the pre-crisis asset and credit boom, GMAC moved away from its
core mission of providing auto-financing and became heavily involved
in the origination and securitization of subprime residential
mortgages, relying principally on short-term funding markets.312 The
subprime mortgage crisis exposed GMAC to large losses and
threatened the company's collapse.313 To avoid bankruptcy, GMAC
began negotiating a conversion into a BHC with the Board in
November 2008.314
307. In 2010, GMAC changed its name to Ally Financial Inc. ("Ally Financial"). See
Our History, ALLY, http://www.ally.com/about/company-structure/history/index.html (last
visited Apr. 29, 2011).
308. See Who We Are, ALLY, http://www.ally.com/aboutlally-story/ (last visited Apr.
29, 2011).
309. COP REPORT, supra note 13, at 27-30. In the United States, nearly all automobile
dealers, "which typically operate as independent franchises affiliated with one or more
automobile manufacturer[s]," finance their wholesale purchases of automobiles through
so-called floorplan financing. Id. at 6. According to a recent influential report,
A floorplan loan is essentially a two-party contract between the automobile
manufacturer and the dealer, with the lender serving as a third-party financier. In
a typical floorplan loan, a dealer agrees to purchase a certain number of cars from
a manufacturer for a set price. The lender will advance the amount of the purchase
price of the automobiles to the dealer and, in turn, take a security interest in the
automobiles as collateral for the loan.
Id. at 8.
310. See id. at 13. A consortium led by Cerberus Capital Management L.P., one of the
largest U.S. private equity funds, acquired a 51% controlling interest in GMAC. Id. GM
retained a 49% stake in the newly independent GMAC. See id. As a condition of the
government rescue of GMAC in December 2008, both companies were forced to
significantly reduce their ownership stakes in May 2009. Id. at 20-22.
311. After the spin-off, the historical relationship between GM and GMAC as its
"captive financing arm" was effectively replicated on a contractual basis. Id. at 10.
312. See id. at 39, 41.
313. Id. at 17. Thus, during 2007, GMAC posted a $2.3 billion loss as a result of its
exposure to troubled mortgage markets. Id.
314. According to the COP Report, the main reason behind GMAC's push to become
a BHC was to gain access to federal bailout funds and other forms of government
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In December 2008, the U.S. automotive industry was on the
brink of bankruptcy."' On December 19, 2008, President Bush
announced the administration's Automotive Industry Financing
Program ("AIFP") that would use TARP to rescue the failing
carmakers.3 16 On December 24, 2008, the Board granted an expedited
approval of GMAC's application to become a BHC. 17 Almost
immediately upon its conversion to BHC, GMAC received its first
$5.25 billion in TARP bailout funds.318 In addition, GMAC Bank319
received access to discount window borrowing and other special
liquidity facilities available to depository institutions, including the
Term Auction Facility ("TAF") administered by the Board.320
However, section 23A severely limited GMAC Bank's ability to
extend credit to GM's customers and dealers, by virtue of the
attribution rule.321 Thus, on the same day that GMAC was approved
to become a BHC, GMAC Bank received its first exemption from the
quantitative and qualitative limits of section 23A for providing
consumer credit to purchasers of GM cars.322 The Board's justification
assistance. See id. at 18. At the time, it was not clear whether TARP funds would be
available to nonbanking financial institutions. See id. at 8-19.
315. See John D. Stoll et al., Big Three Seek $34 Billion Aid-GM, Chrysler Warn of
Collapse This Month as Lawmakers Explore Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2008, at Al.
316. See Neil Irwin, Treasury Maintains Leeway in Auto Aid, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2009,
at D1; David E. Sanger et al., Bush Aids Detroit, But Hard Choices Wait for Obama, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20,2008, at Al.
317. GMAC BHC Order, supra note 301, at B29-B30. Ordinarily, section 3 of the BHC
Act requires the Board to provide a notice of an application to the appropriate federal or
state banking regulators and supervisors of the banks to be acquired and provide such
regulators and supervisors with a certain period (usually thirty days) to submit their views
and recommendations. Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842(b)(1) (West 2001
& Supp. 2011). In the case of GMAC, the Board expedited the process and granted the
approval without such waiting period. GMAC BHC Order, supra note 301, at B30.
318. See COP REPORT, supra note 13, at 44-45. The Board conditioned its approval of
GMAC's BHC application on the company raising $7 billion in capital. Id. at 44. The
Treasury Department's capital injection was meant to assist GMAC in meeting that goal.
Id. at 44-46.
319. As part of its conversion into a BHC, GMAC converted its Utah-chartered
industrial bank, GMAC Bank, into a national bank, which was later renamed Ally Bank.
Id. at 21, 23.
320. Id. at 55. TAF was created in order to provide liquidity to depository institutions
by allowing them to borrow funds against a broad range of collateral, to compensate for
the severe contraction in interbank lending during the crisis. The last TAF auction was
held on March 8, 2010. For details, see Term Auction Facility, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/taf.htm (last
visited Apr. 29, 2011).
321. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
322. Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to
Richard K. Kim, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (GMAC Bank) 4 (Dec. 24, 2008)
2011] 1757
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
for the exemption was clear: allowing GMAC Bank to extend credit
beyond the statutory limit would benefit the public by providing "an
important source of financing for U.S. retail purchases of GM
vehicles from independent dealers and avoid further disruption in the
credit market for such purchases."323 The exemption was, as always,
subject to several conditions. One set of conditions aimed at ensuring
that GMAC Bank used the exemption to provide consumer credit
only to customers of GM dealers not affiliated with GM and that it
did not extend high-risk consumer loans.324 The Board also imposed a
set of standard conditions based on its long-standing precedent. These
included a specific limit on the aggregate amount of the exempt
transactions, a commitment by GMAC to reimburse GMAC Bank on
a quarterly basis for losses on the loans that become low-quality
assets, and a commitment by GMAC Bank to hold a dollar-for-dollar
risk-based capital against any such loans.325
In addition to these typical commitments, the Board mandated
that GMAC pledge to GMAC Bank collateral acceptable to the
Board, in the "amount equal to 10% of the aggregate covered
transactions amount, for the life of the exemption."326 This collateral
was meant to secure GMAC's obligations under its parent
guarantee.327 On its face, this additional commitment seems to convey
the Board's resolve to ensure that GMAC, as the parent company,
bears the credit risk associated with GMAC Bank's retail auto-
financing beyond statutory limits. However, placing this decision in
the context of GMAC's ongoing saga highlights how little these
commitments meant in reality.
In May 2009, at the conclusion of the series of "stress tests" of
the nation's largest BHCs, the Board announced that GMAC needed
[hereinafter 2008 GMAC Letter], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
legalint/FederalReserveAct/2008/20081224/20081224.pdf.
323. Id. at 4.
324. Id. at 3. Thus, the exemption required that loans were to be extended only to
retail customers with a certain credit bureau risk score and imposed limits on the maturity,
amount, and loan-to-value ratio of each individual loan. Id.
325. Id. at 3-4.
326. Id. at 4. This commitment is similar to the Board's requirements that Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley collateralize parent guarantees in the exemptions from section
23A granted to those institutions to facilitate their conversion into BHCs. See supra note
299 and accompanying text.
327. See 2008 GMAC Letter, supra note 322, at 4. If at any point, the value of GMAC's
collateral fell below the mandated ten percent level, it had to pledge additional collateral
to the bank in order to stay in compliance with the Board's requirement. Id.
[Vol. 891758
2011] UNFULFILLED PROMISE 1759
to raise an additional $11.5 billion in capital.3 28 However, GMAC was
unsure of its ability to raise the needed amount in private markets,
particularly in light of the pending bankruptcy of GM and Chrysler.3 29
On May 21, 2009, the Treasury Department made another capital
injection of $7.5 billion, part of which was meant to finance GMAC's
acquisition of Chrysler Financial's auto-lending assets.330 As a result
of acquiring the financing business of Chrysler Financial, GMAC
became even more important as the principal source of credit for auto
dealers and retail customers of both GM and Chrysler. The auto
makers were particularly dependent on GMAC for their floorplan
financing.331 However, the original exemption from the requirements
of section 23A applied only to the extension of consumer credit by
Ally Bank.332
On May 21, 2009, the Board granted the second request by the
renamed Ally Bank for an exemption from the requirements of
section 23A to permit it to extend both retail and wholesale loans for
new purchases of GM automobiles.333 With respect to retail loans, this
exemption was subject essentially to the same conditions as the
original December 2008 exemption.334 With respect to dealer loans,
the Board imposed a similar set of conditions aimed to ensure that
328. COP REPORT, supra note 13, at 47. The "stress tests" were part of the Supervisory
Capital Assessment Program ("SCAP") conducted by the U.S. bank regulators in early
2009, to ensure that largest U.S. BHCs had enough capital to withstand further worsening
of market conditions. Id.
329. Id. As Treasury officials realized, GMAC was the only BHC included in the
SCAP that could not meet the new capital buffer requirements on its own, because its ties
to GM, moving toward inevitable bankruptcy, put it in a uniquely difficult situation. See id.
at 50 (quoting Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner).
330. Id. at 48. On April 30, 2009, when Chrysler filed for bankruptcy, Ally Bank
entered into an agreement to provide retail and wholesale financing for the Chrysler
dealer network, effectively assuming the auto lending business of Chrysler Financial. See
Ally Financial Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Aug. 12, 2010).
331. See COP REPORT, supra note 13, at 66. Unlike consumer financing for individual
car purchases, the market for floorplan financing has historically been dominated by a few
captive automotive financing companies. See id. In late 2008 to early 2009, the floorplan
financing market came to a virtual halt. Id. at 66-68. Under those circumstances, GMAC's
withdrawal from that market could have had catastrophic consequences for the entire
automotive industry. See id. at 66-72.
332. See 2008 GMAC Letter, supra note 322, at 1, 5.
333. See Letter from Robert deV. Frierson, Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd.,
to Richard K. Kim, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (Ally Bank) 5 (May 21, 2009)
[hereinafter 2009 GMAC Letter], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
legalint/FederalReserveAct/2009/20090521/20090521.pdf. Because Ally Bank was not an
affiliate of Chrysler, no exemption was necessary for the financing of purchases of
Chrysler automobiles. Id. at 1.
334. See id. at 3; see also 2008 GMAC Letter, supra note 322, at 3-4 (detailing
conditions imposed to limit riskiness and protect GMAC Bank).
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the exemption was used to provide floorplan financing only to
independent dealers with good credit standing, which were not likely
to present an unacceptably high credit risk.335 In addition, the Board
conditioned both retail and dealer loans on the same typical
commitments as those included in the original 2008 exemption: the
limit on the aggregate amount of the exempt covered transactions,
GMAC's commitment to reimburse Ally Bank for losses on any loans
that became low-quality assets, the requirement of dollar-for-dollar
capital cushion for all low-quality assets, and the mandatory approval
of the exemption by a majority of the bank's directors.336
However, in contrast to the 2008 exemption, the Board did not
require GMAC to post collateral securing its parent guarantee.337 The
Board explained that decision bluntly by referencing the fact that the
federal government's support provided sufficient protection for Ally
Bank. As the Board stressed, "GMAC's financial position will be
strengthened by an additional equity investment by the Treasury.
Treasury's support helps ensure that GMAC will be in a position to
honor its obligations under the guarantee."" In effect, this was an
admission that GMAC's parent obligations by themselves were
irrelevant, given its financial condition.
Importantly, the Board did not impose any limits on the duration
of this extraordinary exemption, which authorized a U.S. federally
insured commercial bank to continue funding the business of its
affiliated automotive companies far in excess of the statutory and
regulatory limits on bank affiliate transactions. In effect, this decision
made it clear that the macro-economic goal of saving the U.S.
automotive industry justified a complete override of section 23A.
As the Board explicitly acknowledged in the very beginning of its
interpretive letter, the Treasury Department was strongly committed
to providing substantial financial support for GMAC as the lifeline
that was indispensable to the government's efforts to restructure GM
and Chrysler.339 Although GMAC was not considered a systemically
important financial institution, Treasury's belief in GMAC's vital role
335. 2009 GMAC Letter, supra note 333, at 3-4. Thus, the exemption was available for
financing only independent dealers who were current on their existing floorplan loans and
who would use it only for new purchases of cars from GM. Id. In addition, all dealer loans
had to conform to the bank's underwriting standards, be limited to the normal factory
invoice amount, and be repaid once the inventory securing it was sold by the dealer. Id.
336. Id. at 4-5.
337. Id. at 3-5.
338. Id. at 4.
339. Id. at 1.
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in keeping the automotive industry alive explains the extraordinary
amount of government assistance provided to it,wo including the
Board's expedited approval of its BHC application and successive
infusions of TARP funds."'1 The Board's grant of what appeared to be
a permanent exemption from the quantitative and qualitative limits of
section 23A for Ally Bank's financing of GM's automobile sales was
just one of many such forms of extraordinary assistance, driven
ultimately by the overarching policy goal of saving the automaker.
However, from a bank regulatory perspective, this decision marked
an unprecedented change. The Board, the principal guardian of the
statutory wall between depository institutions and their affiliates,
established a precedent allowing U.S. commercial banks to transfer
federal subsidy not only to nonbank financial institutions, but also to
nonfinancial, industrial companies affiliated with them. 3
340. See COP REPORT, supra note 13, at 79-82. The COP Report discusses the
differences in treatment of GMAC and CIT and argues that the Treasury Department's
far greater willingness to use public funds to assist GMAC, rather than CIT, was rooted in
the government's view of the GMAC rescue as the rescue of the automotive industry. See
id.
341. GMAC BHC Order, supra note 301, at B30. Thus, as a result of the $17.2 billion
public bailout, the U.S. government came to own 56.3% of GMAC's voting equity. See
Dakin Campbell, GM's IPO Shows Ally Could Afford to Repay Bailout, BLOOMBERG
BUS. WK. (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-09-15/gm-s-ipo-
shows-ally-could-afford-to-repay-bailout.html.
342. GMAC BHC Order, supra note 301, at B30-B31. GM filed for bankruptcy on
June 1, 2009, and entered the process of government-assisted restructuring. See Linda
Sandler et al., GM Files Bankruptcy to Spin Off More Competitive Firm, BLOOMBERG
(June 1, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a4brqCW
wvYXY. GM opted for a pre-packaged Chapter 11 restructuring. Id. On July 10, 2009, the
process was completed and GM's profitable assets were officially sold to its successor-
entity, which assumed the name of General Motors Company. See, e.g., John D. Stoll &
Sharon Terlep, GM Takes New Direction, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2009, at Bl. The U.S.
government, which provided $50 billion to finance that purchase, ended up owning over
sixty percent of the equity in the new GM, and announced its plans to divest its stake
through a series of public securities offerings starting in 2010. Id. In 2010, GM and
Chrysler started showing signs of returning to profitability and began repaying TARP
funds, which positively affected GMAC's financial condition and outlook. See U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-933T, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM:
CONTINUED ATTENTION NEEDED TO ENSURE THE TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY OF ONGOING PROGRAMS 7-9 (2010). Nevertheless, it remains to be
seen whether GMAC will be able to achieve true financial stability and independence in
the near future. Id.
343. On December 23, 2010, the Board granted the request by Ally Financial not to
treat GM as an affiliate of Ally Bank for the purposes of sections 23A and 23B, once the
planned restructuring and conversion of preferred stock of Ally Financial held by the
Treasury Department and other third parties brings GM's ownership stake in Ally
Financial below ten percent of all voting shares. See Letter from Robert deV. Frierson,
Deputy Sec'y of the Bd., Fed. Reserve Bd., to Jeffrey Brown, Ally Financial, Inc. 3 (Dec.
23, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Legallnt/FederalReserve
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D. Summary
This Part detailed how a severe financial crisis, which quickly
spread to the broader economy, led the Board to effectively
dismantle the section 23A firewall. There may be many different
explanations for the Board's choices. In some respects, this may be
viewed as a case of regulatory failure. One approach to explaining the
Board's failure to safeguard the integrity of the statute may point to
some form of regulatory capture, either in its traditional sense or in
the more subtle form of ideological capture.3 * Another potential
explanation is regulatory incompetence and the inability, or
reluctance, of the regulators to recognize and address potential
systemic consequences of discrete administrative actions. Yet, the
whole picture is far more complex than the familiar interplay of
regulatory incompetence, complacency, and complicity.
The Board's use of its exemptive authority under section 23A to
permit massive transfers of funds and federal subsidy from depository
institutions to the rest of the crisis-ridden financial system was driven
primarily by its fear of a total systemic collapse.345 Whereas the
Board's pre-crisis reasoning focused entirely on individual banks'
safety and soundness and ignored the systemic aspect of proposed
transactions, its crisis-era decision making aimed first and foremost at
preserving systemic stability. Under the circumstances, the Board's
chosen course of action may have been well justified, if not
inevitable.346 It is hard to deny that lifting statutory restrictions on
banks' transactions with affiliates, in order to increase the flow of
badly needed credit and liquidity in the markets, served the public
interest. However, in order to provide that urgently needed public
benefit, the Board had to sacrifice the competing public interest in
maintaining separation between banking and commerce. Despite the
Board's rhetoric, the crisis-driven exemptions from section 23A,
which purposely exposed banks to risks associated with their
affiliates' nonbanking business and transferred federal subsidy
Act/2010/20101223/20101223a.pdf (modifying the conditions of GMAC BHC Order that
required Ally Bank to treat GM as an affiliate for the purposes of sections 23A and 23B).
344. For a discussion of regulatory capture in the banking industry, see generally
Daniel Hardy, Regulatory Capture in Banking (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.
06/34, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=892925.
345. See generally Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REv.
1051, 1051 (2009) (examining the use of "extraordinary measures to stop the spread of
financial distress" during financial crisis containment).
346. See id. at 1057.
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outside the depository system, were not, and could not have been,
consistent with the fundamental purposes of that statute.
If this story, as incomplete and oversimplified as it may be,
nevertheless captures the essence of what happened, it raises an
important set of questions. What should be done to address this
internal conflict in the practical application of section 23A? And what
are the broader implications of this phenomenon for the future of
financial regulation in the United States?
IV. FIXING THE WALL: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY
REFORM
In the Dodd-Frank Act, conceived as a major overhaul of the
U.S. system of financial regulation, Congress attempted to strengthen
the existing section 23A regime by tightening certain statutory
requirements. In general, the Act embraces the concept of statutory
walls protecting banks from certain risky institutions and activities,
such as proprietary trading347 or certain types of derivatives dealing.348
However, it does not provide sufficient details on how these
arrangements would work in practice, leaving much of that decision
making to regulatory agencies.3 49 The recent history of section 23A,
which illustrates the difficulties associated with maintaining and
policing statutory firewalls and the dangers of giving too much
discretion to regulators, is very instructive in this respect.
This Part examines the amendments to section 23A enacted as
part of the Dodd-Frank Act. It argues that these amendments fail to
address the fundamental tensions in the operation of section 23A that
were so clearly exposed during the latest crisis. This Part discusses a
number of broad issues in financial regulation reform that remain
unresolved under the Dodd-Frank Act.
A. The Dodd-Frank Act Amendments: Patches and Guards
The Dodd-Frank Act made several important changes to the
requirements of section 23A. These amendments significantly
expanded the scope of section 23A and seek to tighten its application.
There are five key areas in which the revisions were made.
347. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, sec. 619, § 13, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620-31 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1851 (West
Supp. 2011)) (adding section 13 to the BHC Act).
348. § 716, 124 Stat. at 1648-51 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 8305 (West Supp. 2011)).
349. See Eric Lichtblau, Ex-Regulators Lobby to Shape Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
2010, at B1.
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First, the Act eliminated the exception from the quantitative
limits for covered transactions between a bank and its financial
subsidiary.350 Second, the Volcker Rule, which imposed prohibitions
and restrictions on banking organizations and systemically important
nonbanking organizations with respect to proprietary trading and
investing in hedge funds and private equity funds, also extended
section 23A and 23B limits to cover banking entities' permitted fund
activities.35' The Act prohibited any banking organization that serves,
directly or indirectly, as an investment manager, adviser, or sponsor
of a hedge fund or private equity fund, or that organizes or offers
shares in such fund, and any affiliate of such banking organization,
from entering into covered transactions with such hedge or private
equity fund, as well as with any other fund controlled by such fund, as
if they were affiliates.35 2
Third, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the definition of "covered
transactions" to explicitly include derivatives and securities lending
and borrowing transactions that cause a bank to have credit exposure
to an affiliate.353 It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this
amendment, especially given the volume of bank derivatives business
with affiliates.354 By subjecting derivatives to the requirements of
350. § 609(a), 124 Stat. at 1611 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c(e) (West Supp. 2011)).
Previously, section 23A(e)(3) exempted covered transactions between a bank and any
single financial subsidiary of that bank from the ten percent limitation. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 223.32 (2010).
351. Sec. 619, § 13(d), 124 Stat. at 1623-1627. As enacted, the Volcker Rule provides
that banking and systemically important nonbanking organizations may engage in certain
"permitted" fund activities. Id.; see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
352. Sec. 619, § 13(f)(1)-(2), 124 Stat. at 1628. The Act provides, however, that the
Board may permit the banking entities to offer prime brokerage services to certain hedge
and private equity funds, subject to certain conditions. Sec. 619, § 13(f)(3), 124 Stat. at
1628. The Act's prohibition on covered transactions becomes effective on the earlier of
one year after the date of adoption of the final rules implementing the Volcker Rule or
two years after the date of the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. Sec. 619, § 13(c)(1), 124
Stat. at 1622.
353. § 608(a)(1)(B), 124 Stat. at 1608 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c(b)(7) (West Supp.
2011)). The Act does not define "credit exposure" as used in this context.
354. With respect to securities lending and borrowing, however, the Dodd-Frank Act's
mandate may not be such a radical change. As discussed in Part III, the Board has been
treating credit exposure under securities lending and borrowing as an "extension of credit"
within the meaning of section 23A and explicitly recognized that securities lending and
borrowing are "covered transactions" under the statute and Regulation W. See 2007 BAC
Letter, supra note 160, at 3; 2005 BAC Letter, supra note 161. Nevertheless, an explicit
inclusion of these types of transactions in the statutory definition of a "covered
transaction" signals the significance of controlling their potential implications both for the
safety and soundness of depository institutions (especially those affiliated with securities
broker-dealers) and for systemic stability.
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section 23A, Congress reversed the decade-long prior policy of giving
derivatives preferential treatment and leaving the task of managing
the risk of such transactions to the financial institutions' internal risk
management.3 55 This change of heart was clearly a result of the recent
financial crisis, which demonstrated the dangers of relying entirely on
Wall Street executives' prudence and technical sophistication. Not
surprisingly, the industry lobbied especially hard to prevent this
particular amendment from passing, arguing that it would amount to
an outright prohibition on derivatives transactions between banks and
their affiliates and diminish the ability of large financial institutions to
manage risk on a consolidated basis.356
However, despite its potentially harsh tenor, the practical impact
of this change on banking organizations' derivatives business depends
on how the regulators implement it. For instance, the Dodd-Frank
Act specifically allows the Board to issue regulations or
interpretations with respect to the manner in which a bank may take
any netting agreements into account in calculating the amount of a
covered transaction or determining whether the transaction is fully
collateralized."' This gives the Board an important ability to
substantially reduce the portion of derivatives that would be subject
to the limits of section 23A. In addition, the Board, along with the
FDIC and OCC, may significantly curtail potentially restrictive effects
of this provision by using their authority to exempt certain derivatives
transactions from the quantitative and qualitative limits of section
23A.3 11 Thus, agency action will ultimately determine whether this
provision of the Dodd-Frank Act affects any real change in large
banking organizations' derivatives dealing and trading.
Fourth, the Act tightened the collateral requirements of section
23A by mandating that banks maintain the appropriate level of
collateral at all times for covered transactions subject to
collateralization.359 Prior to the enactment of the Act, section 23A
required collateral only at the time the bank entered into the relevant
355. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
356. Stacy Kaper, Obscure Provision in Reg Reform May Have Big Impact, AM.
BANKER (Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/obscure-provision-in-reg-
reform-1015476-1.html (detailing the debate on the positive and negative effects of
adopting this amendment).
357. § 608(a)(4)(B), 124 Stat. at 1608-11. As a general matter, a "netting agreement" is
a contract that allows the parties to aggregate their mutual payment and settlement
obligations across various transactions and to offset payables against receivables. 12
U.S.C. § 4402(14)(A) (2006).
358. See infra notes 362-68 and accompanying text.
359. § 608(a), 124 Stat. at 1608-10.
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covered transaction." The new requirement aims to strengthen the
protection afforded to banks extending credit to their affiliates, by
ensuring that the value of collateral remains at the statutory level and
shielding the bank's security interest from fluctuations in market
prices of the assets used as collateral. The Act also expanded the
scope of covered transactions required to be collateralized to include
derivatives, securities borrowing and lending, and securities
repurchase agreements, to the extent such transactions create credit
exposure to affiliates.36 1
Finally, the Dodd-Frank Act imposed certain limitations on the
Board's previously broad authority to grant exemptions from the
requirements of section 23A.362 Under the new law, the OCC and the
FDIC are for the first time given statutory power to grant exemptions
from the requirements of section 23A to institutions under their
respective supervision.363 The Act explicitly prohibits the Board, the
OCC, and the FDIC from exempting any transaction or relationship
from section 23A, if the FDIC determines that such exemption
presents an unacceptable risk to the federal deposit insurance fund.3 64
Both the Board and the OCC are required to notify the FDIC of the
proposed exemption and give the FDIC sixty days to object in
writing, if it finds that the proposed exemption presents an
unacceptable risk to the federal deposit insurance fund.3 65
360. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c(c)(1) (2006) (amended 2010).
361. § 608(a), 124 Stat. at 1608-10. However, as noted above, the Act gives the Board
discretion to determine the manner in which a bank may take into account netting
agreements with its affiliates in calculating collateral requirements applicable to covered
derivatives transactions. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
362. § 608 (a), 124 Stat. at 1608-10.
363. 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c(f)(2) (West Supp. 2011). The OCC is the primary federal
regulator and supervisor of federally chartered banks and, upon dissolution of the OTS
mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, savings associations. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5412 (West
Supp. 2011) (detailing the transfer of powers to the OCC); Heidi M. Schooner, Private
Enforcement of Systemic Risk Regulation, 43 CREIGHTON L. REv. 993, 1005 n.45 (2010).
The FDIC is the primary federal regulator and supervisor of state chartered banks that are
not members of the Federal Reserve System. See Who is the FDIC?, FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbollindex.html (last updated Aug. 11, 2010).
364. § 608(a)(4)(A), 124 Stat. at 1609.
365. Id. The Dodd-Frank Act also amended section 23B of the Federal Reserve Act to
make the Board's authority to grant exemptions from that section's requirements subject
to the FDIC's determination that such exemptions do not present unacceptable risk to the
deposit insurance fund. See § 608(b), 124 Stat. at 1610.
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The Board still retains direct exemptive authority under section
23A with respect to member banks.3" In addition, the Act specifically
allows the Board to "issue regulations or interpretations" with respect
to certain aspects of the amended statute.3 67 However, in issuing
interpretations with respect to specific entities, the Board must act
jointly with the federal banking agency, either the OCC or the FDIC,
which directly regulates and supervises such entities.3 6
Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act has not eliminated the Board's ability
to grant exemptions from the requirements of section 23A, even
though it made those requirements more pervasive and stricter. The
Act merely divided the existing exemptive authority among three
federal banking agencies and put the FDIC at the center of the
exemption process by giving it an effective veto right over the Board's
and the OCC's decisions. On the one hand, this step dilutes the
Board's power and creates, at least potentially, structural checks and
balances designed to ensure the exemptions are more thoroughly
vetted. On the other hand, whether this more decentralized
exemptive process makes it more difficult for financial conglomerates
to pierce through the statutory wall in practice depends greatly on
how these agencies approach the issue and how independently, or
how uniformly, they make decisions in this area. One may easily
imagine a situation in which the FDIC fails to exercise its veto right as
assertively as it should, perhaps as a result of certain power dynamics
among the three agencies. Or, in the alternative, all three banking
agencies may share the same permissive approach to granting
exemptions from section 23A, driven by various ideological or
pragmatic reasons. It is worth noting, for instance, that the FDIC
concurred with most, if not all, of the Board's prior decisions to
exempt individual transactions from the quantitative and qualitative
limits of section 23A.369 Formalizing the FDIC's participation in the
process of granting exemptions from the statutory provision
366. § 608(a)(4)(A), 124 Stat. 1609-10. Any grant of exemption by the Board remains
subject to the requirement that the Board must find the proposed exemption to be "in the
public interest and consistent with the purposes of' section 23A. Id.
367. See, e.g., § 608(a)(4)(B), 124 Stat. at 1608-11 (giving the Board the authority to
make rules and issue interpretations with respect to the manner in which "netting
agreement[s] may be taken into account" when banks calculate various amounts in order
to determine whether their derivatives transactions with affiliates comply with the
statutory limits).
368. § 608(a)(4)(A), 124 Stat. at 1609-10.
369. Of course, it may be the case that the FDIC's concurrence with the Board's
exemption decisions was a mere formality and that the Board did not give the FDIC a
meaningful opportunity to weigh in on any of those decisions.
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traditionally administered and implemented by the Board may or
may not have the desired effect.
B. Searching for Alternatives: Rebuild on a New Foundation?
An examination of the Board's use of exemptive authority under
section 23A shows how often this venerable statutory firewall came
down in order to accommodate the business needs, or sheer survival,
of large financial conglomerates.3 70 It also provides important context
both for assessing the Dodd-Frank Act's approach to fixing the
statutory wall and for discussing broader regulatory design issues the
Act failed to address.
During the recent crisis, the Board's strategy of dismantling the
section 23A wall was a pragmatic and largely unavoidable response to
severe market dislocation. As with most crisis containment measures,
the Board's actions operated to suspend peacetime regulation of bank
affiliate transactions.3 7 1 However, such suspension inevitably creates a
serious moral hazard issue and threatens to undermine the legitimacy
and efficacy of the regulatory regime after the crisis, unless followed
by regulatory reforms aimed at preventing future crises and
redesigning peacetime regulation to address the causes of the prior
failure.372 This is a particularly salient issue with respect to section
23A, given the massive nature of its "suspension" during the latest
crisis. If a fundamental expectation built into the operation of section
23A is that regulators always remove the statutory limitations on
bank affiliate transactions in crises, that expectation will shape the
long-term incentives for financial institutions' risk-taking in ways
370. One could argue that focusing on the exemptions from section 23A tends to
downplay the fact that, in the majority of cases, the statute may be successfully operating
to prevent risky affiliate transactions. A relatively low number of exemptions in this area,
given the high volumes of affiliate transactions, may be viewed as proof of such success.
There may be some validity to this counterargument, especially since it is impossible to
ascertain whether, and under what circumstances, the Board actually denied any requests
for exemptions. However, the fact that there have not been more exemptions during the
period under examination may also be a sign of successful regulatory arbitrage on the part
of financial institutions. For instance, the fact that Regulation W excluded derivatives
from "covered transactions" allowed banks to provide a great deal of leverage to their
affiliates without regard to the quantitative limits of section 23A. In addition, as some
observers note, the limitations on affiliate transactions are generally easy to evade and
"difficult to enforce." See Wilmarth, supra note 55, at 456.
371. See Gelpern, supra note 345, at 1057 (arguing that "suspending regulations" in the
crisis containment stage "is neither good, nor bad, but [simply] unavoidable").
372. Id. at 1051 (arguing that "regulation, prevention and resolution" measures in
times of calm seek to establish long-term incentives for market actors).
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contrary to the legislative intent. It is also highly likely to become a
self-fulfilling prophecy.
The Dodd-Frank Act misses the target in this respect. It purports
to expand the scope of the existing limitations on bank affiliate
transactions but does not change the fundamental dynamics of the
regulatory decision making in times of crisis.3 73 Even assuming that
the Act's provisions will technically strengthen the statutory firewall
in times of calm, nothing in the Act guarantees that this newly
enhanced firewall will withstand the next systemic crisis.3 74 Dispersing
the exemptive authority among several agencies is not likely to
provide such a guarantee. In times of crisis, when systemic risk
concerns drive all policy choices, it would not matter which agency
actually makes the individual decision or whether that decision is
made by a single agency or collectively. Moreover, since the Dodd-
Frank Act expanded and reinforced the Board's authority and
responsibility for systemic risk regulation,375 the Board may be even
more likely to prioritize that regulatory duty, even if it involves
dismantling the new and improved section 23A firewall. In addition,
the Dodd-Frank Act makes the heads of the OCC, FDIC, and the
Board the members of the Financial Stability Oversight Council
373. One could potentially counter that point by arguing that other provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act-such as the creation of the new systemic risk regulatory structure or
new comprehensive resolution regime-would operate to minimize the possibility of such
a situation arising in the first place. However, whether or not these or any other reforms
are effective in minimizing the risk of a major systemic failure remains to be seen.
374. It is also doubtful that the Dodd-Frank Act amendments to section 23A can make
the statutory provisions more resilient and effective during ordinary times. As recent
experience shows, in periods of economic growth, when the financial industry is generating
steady profits and financial innovation seems to have only positive effects, regulators tend
to be less vigilant and more inclined to lift statutory restrictions to accommodate financial
institutions' quest for higher profits. See Jeffery N. Gordon & Christopher Muller,
Avoiding Eight-Alarm Fires in the Political Economy of Systemic Risk Management 25-26
(European Corporate Governance Grp., Working Paper No. 277, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1553880#%23. There is little basis to
think that this pro-cyclical pattern will change in the near future. See id. at 25. Devising
truly effective counter-cyclical regulatory and supervisory mechanisms is notoriously
difficult, and it is unclear whether the current efforts to come up with such techniques will
succeed. See, e.g., Raghuram Rajan, Eric Gleacher Distinguished Serv. Professor of Fin.,
Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., Address at the Credit Markets Symposium: Cycle Proof
Regulation (Apr. 2-3, 2009), available at http://www.richmondfed.org/conferences-and
_events/banking/2009/pdf/cms 2009 rajan.pdf (citing the ability of firms to avoid
complying with regulatory requirements).
375. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 161(a)-(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1420-21 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5361
(West Supp. 2011)) (granting the Board the authority to regulate and supervise
systemically important nonbank financial companies).
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("FSOC"), the new systemic risk regulator.76 Charged with this
regulatory task, all of these agencies may be more inclined to place
systemic stability concerns above the more narrow purposes of
section 23A. The Act's purported solutions to the fundamental
problem of redefining the regulators' exemptive authority under
section 23A do not provide much guidance in this respect.
Given the inherently unsettling dynamics of crisis containment, it
may be far more important and realistic to focus on ensuring effective
functioning of the section 23A firewall during peacetime, before a
crisis inevitably alters regulatory calculus. This is precisely what the
Dodd-Frank Act aims to accomplish. As discussed above, the
practical impact of the amendments to section 23A is difficult to
ascertain. However, the Act also raises broader potential issues with
respect to the operation and enforcement of section 23A.
Thus, the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act may lead to a spike in
financial institutions' requests for exemptions from the limitations of
section 23A. The inclusion of derivatives as "covered transactions" is
the most obvious potential reason for large financial conglomerates to
seek individual exemptions from the revamped requirements of
section 23A.377 New statutory and regulatory restrictions on banks'
ability to engage in proprietary trading, deal in OTC derivatives, or
conduct certain other activities are likely to force FHCs to move most
of their high-margin, high-risk operations into nonbank
subsidiaries. 378 By forcing financial conglomerates to relocate the
riskiest business activities from banks to nonbanking entities, the new
financial regulation framework may further elevate the profile and
legal significance of section 23A and, in particular, increase the
importance of individualized exemptions from its operation for a
variety of affiliate transactions.
376. § 111, 124 Stat. at 1392-94 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5321 (West Supp. 2011))
(establishing the FSOC).
377. In fact, there is strong reason to believe that the Board's decision in Regulation W
not to include derivatives in the definition of a "covered transaction" was one of the main
reasons why the Board did not get inundated with requests for exemptions from section
23A limitations in the pre-crisis period.
378. Stricter capital adequacy rules under the new Basel III regime may create further
incentive for such internal risk arbitrage, although it is extremely difficult to predict how
that regime would operate in practice. See International Regulatory Framework for Banks
(Basel III), BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm (last
visited Apr. 29, 2011); N.M., Third Time's the Charm?, ECONOMIST (Sept. 13, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/09/baseliii (arguing that Basel III
may increase the incentive for banks to engage in capital arbitrage).
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In this context, it becomes even more crucial to address the
fundamental questions that the Dodd-Frank Act failed to address. In
light of our post-crisis wisdom, what is the proper role of section 23A
in the U.S. system of financial regulation? How important are the
underlying policy goals of section 23A? Is section 23A well-suited to
achieve these policy goals, or are there more effective mechanisms for
accomplishing them in today's complex financial system? In other
words, it is necessary to revisit the normative foundation on which the
entire section 23A regime rests and to reevaluate our policy priorities
in light of what we have learned about the operation and the failings
of that regime in the past decade.
If the twin purposes of section 23A-protecting U.S. banks from
excessive risk exposure to affiliates and preventing transfer of federal
subsidy outside the depository system379-are still important, or
arguably even more important today, it is vital to resolve the key
tension in the operation of the statute, which, despite its high profile
and substantive importance, is so often and so easily overridden by
the regulatory exercise of exemptive authority.
One potential solution to resolving this tension would be to
eliminate, or severely restrict, the regulators' authority to grant
exemptions from the requirements of section 23A. As discussed
above, the Dodd-Frank Act purports to do that by eliminating the
Board's monopoly on granting exemptions from section 23A and
giving the FDIC a veto power.380 However, overcoming powerful
incentives to suspend the operation of the statute, both in moments of
systemic instability and in the midst of market boom, requires much
stricter limits on regulatory discretion. To be meaningful, the
agencies' ability to grant exemptions, by order or regulation, would
have to be confined to a very narrow spectrum of situations clearly
defined in the statute. The vague current standard-that the agency
must determine that granting an exemption would serve public
interest and be consistent with the purposes of section 23A 381-would
have to be replaced by a more specific set of conditions under which
the agencies would be allowed to grant exemptions.
Despite its attractiveness, this approach has a serious potential
drawback: it may be unfeasible and even counterproductive,
especially in situations where regulators are faced with difficult and
very important substantive choices between competing policy goals.
379. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 362-68 and accompanying text.
381. See Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c(f)(2) (West 2001 & Supp. 2011).
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When the purposes of section 23A conflict with other more pressing
goals such as containment of a rapidly escalating credit crisis, it may
be vital for the regulators to have sufficient flexibility to relax or even
remove statutory limits in specific situations. Thus, in the end, the
ultimate question is one of substance rather than procedure. Striking
the right balance with respect to regulators' exemptive authority
under section 23A involves weighing the relative significance of
various substantive policy objectives, which is an inherently difficult
task.382
An alternative approach to resolving the tension in the operation
of section 23A is to redefine its role in the U.S. system of bank
regulation. This solution would require renouncing the notion that
section 23A is the "Magna Carta" of U.S. banking law," the principal
statute that protects the safety and integrity of the entire U.S.
depository system, and recalibrating our view of what it can, and
cannot, achieve.
If strictly applied and enforced, the quantitative and qualitative
requirements of section 23A can limit banks' potential exposure to
their affiliates' credit risk and limit the transfer of federal subsidy
outside the depository system. Limitations on affiliate transactions
can also significantly curtail potential conflicts of interest in credit
allocation. Minimizing the danger of unfair allocation of credit as a
result of banks steering funds toward their affiliates has always been
an important element of the statutory design. 8" Moreover, by
restricting the ability of nonbank entities to benefit from affiliation
with insured depository institutions, section 23A can potentially help
to control the unlimited growth of the shadow banking system.
Diligent enforcement of section 23A can have a meaningful impact on
firms' decisions to affiliate in the first place, as fewer opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage and indirect access to federal subsidy would
make such affiliation potentially less attractive. From this perspective,
the real promise of section 23A in the post-GLB Act world is its
382. It is worth emphasizing that this is a difficult, if not impossible, choice to make in
the abstract. It also raises legitimate questions about the specific quantitative thresholds
enshrined in section 23A: Why are ten and twenty percent of a bank's capital and surplus
the magic limits that cannot be sacrificed easily, even in a crisis? Assuming there is a
strong basis for reiterating the importance of the main purposes of section 23A, it may be
much more difficult to justify these specific numerical criteria. Eliminating these
thresholds, by simply prohibiting all extensions of credit by banks to their nonbank
affiliates, would remove this difficulty but would not resolve the problem of regulatory
discretion.
383. See COP REPORT, supra note 13, at 24.
384. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 8, at 427.
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potential ability to serve as a key mechanism in reducing incentives
for excessive conglomeration in the financial services sector.
However, as this Article shows, the Board consistently failed to
recognize and realize this hidden potential of the section 23A regime.
The Board's extensive use of its exemptive authority, especially
during the years preceding the recent financial crisis, effectively
undermined the statute's ability to restrict the growth of shadow
banking and discourage arbitrage-driven conglomeration.
Ironically, in the post-GLB Act world, this permissive regulatory
approach was combined with the grand notion of section 23A as the
principal firewall keeping banks safe from risks generated by their
nonbank affiliates. The story this Article has laid out strongly
suggests that this notion helped to create a false sense of security with
respect to broader systemic risk issues. In reality, section 23A has not
been very effective in meeting its officially stated policy objectives
primarily because of a fundamental design flaw. The statute relies
exclusively on imposing quantitative and qualitative limitations on
bank transactions with affiliates as the method of achieving its
objectives. As the prior discussion shows, such limitations are
relatively easily and frequently lifted by regulatory action. In
addition, on its face, the statute conspicuously lacks systemic focus
and operates purely on a microprudential, individual entity level,
which undermines its ability to safeguard the U.S. depository system
in today's complex and interconnected financial marketplace.
The key to understanding why section 23A was designed this
way, and why it largely failed to deliver on its alleged promise, is the
fact that it was never supposed to promise that much. At the time of
its enactment in 1933, the statute's approach was based on the key
premise that none of banks' nonbank affiliates would actually engage
in securities dealing or other financial activities that Congress viewed
at the time as unacceptably risky for federally insured commercial
banks.8 Originally, section 23A was not designed to be the single
most important statutory mechanism keeping banks, and federal
deposit insurance funds, safe from risky capital markets activities.
Neither was it meant to be the main statutory provision safeguarding
the fundamental principle of separation of banking and commerce. In
1933, Congress assigned those functions primarily to the Glass-
Steagall Act.386 Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act was an
385. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
386. Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), repealed in part by Financial Services
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ancillary provision, an additional protection applicable to a much
narrower set of transactions between banks and their permissible
affiliates, which at the time excluded investment banks, hedge funds,
derivatives dealers, and most of the rest of the financial world. It was
the interplay between these statutes that created a coherent legal
regime. After the partial repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999, section 23A
was propelled to new prominence as its "successor" statute, in the
sense of preserving the integrity of a federally insured depository
system.387 The problem is that, if quantitative limits on bank affiliate
transactions were not designed to fulfill such a complex and
important policy objective back in 1933, they certainly could not be
expected to meet that challenge in the twenty-first century.
And that leaves us facing another dilemma. If we scale back our
expectations of section 23A and stop relying on it as the centerpiece
legislation protecting banks from externally generated risks and
preventing the leakage of public subsidy outside the banking system,
we need to look for other, more viable alternatives. We also have to
admit that U.S. bank regulation does not currently provide a
functioning mechanism for preserving the wall between federally
insured commercial banks and "shadow banks" or, more broadly,
between banking and commerce.
Acknowledging this sobering reality is the necessary first step
toward a potential solution. One such potential solution may be
returning to the old Glass-Steagall principle of institutional
separation among different classes of financial institutions, based on
their business and risk profile. In the run-up to the enactment of the
Dodd-Frank Act, the idea of resurrecting the Glass-Steagall Act in its
original form had gained significant popularity." Of course, a
complete reconstitution of the old regulatory regime may not be the
most desirable choice in the context of the twenty-first century
financial marketplace. Nevertheless, that does not preclude us from
thinking about devising an alternative regulatory system, in which
certain financial institutions (including federally insured banks),
whose safety and soundness are critical for ensuring a steady supply
of credit to support productive functioning of the national economy,
are expressly disallowed from affiliating with other classes of
Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
387. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
388. See, e.g., Allison Vekshin & James Sterngold, War on Wall Street as Congress Sees
Returning to Glass-Steagall, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 27, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aeQNTmo2vHpo.
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institutions engaged in potentially high-risk and complex financial
dealings. After all, if it is so difficult to ensure effective policing of
affiliate transactions, it makes perfect sense to prohibit publicly
subsidized depository institutions from affiliating with any entities
whose potentially risky activities endanger their safety and soundness.
Choosing how and where to draw the line between acceptable and
unacceptable risks would require serious deliberation and analysis,
which goes far beyond the scope of this Article.
Of course, this approach rests on a fundamental assumption that
building statutory firewalls to protect depository institutions from the
rest of the financial system remains a relevant and critically important
policy goal in today's financial markets. However, one can challenge
that assumption and argue for a radically different approach to
safeguarding the depository system. For instance, it may be more
effective to manage the safety and soundness of depository
institutions through legal and regulatory mechanisms aimed at
ensuring stability of the entire financial system. Technology-driven
innovation, complexity, and the global interconnectedness of today's
financial markets elevate systemic risk prevention to the very top of
regulatory priorities. These factors also make it increasingly difficult
to maintain the fiction that the safety and soundness of the banking
system are neatly separable from the safety and soundness of the
nonbanking financial sector. Taking this approach one step further,
one could advocate adopting the universal banking model, which
would allow commercial banks to engage in an unlimited variety of
financial, and even commercial, activities.389 Legalizing universal
banking, among other things, would render section 23A irrelevant
and would have to rely instead on a conceptually different set of legal
and regulatory safeguards against systemic risk.
There may be a broad range of potential regulatory design
options that fall between the revival of the Glass-Steagall principle of
organizational separation, on the one hand, and the acceptance of
universal banking, on the other. However, regardless of the merits of
any particular proposal, the most important first step toward a
solution is to face the complex reality of the existing section 23A
regime and its unfulfilled promise.
389. It may be argued that, in reality, both the industry and the regulators have already
accepted the existence of de facto universal banks in the United States.
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CONCLUSION
As this Article has demonstrated, section 23A of the Federal
Reserve Act largely failed to fulfill its stated purposes. Since the
partial repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, it has been officially
portrayed as the principal statutory firewall keeping banks safe and
preventing them from being used as a cheap, publicly subsidized
source of financing for potentially high-risk business activities of their
nonbank affiliates. However, an examination of the Board's use of
exemptive power under section 23A in recent years exposes serious
cracks in this statutory firewall and calls into question the efficacy of
the current regime governing bank affiliate transactions.
Furthermore, by creating a false sense of security with respect to the
safety and soundness of the depository system in the face of financial
conglomeration, the section 23A firewall potentially hinders the much
needed debate on the future of financial regulation reform in the
United States.
